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Much research and theory has suggested that implicit (versus explicit) impressions of 
other people may be particularly difficult to reverse once formed, as they may be relatively 
insulated from propositional thinking.  Furthermore, the revision of negative first implicit 
impressions has been considered particularly difficult to achieve, due to the dominance of 
negative information in impression formation.  I demonstrate across multiple lines of work that 
negative implicit impressions can be updated when new information provides a reinterpretation 
of the basis of the initial negative impression, overturning the negative construal of earlier 
learning.  
In a first set of studies (1a-6), people who formed a negative implicit first impression of a 
new person based on seemingly bad behavior – breaking into and damaging the homes of his 
neighbors – significantly reversed their implicit impressions after learning that he was actually 
saving children trapped in a fire. The studies isolate reinterpretation as the mechanism of change 
through comparison to other positive behaviors that do not reinterpret the earlier story and 
mediation of the effect through self-reported extent of reinterpretation, and show that revision 
endures days after the initial study session. 
A second line of work (Studies 7-12) examines revision through reinterpretation under a 
broader set of conditions and domains, to begin to establish the more general applicability and 
  
utility of this mechanism for implicit revision.  Studies 7-8 examine the process components of 
reinterpretation-driven change more closely with the aim of identifying a broader family of 
strategies for revision.  Study 9 assesses whether reinterpretation can still reverse implicit 
impressions two days after formation of the first impression.  Study 10 examines reinterpretation 
in the domain of public opinion on big-game hunting, while Studies 11 and 12 test the effect of 
race and gender of the target on the effectiveness of reinterpretation, respectively.  
A final line of work examines the automaticity features of reinterpretation-driven 
updating.  Additional analyses of the implicit measures reported in earlier sections show 
distributional features that have not been reported previously in the literature (bimodality), and 
then aim to establish the robustness of revision effects to potential explicit influences on the 
implicit measures and elimination of the unusual distributions. Further studies supported the 
implicit nature of revision, demonstrating a lack of online participant awareness of their implicit 
responses (Studies 13-14), persistence of revision effects under taxing distraction (Study 15), and 
replication of implicit updating with heightened warnings to follow task instructions and 
elimination of the anomalously bimodal distributions (Studies 16-17). 
Collectively, these three sets of findings demonstrate that negative implicit first 
impressions can be reversed by a reinterpretation of the information upon which a first 
impression is based, and that this process may contribute to impression revision in a variety of 
domains. 
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CHAPTER I. Introduction 
 For Richard Jewell, the tide of public opinion changed swiftly.  On July 27, 1996, tragedy 
struck the Summer Olympics in Atlanta, Georgia: three pipe bombs detonated inside a backpack 
in Centennial Olympic Park, killing one bystander and maiming over 100 more. Yet, as often 
occurs in the face of disaster, an ordinary person donned the hero’s mantle. Jewell, a security 
guard at the park, reportedly discovered the bomb mere minutes before detonation, leaving 
enough time for him to alert authorities and clear many innocent people out of the area, 
minimizing loss of life in the process. Jewell was hailed as a hero in the eyes of the nation and 
the world. 
 Within days, however, new developments in the investigation cut short the admiration.  
An anonymous source leaked that Jewell was the prime suspect of the investigation, and the 
heroic narrative in the media gave way to a more sinister one: Had Jewell planted the bomb 
himself, perhaps to allow himself to play a hero and win national commendation, or to throw 
investigators off his trail? Just as swiftly as the nation had sung his praises before, it now turned 
on him with potent vengeance, assailing his character, excavating his personal history for any 
tidbits that might fit the growing view of him as a radicalized terrorist, and following the every 
move of authorities as they interviewed Jewell’s friends and acquaintances. It would be 6 years 
before the saga would come to a close with the apprehension of the true culprit, Eric Rudolph, 
who carried out the attack in protest of tolerance for abortion in the United States that he viewed 
as unacceptable – long after the damage to Jewell’s reputation had been done. Jewell’s story, like 
so many others, is a testament to the complex problem we all face as we try to understand and 
evaluate other people – a process that requires a readiness to incorporate new information as it 
comes to light, and attention to the proper way to construe the meaning of the actions of others. 
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 Construal has a well-deserved place among the central concepts of psychology.  The idea 
that objective reality is less psychologically important than how an individual mind interprets 
and constructs the world is both foundational and enduring, and has deeply informed myriad 
areas of research, including persuasion (Greenwald, 1968), person impressions and attitudes 
(Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977; Srull & Wyer, 1979, 1980), judgment and decision making 
(Vallone, Griffin, Lin, & Ross, 1990), memory (Bartlett, 1932), morality (Graham, Haidt, & 
Nosek, 2009; Kreps & Monin, 2014; Schein & Gray, in press), emotion (Barrett, 2012; Blechert, 
Sheppes, Di Tella, Williams, & Gross, 2012; Brooks, 2014; Shurick et al., 2012), intergroup 
interaction (Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2008), motivation (Fujita & Carnevale, 2012), and more 
(Trope & Liberman, 2010).  The mind is built to construe the world, and construe it does, on 
scales both macro and micro: The quest to draw meaning from the world consumes years of 
devoted and concerted work on the part of painters, poets, writers, philosophers, scientists, and 
graduate students alike, but also is evident in every waking moment as the mind slices and dices 
raw input to effortlessly categorize, judge, and interact with an environment. The mind is so 
expert in such tasks that mountains of work now show that countless complex responses can be 
computed rapidly, with little effort, attention, and even awareness (e.g., Bargh, 1994; Bijleveld, 
Custers, & Aarts, 2009; Kiesel, Kunde, Pohl, Berner, & Hoffmann, 2009; Marien, Custers, 
Hassin, & Aarts, 2012; Pessiglione et al., 2009; Rule & Ambady, 2008; Tabak & Zayas, 2012; 
van Gaal et al., 2014; Willis & Todorov, 2006; see Dehaene, 2014; Hassin, 2013).  
 That the mind is a construal machine fits hand in glove with the perspective that at 
multiple levels, it is also a predictive one (Bar, 2011; Clark, 2013; Edelman, 2008; Gregory, 
1980; Huang & Rao, 2011; Helmholtz, 1860).  To survive and thrive requires efficient 
computation of the implications of external events and possible courses of action; construal acts 
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in the service of prediction.  It is largely for this reason that evaluation – the basic determination 
of goodness or badness, or likelihood of helping or harming – has been given such a central role 
as a fundamental process of cognition (Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009; Cacioppo, Gardner, & 
Berntson, 1999; Russell, 2003).  Given the importance of other people to the life of any 
individual, it will come as no surprise that much evidence shows that humans are adept at 
evaluating social targets. Inferences about other people are made rapidly and spontaneously, on a 
variety of dimensions, and even outside of conscious awareness (e.g., Cunningham et al., 2004; 
Todorov, Olivola, Dotsch, & Mende-Siedlecki, 2015; Todorov & Uleman, 2002, 2003, 2004; 
Whalen et al.,1998; Willis & Todorov, 2006).  
 For all of the importance of accurately drawing actionable inferences about other people, 
a basic question arises: How well does our inferential machinery actually serve us?  How 
accurate are our immediate responses, in the moment, to other people – responses that prepare us 
to approach or avoid?  And, most pertinent to the present work: How effectively can our 
responses to others be updated in light of new information that we learn over time? 
  There is much work establishing conditions under which people fail to update erroneous 
impressions – especially negative impressions – of other people.  Perceivers may simply avoid 
stimuli that are viewed as negative, thereby never having an opportunity to encounter 
disconfirming information, but also minimizing risk of harm for their caution (Eiser, Fazio, 
Stafford, & Prescott, 2003; Eiser, Stafford, & Fazio, 2008; Fazio, Eiser, & Shook, 2004; Fazio, 
Pietri, Rocklage, & Shook, 2015). Work on self-fulfilling prophecies has similarly shown that an 
initial impression can bring about its own confirmation by eliciting corresponding behavior from 
its target, such as when an expectation that someone will be warm and attractive, or hostile and 
aggressive, elicits such behavior through one’s own actions toward the person (Chen & Bargh, 
 4 
1997; Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977). More generally, confirmation biases are a well-
studied quirk of human reasoning that can lead perceivers to selectively seek out or notice 
information that fits with their expectations (Darley & Fazio, 1980).  
 Though it is clear that people may fall short of accuracy in their perceptions of others 
when relevant information is ambiguous, mixed, or risky to attain, one might expect that a mind 
adept at navigating the complex social world would be capable of integrating new information 
about other people when it is available, clear, and seemingly compelling. Yet this expectation 
begets a puzzle, for decades of research and theory in social-cognitive psychology have crafted a 
picture of the mind at odds with itself. This research suggests that although many people may be 
outwardly egalitarian, fair-minded, and quick to incorporate new information in their explicit 
(i.e., intentional) judgments about other people, those same individuals can show stereotype-
laden, prejudice-based, intractable responses to others in their implicit (i.e., unintentional) 
responses (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006; McConnell, Rydell, Strain, 
& Mackie, 2008; Nosek, 2007; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002; Rydell & McConnell, 2006; 
Rydell, McConnell, Strain, Claypool, & Hugenberg, 2007). Stemming largely from dual-systems 
(Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Smith & DeCoster, 2000) and dual-process (Fazio, 2007; 
Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 2011; Petty et al., 2006) accounts of cognition, much of this 
work has held, and found, that while it is relatively easy to set aside an initial negative 
impression in explicit judgments, it is more difficult to do so in implicit reactions (McConnell et 
al., 2008; Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Gawronski, Deutsch, Mbirkou, Seibt, & Strack, 2008). A 
chief implication of this set of findings and perspective is that people may be incapable of 
completely integrating compelling, accurate information into their impressions of another person, 
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leaving their implicit responses yoked to some extent to discredited, rejected information that 
they have explicitly discarded. 
 In the present work, I critically reexamine the potential for negative implicit impressions 
of other people to be rapidly updated in light of new information. The investigation will argue 
that one potential mechanism through which updating could occur – reinterpretation of earlier 
learning – has not previously been thoroughly tested as a potentially successful route of implicit 
impression updating. After presenting a number of studies that provide evidence for the basic 
efficacy of reinterpretation-driven reversal of initially negative implicit first impressions, I will 
move toward investigations of boundary conditions, mechanisms, generalizations, and 
implications of this form of revision, as well as a closer examination of the automaticity features 
of such updating.  In so doing, this work aims to begin to build a picture of a mind that can 
update to reflect a new understanding of the social world, even at an implicit level. 
Outline of subsequent chapters 
Chapter II 
 In this first central chapter, I present a reproduction of a paper published in 2015 with 
coauthor Melissa J. Ferguson in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, titled “Can 
we undo our first impressions? The role of reinterpretation in reversing implicit evaluations.”  
Across seven studies (1a-6), this paper develops my initial argument that reinterpretation is a 
largely untested, yet theoretically promising, route through which even initially negative implicit 
impressions of other people could be durably and quickly reversed.  The opening sections of the 
paper review the substantial body of literature on implicit impression change, introducing the 
foundational theories and studies that have been taken as evidence for the comparably slow rate 
of change to which implicit social responses are largely believed to be restricted.  The 
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introductory sections of the paper also review the dual-mode perspectives that have both 
informed and been informed by the aforementioned work, together with recent theoretical 
treatments that leave more room open for rapid implicit updating (e.g., De Houwer, 2014).  
 Turning to the experiments, the initial three studies (Studies 1a, 1b, 2) in the paper aim to 
establish the basic possibility of rapid reversal of negative implicit first impressions and 
demonstrate that only new positive information that does provide a reinterpretation of the earlier 
negative details, and not positive information that fails to do so, results in the reversal of implicit 
evaluations toward the impression target.  These initial studies also introduce the novel 
theoretical paradigm (the “Francis West” story) that will be featured in most of the studies within 
this package. 
 In subsequent studies, Chapter II will further corroborate a reinterpretation-based account 
of the demonstrated implicit revision effects by showing that a strong cognitive distraction 
curtails revision even though participants encode the new, reinterpreting information well 
enough to identify it later (Study 3), and by showing that revision is mediated by self-reported 
reinterpretation but not by self-reported general extensiveness of deliberation and speed of 
thinking (Studies 4-5). These studies help to inform both the mechanism and operating 
conditions (cognitive efficiency) of reinterpretation-driven change. A final study in Chapter II 
(Study 6) examines the “meaningfulness” of the revision by assessing whether it endures for 
three days after the end of the first part of the experiment, finding that this revision is durable 
over that time period, rather than an ephemeral deviation that rapidly reverts to the initial 
impression. 
Chapter III 
 7 
 After demonstrating the initial revision effect and pinpointing reinterpretation as the 
critical feature of the new information and cognitive mechanism underlying this reversal, I turn 
in Chapter III to a deeper investigation of the mechanism, boundary conditions, and 
generalizability of implicit revision through reinterpretation.  The studies in this chapter feature a 
mix of published and unpublished work. 
 In Studies 7-8, I aim to more deeply conceptualize and model the constituent processes 
through which reinterpretation may enact implicit revision by construing reinterpretation as a 
potential member of a broader family of strategies for change that combine negation of an earlier 
impression with its simultaneous replacement with a new one, drawing inspiration from various 
prominent theories of implicit updating as reviewed in Chapter II.  Study 7 approaches this 
analysis experimentally, including multiple conditions meant to isolate these component steps 
and compare reinterpretation to each, as well as their combination.  In the next experiment 
(Study 8), I supplement the experimental isolation of these processing components with a 
multinomial process modeling approach designed to examine which constituent processes that 
occur during the implicit measure itself are affected by reinterpretation, and compare the 
parameters fit by the model between the different conditions (Batchelder & Riefer, 1999; Conrey 
et al., 2005; Jacoby, 1991; Payne, 2001; Payne et al., 2010; Sherman et al., 2008). 
 In Study 9, I present a paper published with coauthor Melissa J. Ferguson in the Journal 
of Experimental Social Psychology in 2017, titled “Reversing implicit first impressions through 
reinterpretation after a two-day delay.” This study, with its accompanying introduction and 
discussion, examine the question of whether reinterpretation can be effective in reversing 
implicit first impressions after a larger time delay (two days) than that used in the previous 
studies in this package and in most other work in this field (a single lab session). The principal 
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finding of this work – that reinterpretation was still able to reverse implicit evaluations after the 
delay, and across varying levels of participant recall for the story details provided in the earlier 
session – is a critical first test of the broader utility of reinterpretation as a mechanism of implicit 
change toward real-world targets. The study also affords an opportunity to begin to connect work 
on implicit impression change with broader trends in the memory literature on how 
representations can be updated after initial formation with relevant new information (Lee, Nader, 
& Schiller, 2017).  
 The subsequent studies in this chapter continue to shift toward examining the 
generalizability and utility of reinterpretation-based updating of implicit impressions. In Study 
10, I present work testing whether reinterpretation presented in the form of an argument made 
during a podcast episode on a controversial program for funding conservation efforts to preserve 
endangered species in Africa – specifically, auctioning off the rights for big-game hunters to 
legally stalk and kill individual members of the species – is effective in updating implicit 
impressions of an associated person who is initially viewed in a negative light (a big-game 
hunter). Additionally, the study measured self-reported reinterpretation to bolster the argument 
that although the results revealed (expectedly) weaker implicit revision than that observed in 
earlier studies, reinterpretation played a mediating role in the change that was observed.  This 
study thus begins to build the argument that reinterpretation may represent a more broadly 
applicable strategy for achieving revision of implicit evaluations toward real targets. 
 Study 11 examines the generalizability of implicit revision through reinterpretation in 
another way, by examining whether reinterpretation is still successful when visual features of the 
target person (which are often thought to be more preferentially impactful on implicit responses; 
McConnell et al., 2008; Rule, Tskhay, Freeman, & Ambady, 2014) identify the person as a 
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member of a group (African Americans) stereotyped in a way consistent with the negative (to-
be-discredited) first impression. The results find revision toward the target person to be robust, 
but that updating does not generalize to other members of the same group, thereby showing 
evidence for a novel form of indirect implicit bias. 
 Finally, Study 12 closes the chapter by observing how implicit impressions respond to 
milder, more mundane revelations that earlier expectations about a person were wrong. 
Specifically, the study takes up a finding reported by Cao and Banaji (2016) that counter-
stereotypic information about the professions of two individuals (that a woman named Elizabeth 
is a doctor and a man named Jonathan is a nurse) only reduced, but did not reverse, implicit 
gender-based stereotyping of the careers of these individuals.  Study 12 adds complexity to that 
finding by demonstrating an important difference between measures in the extent of implicit 
stereotyping after such minimal individuating information, and begins to integrate the work with 
the other studies in this package by finding evidence that factors that increase the depth of 
processing and psychological realism of the new information – immersion and self-relevance – 
may hold the key to increasing the efficacy of such minimal, commonplace expectancy 
violations for enacting reversals of implicit impressions. 
Chapter IV 
 In the final body chapter of this work, I present a series of supplementary analyses and 
additional studies to investigate the implicit nature of the revision effects reported herein, other 
conditions of automaticity (such as efficiency) under which these effects can emerge, and the 
robustness of the revision effects to task alterations meant to motivate and facilitate greater 
participant control over their responses.  
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 The chapter begins with a discussion of prior work on the implicitness of the primary 
implicit measure used (in some form) in most of the studies in this package.  It then presents 
evidence for a previously unknown feature of the distributions of data produced by the measures 
in many of the studies in this package that re-raises the question of whether (most of) the 
responses on this measure are truly implicit, which is followed by new analyses of many of the 
preceding studies that are intended to find evidence for whether the more unusual data points in 
the prior studies were generated through explicit responding rather than implicit mechanisms. I 
also test whether effects previously reported in this package are robust to the exclusion of such 
data points and whether the unusual data can be accommodated by process models of this 
measure in a manner that does not discard the assumption of implicitness.  
 After the new analyses, Chapter IV turns to a set of additional experiments meant to 
further explore these questions. In Studies 13-14, two different implicit revision effects from 
earlier studies (one from Chapter II and one from Chapter III) are replicated under conditions 
that make it easy and encouraged for participants to avoid giving explicit judgments during the 
implicit task. The findings additionally support the conclusion that participants are not even 
aware, in the moment, of the critical responses that the task is measuring. In Study 15, a highly 
distracting and taxing secondary task is added to the implicit measure that partially succeeds in 
eliminating the distributional anomalies and provides another examination of the efficiency of 
implicit revision under cognitive load (see also Study 3). Finally, Studies 16-17 will show that 
when participants are encouraged more blatantly to avoid explicit influence on the implicit 
measure and given more visually variable stimuli to judge during the task, the distributional 
anomalies are eliminated, and the critical revision effect is replicated.1   
                                                
1 All studies were supported by a National Science Foundation Graduation Research Fellowship. 
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Chapter II. Reversal of Novel Implicit First Impressions2 
 
Abstract 
 
Little work has examined whether implicit evaluations can be effectively “undone” after 
learning new revelations. Across 7 experiments, participants fully reversed their implicit 
evaluation of a novel target person after reinterpreting earlier information.  Revision occurred 
across multiple implicit evaluation measures (Experiments 1a and 1b), and only when the new 
information prompted a reinterpretation of prior learning versus did not (Experiment 2).  The 
updating required active consideration of the information, as it emerged only with at least 
moderate cognitive resources (Experiment 3).  Self-reported reinterpretation predicted 
(Experiment 4) and mediated (Experiment 5) revised implicit evaluations beyond the separate 
influence of how thoughtfully participants considered the new information in general. Finally, 
the revised evaluations were durable three days later (Experiment 6). We discuss how these 
results inform existing theoretical models, and consider implications for future research. 
 
Key Words: implicit evaluations; attitudes; reinterpretation; AMP; IAT; revision; relevance 
 
  
                                                
2 Published as: Mann, T. C., & Ferguson, M. J. (2015). Can we undo our first impressions? The 
role of reinterpretation in reversing implicit evaluations. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 108(6), 823–849. http://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000021 © American Psychological 
Association, 2015. This paper is not the copy of record and may not exactly replicate the 
authoritative document published in the APA journal. Please do not copy or cite without author's 
permission. The final article is available, upon publication, at: 
http://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000021 
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  What happens when our initial information about someone turns out to be wrong?  Can 
we change how we feel about someone who upon further examination is nothing like our first 
impressions?  Consider the case of a member of the Nazi party in the late 1930’s who took over a 
formerly-Jewish owned business to produce supplies for the German war effort, employing Jews 
as a cheap source of labor.  Learning such details about this person would lead most people to 
detest him for enabling the Germans during the Holocaust.  In the end, however, it turned out 
that this man – Oskar Schindler – used all his money and connections to keep his Jewish workers 
from being killed, deliberately producing essentially zero materials for the war effort in his 
factory and ending up destitute from his efforts to protect his workers (Crowe, 2004; Steinhouse, 
1994).  As such, Schindler represents a dramatic case of an everyday idea: that people sometimes 
act with ulterior motives which, when revealed, prompt us to reinterpret their earlier actions.  In 
terms of one of the most basic ways we assess the world around us – evaluation – how do 
revelations such as these influence us?  Are we able to “undo” our first impressions and change 
our minds about the goodness or badness of others?    
 The ease of this kind of change may depend on which kind of evaluation is meant: 
explicit or implicit. Explicit evaluations are those measured directly, such as when someone 
endorses a statement about preference (e.g., “I like her.”).  Explicit evaluations seem to be quite 
capable of reflecting newly learned truths that override earlier information: one can simply 
choose to reject an old evaluation and endorse a new one (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006).  
Implicit evaluations are those measured indirectly, which means instead of asking people how 
they feel about a stimulus, the researcher infers it by assessing whether the perception of that 
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stimulus facilitates responses to a different, unrelated stimulus.3 As it turns out, implicit 
evaluations are not as easily reversed when prior impressions are found to be false (e.g., Boucher 
& Rydell, 2012; Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006; Peters & Gawronski, 2011; see also Wilson, 
Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000).  This work suggests that our implicit first impressions may be 
relatively hard to undo, persisting even after we learn new information that should override them 
(see also Rule, Tskhay, Freeman, & Ambady, 2014).  
In the present work, we offer a fresh look at this question of whether and how implicit 
evaluations can be updated to reflect newly learned truths.  Given that implicit evaluations 
uniquely shape and predict behavior (Cameron, Brown-Iannuzzi, & Payne, 2012; Ferguson, 
2007; Greenwald, Banaji, & Nosek, in press; Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009; 
McNulty, Olson, Meltzer, & Shaffer, 2013; Perugini, Richetin, & Zogmaister, 2010; Towles-
Schwen & Fazio, 2006; cf. Oswald, Mitchell, Blanton, Jaccard, & Tetlock, 2013), it is important 
to know whether – or when – they can be reconciled with one’s reasoning about what is true of 
the world.  In what follows, we describe recent findings that speak to this question, and review 
what contemporary models of evaluations would predict about this possibility.  We then discuss 
a heretofore little-examined possibility: that, as in the case of Schindler, when new information 
forces a reinterpretation of the prior impression, reversal of implicit evaluations may be possible.   
Can implicit evaluations be undone? 
 Implicit evaluations were initially assumed to be difficult to change, let alone completely 
“undo.”  They were thought of as the products of long-term exposure to information in one’s 
                                                
3 Throughout this paper, we use the term implicit evaluation because it refers to effects – that is, 
indirectly-measured unintentional evaluative responses. The term implicit attitude, while often 
used in this literature, is ambiguous in that it might refer either to behavioral effects or the mental 
constructs posited to explain them (see discussion in De Houwer, Gawronski, & Barnes-Holmes, 
2013). 
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environment (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) and were assumed to persist in memory even after new 
attitudes formed (Wilson et al., 2000). More recent work, however, suggests that implicit 
evaluations can sometimes be altered. For example, some have argued that implicit evaluations 
are enabled by associative processes that entail the spreading of activation through networks 
based on spatial or temporal proximity, or semantic similarity (Conrey & Smith, 2007; 
Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Rydell & McConnell, 2006).  Changing these associations has 
sometimes been assumed to occur through the repeated pairing of the attitude object with 
counter-attitudinal information (Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Rydell, McConnell, Mackie, & 
Strain, 2006; Rydell, McConnell, Strain, Claypool, & Hugenberg, 2007).  
In line with these assumptions, some researchers have used extensive evaluative 
conditioning paradigms to try to modify existing implicit evaluations.  For example, Karpinski 
and Hilton (2001) exposed participants to 200 trials of counter-conditioning to try to modify 
implicit evaluations of the elderly.  In this method, change is assumed to depend on the repeated 
spatial and temporal co-occurrence of the stimulus and evaluative cues (cf. Mitchell, De Houwer, 
& Lovibond, 2009).  If a stimulus, such as a social group, was originally implicitly evaluated as 
negative, for example, perhaps repeatedly pairing group members with positive cues – without 
any context, explanation, or reasoning – might nudge the evaluation toward positivity.  To be 
sure, this method has shown that such change of implicit evaluations through evaluative 
conditioning is possible (e.g., Karpinski & Hilton, 2001; Lai et al., in press; Olson & Fazio, 
2006; Rydell et al., 2006). 
The question of the current work, however, is whether we can effectively undo implicit 
evaluations when reasons to doubt our initial impressions come to light.  Sometimes we learn 
new things about the world that immediately transform the meaning of prior knowledge, and to 
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what degree can such revelations alter our impressions?  This kind of learning differs from the 
mere repeated pairing of the attitude object with new information, in that it depends on 
considerations of truth and falsehood.  For instance, new details might emerge about a person 
suggesting that a first impression of him or her was entirely incorrect, and that some different 
impression is warranted instead. Beyond adding something new to one’s representation of that 
person, such revelations can suggest that other aspects of an impression should be subtracted. As 
such, processing the new information might entail figuring out whether to endorse the new 
information as valid and true, and how the new information is related to older information 
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006).  Below, we describe theory and empirical work addressing 
the question of whether implicit evaluations can be “undone” through the affirmation of new 
impressions as true, the negation of old impressions as false, or the combination of the two. 
Revision through the addition of new information 
Some studies have tried to change implicit impressions by providing new information 
about a target that is both different in valence from, as well as totally unrelated to, the initial 
information (Gawronski et al., 2010; Petty et al., 2006, Study 1; Rydell & Gawronski, 2009; 
Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Rydell et al., 2007). In these studies, participants are typically first 
presented with a large number of evaluatively consistent statements about a target person (e.g., 
“Bob donates his time at the soup kitchen”), and subsequently display the expected implicit and 
explicit evaluation toward that person.  Then, researchers attempt to change overall impressions 
by presenting new statements with the opposite valence (e.g., “Bob refused to help a child fix his 
bike”) that are seemingly unrelated to the initial statements. In this task, participants play an 
active role in affirming the validity of each new piece of information (Rydell & McConnell, 
2006), and so the new information is vetted as accurate.  But, this approach of adding new 
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information tends to lead to implicit revision only after considerable amounts of countervailing 
information is presented, and at a much slower rate than what is needed for explicit revision 
(e.g., Rydell et al., 2007).  To date, the one exception to this is when the new information is 
extremely negative and rare (Cone & Ferguson, in press).  In these studies, after learning a large 
amount of mildly positive pieces of information about a new person (e.g., “Bob gave a hitchhiker 
a ride to a shelter”), participants immediately reversed their implicit evaluations of the person 
after learning a piece of extremely negative and rare information (e.g., “Bob was recently 
convicted of molesting children”).   
Although the evidence for revision through adding new, unrelated information is 
somewhat mixed, some theories claim that this approach of adding new information is the most 
likely way in which implicit evaluations can be updated.  The Associative – Propositional 
Evaluation model (APE; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 2011) contends that implicit 
evaluations are generated through associative processing, but can be updated after learning new 
information that is deemed valid.  When people learn about (and believe) new, counter-
attitudinal information about a target, for instance, this can create a new counter-attitudinal 
association, which might then drive the implicit evaluation.  Importantly, this model assumes that 
adding new information in this way is the most likely route to changing implicit evaluations 
because it is very difficult to overturn, or silence, older associations that were the basis for the 
initial impression.  However, it is not yet clear when such new information, even if fully believed 
and affirmed, will have a relatively small or large impact on implicit evaluations.  Extreme 
negativity and diagnosticity (Cone & Ferguson, in press) may be one criterion that is necessary 
for new, unrelated information to lead to revision. 
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These studies that simply add new, unrelated information to the totality of information 
about the person (or stimulus) might be classified as “addition” studies.  They represent cases 
where we learn new information about someone that is countervailing to, but independent of, our 
former impressions.  This approach assumes that change will emerge incrementally from the 
totality of information about the stimulus.  In this way, even though adding an extreme piece of 
information may occasionally swamp out older information (Cone & Ferguson, in press), new 
information will tend to be added to older information, often resulting in evaluatively 
complicated representations (i.e., implicit ambivalence; Petty et al., 2006) or contextualized 
evaluations (Gawronski, Rydell, Vervliet, & De Houwer, 2010; Rydell & Gawronski, 2009), 
which can allow for the recovery of the initial association with a shift in context (Gawronski et 
al., 2010; see Bouton, 2004).  
Revision through the undoing of initial information 
What about when new information forces a change in meaning of the initial information? 
Is it possible to revise implicit impressions by undoing the meaning of previously learned 
information?  In other words, can we effectively “erase” the influence of our implicit 
associations on the basis of new information?  Although some theory maintains that this will be 
very hard to do (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 2011; see also Deutsch, Gawronski, & 
Strack, 2006; Gawronski, Deutsch, Mbirkou, Seibt, & Strack, 2008), other perspectives claim it 
is possible.  For example, some theoretical work maintains that implicit evaluations are enabled 
by propositional representations acquired through top-down learning (De Houwer, 2014; 
Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & De Houwer, 2011), or are generated through a variety of processes 
(see, e.g., Amodio, 2014; Amodio & Devine, 2006; Amodio & Ratner, 2011; Conrey, Sherman, 
Gawronski, Hugenberg, & Groom, 2005; Payne, 2001; Sherman et al., 2008), each of which may 
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have different capacities for updating (see Amodio & Ratner, 2011).  These views either would 
strongly predict such undoing of implicit evaluations (De Houwer, 2014; Hughes, Barnes-
Holmes, & De Houwer, 2011) or are at least open to the possibility (Amodio & Ratner, 2011; 
Conrey, Sherman, Gawronski, Hugenberg, & Groom, 2005).    
Another example is the Metacognitive Model (MCM) by Petty and colleagues (Petty & 
Briñol, 2010; Petty, Briñol, & DeMarree, 2007).  In this model, new, countervailing information 
that overturns older information can indeed change implicit evaluations, but only when the new 
information is sufficiently elaborated on to replace previous associations. Specifically, 
previously held evaluations that one chooses to reject do not get immediately removed from 
memory, but instead get tagged as false.  These validity tags are initially only weakly associated, 
which explains why it is difficult to instantly revise (see Petty et al., 2006). However, the model 
predicts that various factors may moderate the strength of these new “false” tags, such as the 
extent of elaboration, and the tags may eventually become sufficiently strong so as to prevent the 
activation of the original evaluation (Petty et al., 2006; Petty & Briñol, 2010).   
Despite the theoretical support for implicit revision through the undoing of initial 
learning, the empirical evidence is mixed.  Some studies have attempted to change implicit 
evaluations by presenting new information about the validity of older information.  In such 
studies, participants first form an initial implicit (as well as explicit) evaluation toward a novel 
person or group, and then are told that the initial information was true or false (Boucher & 
Rydell, 2012; Peters & Gawronski, 2011).  Asking people to simply “negate” or undo a prior 
impression in this way has typically been less effective in shifting implicit than explicit 
evaluations (Deutsch et al., 2006; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011, p. 88; Gawronski et al., 
2008; Gregg et al., 2006).  The only way that such negation instructions lead to implicit revision 
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is when they are presented simultaneously with the initial information (Peters & Gawronski, 
2011), and are sufficiently salient to elicit considerable attention (Boucher & Rydell, 2012).   
These studies might be classified as “subtraction” studies because the new information 
requires people to “unlearn” the prior information, in effect subtracting its influence from their 
impressions.  These might represent cases where we learn that our first impressions were actually 
based on false rumors, for instance.  This kind of subtraction method of telling people to simply 
reject initial information as false may present several challenges though, which may explain why 
empirical attempts have yielded only mixed evidence.  First, asking people to negate their initial 
impression may prompt them to try suppressing it, which might ironically keep the rejected 
thought active (Wegner, 1994).  Second, people may be unable to erase all traces of implicit 
evaluations when instructed to do so, in line with memory work suggesting that intentional 
forgetting does not erase all traces of a memory (Bjork & Bjork, 2003).  Even if participants 
could, in theory, respond to an instruction to negate everything they have previously learned by 
thoroughly reinterpreting those details, they may sometimes have low motivation or ability to do 
so, resulting in insufficiently deep processing of the negation (Boucher & Rydell, 2012; see also 
Petty et al., 2006).  And, finally, learning that initial information was false does not necessarily 
imply the opposite impression.  Learning that someone did not perform a negative behavior does 
not mean the person enacted a positive one, and vice versa.  Attempting to silence initial 
information by classifying it as false would seem to face multiple kinds of challenges, and these 
challenges might explain the mixed empirical record to date. 
Joining forces: Revision through subtraction and addition  
What happens when we learn new, counter-attitudinal information that also overrides the 
initial impression?  That is, what about trying to encompass both an addition as well as a 
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subtraction approach to implicit revision?  For example, learning that Schindler was actually a 
hero both adds new information as well as changes the meaning of the initial information.  The 
fact that he employed Jewish workers in his factor, for example, now has a completely different 
meaning (and evaluative connotation).  Learning new information that also forces a change in the 
meaning of older information would seem to possess the advantages of addition and subtraction 
approaches, while avoiding the pitfalls of using either by itself.   
To our knowledge, there are only a few studies that provide a test along these lines.  
Gregg et al. (2006, Studies 3 and 4) attempted this approach in two of their studies.  They 
informed participants that their impressions of two novel groups should be flipped: in one (Study 
3), the experimenter had ostensibly made a mistake in informing them of which group was 
positive and which negative; in the other (Study 4), the groups were said to have changed in their 
moral character over time, the formerly negative one becoming positive, and the formerly 
positive one becoming negative.  These seem like “subtraction + addition” methods in that the 
new information states that the evaluation attached to each of the groups should be reversed (e.g., 
the “Niffites” are no longer bad, and are instead now good), but, in this case, they did not find 
any evidence of implicit revision.  However, these particular instantiations of a “subtraction + 
addition” approach may not have been ideal.  First, in Study 3, the new information did not 
change the meaning of the groups’ initial behaviors so much as switch the authorship of those 
behaviors.  The behaviors had the same evaluative connotation, but the mapping of behavior to 
group was supposed to be switched.  Secondly, whether people are able to revise their 
impressions would seem to depend critically on the believability of such a switch.  If people find 
the notion of a group completely switching its entire moral character unlikely (which is what 
Study 4 asked participants to believe occurred over time), then we might not see implicit revision 
 21 
even if they had been able to do so (especially given the stickiness of initial immorality; e.g., 
Knobe, 2006; Malle & Knobe, 1997; Reeder, Pryor, & Wojciszke, 1992).  Finally, these 
concerns might have been especially pronounced because the participants in both studies knew 
that the groups were fictional and the scenarios hypothetical. In Study 3 for instance, they learn 
that for some other participants the goodness or badness of the groups is the reverse of what they 
were told, which might privately undermine their sense that either group is “truly” good or bad. 
Explicit evaluations, on the other hand, may have reflected participants’ perceptions of the 
expectations of the experimenter.4 
A better test of the “subtraction + addition” approach might be to present new 
countervailing information that truly changes the meaning of the old information, and to do so in 
a way that has some ecological validity (i.e., use a paradigm that maximizes believability). To 
our knowledge, there is only one study that has tested such an approach.  Wyer (2010; Study 2) 
showed that implicit evaluations of a novel target were revised in light of new, counter-
attitudinal information that changed the interpretation of prior details – an apparent skinhead 
who behaved in an off-putting way turned out to be ill with cancer.  This changed participants’ 
implicit evaluation of the target, but only if they were able to revisit each one of his initial 
behaviors once they get the new information.  Wyer suggested that this focused rehearsal may 
have sufficiently strengthened the “false” tags linked to those prior details to allow the implicit 
revision, in line with the MCM perspective (Petty et al., 2006).  Although there remain many 
                                                
4 Note that a few studies similar to those reported by Gregg et al. (2006) did not technically 
measure implicit evaluations. Wilson and colleagues (2000) employed a measure requiring rapid 
explicit judgments, and compared these to more conventional slower explicit judgments. Petty et 
al. (2006) employed a study design (in Experiment 2) asking participants to switch the targets of 
two sets of information, but the implicit measured tapped associations between the targets and 
confidence vs. doubt, rather than evaluations. As such, very few studies have attempted “addition 
+ subtraction” designs while measuring changes in implicit evaluations. 
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questions about why and how this effect emerged, it is intriguing, and raises the possibility that 
when people learn information that makes them reassess their prior knowledge, their implicit 
evaluations can be updated accordingly.  In what follows, we consider this possibility. 
Reinterpretation 
Although existing theories are open to the possibility of undoing implicit evaluations, in 
line with some supportive findings, the mechanisms through which it might occur remain largely 
unknown.  We propose that the ability of new information to recast the old information on which 
the initial evaluation was based – such as in the case of Oskar Schindler – is one mechanism of 
change that may be especially effective.  In particular, when new information prompts a 
reinterpretation (i.e., a change in the evaluative meaning) of old information, we predict that 
implicit evaluations will be updated accordingly. 
Reinterpretation of prior information may be uniquely positioned to produce strong 
revision of implicit evaluations.  This strategy involves not just the invalidation of the initial 
impression (i.e., subtraction), but also the replacement of that impression with a countervailing 
other (i.e., addition), and it does this in one fell swoop.  That is, it introduces an explanation for 
why previous learning should be reinterpreted, and revised in the opposite evaluative direction. 
This may often be more effective in producing revision of implicit evaluations than either 
addition or subtraction approaches alone.  If there are reasons to suspect that both rejecting a 
prior impression and affirming a new one may have limitations when implemented separately (as 
we previously reviewed), the initial demonstration in Wyer (2010) is a promising sign that 
reinterpretation – a change in the meaning of earlier details such that an initial impression is both 
negated and replaced with another – may be an effective way to overturn implicit evaluations.  
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Though the demonstration in Wyer (2010) remains the best test in the literature of the 
possibility that reinterpretation may produce revision of implicit evaluations, there is much that 
remains unknown.  Most critically, because there were no measures of the nature of the thinking 
done by participants or comparisons of the effectiveness of different types of counter-attitudinal 
information, it is unclear whether there was any reinterpretation at all; participants given the new 
information may have simply elaborated on it as they revisited the initial information without 
changing their understanding of the initial information.  In other words, there was no evidence 
about the process leading to the revision, and whether it involved any reassessment of the 
meaning of the initial behaviors. It may be that elaborating on any counter-attitudinal new 
information, without a rejection of the earlier impression, would have been sufficient.   
 In the current work, we examine whether implicit evaluations can be fully and durably 
reversed when new information changes the meaning of a previous impression.  This would 
demonstrate that implicit evaluations can be fully reversed after reasoning about a prior 
impression.  In addition, we identify the process by which this kind of change occurs, and reveal 
its operating characteristics: it requires more than the simple pairing of the old attitude object 
with counter-attitudinal information, and is not reducible to more extensive general thinking 
about that information; rather, it occurs through reinterpretation specifically.   
Overview of Current Work 
We developed a new paradigm tailored to this research topic. In each experiment, 
participants read a story, presented one sentence at a time, about an individual named Francis 
West who is described as breaking into and causing damage to two homes. Participants’ implicit 
evaluations toward Francis West are then measured. Afterwards, they read a final piece of 
information which either maintains the gist of what they already read (control conditions in 
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which Francis remains negative) or dramatically reverses it (experimental condition in which 
Francis becomes positive) by offering a reinterpretation of what was previously learned: The 
houses were on fire, and Francis was searching for two young children who he knew were inside. 
 With this paradigm, we accomplish a number of goals across the studies. First, we use a 
paradigm in which participants are learning about an ostensibly real person through a cohesive 
narrative that is meant to be engaging and credible.  In this way, we hope to maximize 
participants’ motivation and attention while in the learning paradigm.  Secondly, we demonstrate 
fast revision in the direction of negative to positive, which has been shown to be especially 
difficult in recent work (Cone & Ferguson, in press) possibly due to negativity dominance 
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997; 
Rozin & Royzman, 2001).  Thirdly, the paradigm leads participants to form implicit evaluations 
toward a novel person, which enables us to test the ways in which implicit evaluations can be 
changed (Fazio, 2007; Ferguson & Fukukura, 2012; Gregg et al., 2006).  That is, we can ensure 
that we measure learning, rather than re-activation of previously learned material (e.g., see Gregg 
et al., 2006, pp. 16).  Presenting counter-attitudinal information about familiar objects might 
simply activate prior learning, the characteristics of which (how long it took to learn it, etc.) 
would be unknowable.5 
In Experiments 1a and 1b, we demonstrate that reversal occurs in this paradigm using 
two different implicit measures of evaluations.  Experiment 2 shows that the relevance of the 
                                                
5 Presenting participants with counter-attitudinal information about a known social group might 
indeed result in changed implicit evaluations of the group.  But, this does not mean that 
participants learned something new.  Thus, the evidence for the context-dependence of implicit 
evaluations (e.g., Blair, Ma, & Lenton, 2001; Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Ferguson & 
Wojnowicz, 2011; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2001; see Blair, 2002, for a review) does not 
address the topic of how easily implicit evaluations can reflect new information.  
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new information in recasting the old is essential to this reversal by comparing it with a condition 
containing equally positive but irrelevant information. Experiment 3 examines whether the 
revision occurs through an active thought process of reappraising the old information, by 
manipulating cognitive load to test whether a reduction in cognitive resources would undermine 
revision. Experiment 4 demonstrates that participants’ self-reported belief that the new 
information changes the meaning of the prior story predicts the degree of revised implicit 
evaluations of Francis West, even when controlling for more general measures of the speed of 
thinking and extensiveness of thinking. In Experiment 5 we show that self-reported 
reinterpretation of the prior story mediates the effect of the new information on implicit 
evaluations, even when controlling for the extent to which participants reported thinking about 
the new information in general. Finally, in Experiment 6 we demonstrate the durability of the 
revised implicit evaluations over three days. For all studies, we report how we determined our 
sample size, all data exclusions (if any), all manipulations, and all measures in the study 
(Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2012). 
Experiment 1a: From Burglar to Hero – I 
 We presented participants with a story in which a novel person (“Francis West”) is 
depicted breaking into and causing great damage to two houses on his street, followed by a 
revelation (in the experimental condition) that his behavior was motivated out of a desire to save 
children inside from a fire spreading through the houses. Thus, this revelation implies a 
reinterpretation of the prior story. In a control condition, participants instead read one additional 
piece of information that does not contradict, but rather is consistent with, the information 
learned before (see Appendix).  In addition to measuring implicit evaluations, we assessed 
 26 
explicit evaluations and a variety of participants’ reactions to the story, including story 
comprehension, confusion, and how deeply they reported thinking about the story’s details. 
Method 
 Participants. Two hundred workers on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk website 
(www.mturk.com) participated in the study for $0.75 (55% male; Mage = 37 years, SD = 14). We 
selected this number a priori so as to collect approximately 100 per between-participants 
condition.  Because this was our first attempt at testing the effect, we collected enough data to be 
able to detect a moderately sized effect. 
 Materials. In order to induce an initially negative implicit evaluation toward a novel 
target person, participants were led through a story detailing supposedly true events centering 
around an individual named Francis West. The story was presented in a linear piecemeal fashion, 
across 26 screens. The described events portray Francis West as a neighbor who ransacks the 
homes of his neighbors, destroying their property (e.g., throwing a pot of water onto a laptop) 
and taking “precious things” from the bedrooms.  After initial assessment of implicit evaluations 
toward Francis, participants were then presented with a single screen of additional information 
that varied by condition.  In the control condition, the new information continued the thread of 
the story: Francis began to chuck rocks at the windows of the houses he had just pillaged.  In the 
other condition (henceforth dubbed the “fire rescue” condition), participants instead read that 
Francis broke into the houses because he saw that they were on fire, and the only precious things 
he removed from the bedrooms were the young kids of the families. 
 As participants read each statement about Francis in both the initial and subsequent story 
periods, an image of the upper body of a white male labeled “Francis West” was displayed on the 
screen. Each participant was randomly assigned an image of one individual to serve as Francis 
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West, out of a set of 11 such images drawn from previous research (Minear & Park, 2004). The 
men in all photographs had neutral expressions, and ranged in age from 20 to 33 years. 
 Implicit Evaluations. Implicit evaluations were measured twice, once after reading the 
initial statements (Time 1) and once after reading the final information (Time 2). The Affect 
Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005) was administered at 
both instances (see the Procedure section). Each AMP consisted of 40 trials, with separate sets 
of Chinese characters used at Time 1 and Time 2. The order in which the sets were administered 
was counterbalanced across participants.6 The image of Francis West that was assigned to the 
participant served as the prime on half of the trials, and each of the other 10 images of unknown 
individuals served as a prime on two of the other trials. Participants were instructed that they 
would sequentially view a set of Chinese ideographs, and that their task was to determine for 
each whether it was more or less pleasant than the average ideograph by pressing the k and d 
keys on their keyboard, respectively. On each of the 40 trials, participants were first presented 
with a prime photograph of Francis or an unknown individual for 75 ms, followed by a blank 
screen for 125 ms, an ideograph for 100 ms, and finally a pattern mask of black and white noise, 
which remained on the screen until the participant responded.  Participants were told that though 
the images that precede the ideographs may sometimes be positive or negative, they were to 
prevent these images from affecting their ratings, and instead should evaluate the ideographs 
solely on their own merits.  Previous research suggests that this measure taps evaluative 
reactions toward the primes that are misattributed to the relatively neutral targets, thus providing 
                                                
6 The order in which the two sets of ideographs were administered will not be discussed further; 
order affected only one analysis of interest across all six studies. In Experiment 3, the interaction 
of time, prime person, and story condition was significantly moderated by ideograph order, such 
that the revision effect was stronger in one counterbalance condition than in the other (but the 
revision effect, and all simple effects of interest, were still significant in both). Ideograph set 
order had no similar effects in any other analysis. 
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a measure of spontaneously elicited, unintentional evaluations of the primes (Payne et al., 2005; 
Payne et al., 2013; cf. Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2012). 
 Explicit Evaluations. Explicit evaluations toward Francis were measured at Time 2 using 
measures adapted from previous research (Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Rydell, McConnell, 
Mackie, & Strain, 2006). Participants indicated how likable Francis is from 1 (very unlikable) to 
7 (very likable), and completed 7-point semantic differential scales in random order on the 
dimensions of bad-good, mean-pleasant, disagreeable-agreeable, uncaring-caring, and cruel-kind. 
These six items were reliable, α = .994, and were combined into a single scale for the analyses. 
 Questionnaire Measures. Participants completed three multiple choice questions asking 
questions about the story that have different probable answers in the control and fire rescue 
conditions: why Francis threw water around the house (e.g. to ruin items, to put out a fire), why 
the cat died (e.g. Francis stepped on it, smoke inhalation), and what he removed from the houses 
(e.g. jewelry, children). They then identified Francis in a lineup of the 11 faces presented in the 
study (1 Francis and 10 control), indicated their level of confusion about what happened in the 
story on a scale from 1 (Not confused at all) to 7 (Completely confused), the extent to which they 
thought about the Time 1 story elements after reading the new information at Time 2 on a scale 
from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A lot), and how hard it was to make sense of how the Time 2 
information fit with the rest of the story on a scale from 1 (Not at all hard) to 7 (Very hard). 
 Procedure. After providing informed consent, participants were instructed to read each 
statement in the story depicting the initial events surrounding Francis West. They were told to 
pay careful attention to the details that unfolded, as they would be asked questions about their 
perspective on the events later in the study. Participants proceeded through the screens 
containing the descriptions at their own pace, but spent a minimum of 3 seconds on each screen. 
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After reading the initial story about Francis West, participants took the first AMP. Then, 
they were informed that they would read a final piece of information about the events described 
previously, and were shown either the control or fire rescue information. They were instructed to 
think about how this information relates to what they learned before, and were required to wait at 
least 15 seconds before advancing. They then completed the Time 2 AMP. Next, they indicated 
whether they knew Chinese, completed the explicit evaluation scale, and answered the other 
questionnaire items. Finally, they completed demographic questions, a set of measures unrelated 
to the present study regarding political evaluations, and were debriefed and compensated. 
Results 
 Data preparation. Following Payne et al. (2005), data from 4 participants were excluded 
for indicating familiarity with Mandarin or Cantonese (2% of cases) and 18 participants for using 
a single key on every trial of at least one AMP, indicating a disregard for the instructions (9% of 
cases). This left 178 cases for the final analysis. 
 Comprehension checks. Participants in both conditions showed good comprehension of 
the story details, with 93% in the control condition and 84% in the fire rescue condition 
answering the three interpretative questions in a manner fully consistent with the condition to 
which they had been assigned.  This difference was marginally significant, χ2 = 2.94, p = .086. In 
addition, every participant correctly identified Francis West in the lineup of 11 photographs.7 
                                                
7 For descriptive purposes, we continued to collect information on how frequently participants 
completed the inferential items in a manner fully consistent with their story condition, and 
whether they could correctly identify the face of Francis West out of a lineup, throughout all of 
the subsequent studies. From Experiment 1b onward, we also always included a simple 
manipulation check item asking participants to identify from a short list which final information 
had been presented to them about Francis West. We never made a priori predictions about these 
measures, and so do not discuss them further in this paper, though the correlations between 
implicit liking and the inferential items in the fire rescue condition are available in Table 1. We 
chose in advance to include participants regardless of their performance on these measures. 
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 Implicit evaluations toward Francis West. Implicit evaluations were assessed using a 2 
(Measurement Time: time 1 and time 2) x 2 (Prime Person: Francis West and control faces) x 2 
(Story Condition: control or fire rescue) mixed design, with the first two factors manipulated 
within-participants and the third manipulated between-participants. The proportion of trials in 
each cell of this design on which participants indicated that the Chinese ideograph was more 
pleasant than average served as the dependent variable in a repeated-measures ANOVA.  
 Every effect in the model was significant, including our predicted 3-way interaction 
between measurement time, prime person, and story condition, F(1,176) = 36.551, p < .001, ηp2 
= .172. Decomposition of this interaction revealed that in the control story condition, in which 
Francis is depicted as negative at both time 1 and time 2, no interaction between time and prime 
person emerged, F(1,176) = 1.55, p = .214. Instead, as predicted, there was solely a main effect 
of prime, such that implicit positivity toward Francis was lower (M = .40, SD = .27) than implicit 
positivity toward the neutral faces (M = .63, SD = .19), F(1,176) = 50.51, p < .001, ηp2 = .223. In 
the fire rescue condition, however, there was the predicted significant interaction between 
measurement time and prime person, F(1,176) = 51.90, p < .001, ηp2 = .228. At time 1, Francis 
was less positive (M = .40, SD = .30) than the neutral faces (M = .60, SD = .19), F(1,176) = 
23.53, p < .001, ηp2 = .118, whereas at time 2, Francis was more positive (M = .72, SD = .22) 
than the neutral faces (M = .54, SD  = .23), F(1,176) = 17.42, p < .001, ηp2 = .09. Viewed another 
way, implicit positivity toward Francis did not show a shift from time 1 to time 2 in the control 
story condition, F(1,176) = 1.43, p = .234, but showed a significant increase from time 1 to time 
2 in the fire rescue condition, F(1,176) = 84.58, p < .001, ηp2 = .325 (see  Figure 1). 
                                                                                                                                                       
Across the samples of all of our experiments, after setting aside excluded participants (reasons 
reported in text), 98.73% were correct in identifying the final information they had been shown, 
99.58% correctly identified the image of Francis West, and 82.70% responded to the inferential 
questions in a manner fully consistent with their story condition. 
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Figure 1. Mean proportion of ideographs judged more pleasant than average in Experiment 1a, 
by face prime, time, and story condition. Error bars are standard errors. 
 
 Explicit evaluations toward Francis West. Explicit evaluations were measured after the 
second AMP, and differed significantly by story condition, unequal variances t(103.36) = 34.77, 
p < .001, Cohen’s d = 6.84. Participants had more positive explicit evaluations toward Francis 
West in the fire rescue (M = 5.99, SD = 1.21) versus control condition (M = 1.20, SD = .41). 
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 Finally, rather than reporting the correlations between implicit and explicit evaluations 
(as well as their relations to other measures) in the main text for each study, we summarize this 
information in Table 1. 
 Story condition effects on other questionnaire measures. Participants reported 
significantly more confusion with the story in the control (M = 3.64, SD = 2.05) versus fire 
rescue condition (M = 1.93, SD = 1.57), unequal variances t(169.50) = 6.27, p < .001, Cohen’s d 
= .96. This pattern was the same for reported difficulty making sense of the final story 
information, unequal variances t(175.96) = 2.95, p = .004, Cohen’s d = .44. This result makes 
sense, given the lack of resolution available to participants in the control condition regarding the 
motivation for the destruction perpetrated by Francis West. Also expected, there was a strong 
story condition effect on the self-reported extent to which participants thought about the overall 
story upon reading the final information, with those in the fire rescue condition reporting more 
thinking (M = 6.26, SD = 1.20) than those in the control condition (M = 5.12, SD = 1.72), 
unequal variances t(163.02) = 5.14, p < .002, Cohen’s d = .80. However, none of the above 
questionnaire items moderated or mediated implicit evaluation revision, and the three-way 
interaction between time, target person, and story condition remained even when controlling for 
any of these (mean centered; Aiken & West, 1991). 
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Table 1. Correlations Between Implicit and Explicit Evaluations and Questionnaire Measures in 
Fire Rescue Condition at Time 2, Experiments 1-6 
 Implicit Evaluations 
 
Study 
1a 
Study 
1b 
Study 
2 
Study 
3 
Study 
4 
Study 
5 
Study 6 
 
          Time 2 
Time 
3 
Perfect comprehension  .12  .10 -.07  .27**  -.03  .08 -.06  .14 
Confusion -.04 -.12  .06  .02  -.03 -.24** -.03 -.14 
Difficulty making sense  .04  -.02       
Extent of thinking -.03   .18†      
Extent of thinking (new)     .19
*     
Extent of thinking (old)     .02     Subjective meaning 
change     
 .31*  .23**   
Rapid vs. gradual 
thinking     
-.10   
  
Extensiveness of 
thinking (Studies 4-5)     
 .01 -.09   
Positive mood       .28
** .15 
Belief that story is real        .09  .14 
 Explicit Evaluations 
Perfect comprehension  .32**  .48***  .54***  .52***  .40***  .30***  .19†  .22* 
Confusion -.33** -.58*** -.55*** -.45*** -.41*** -.45*** -.26* -.23* 
Difficulty making sense -.31**  -.65
***      
Extent of thinking  .26*   .18†      
Extent of thinking (new)     .32
***     
Extent of thinking (old)     .05     Subjective meaning 
change     
 .71***  .58***   
Rapid vs. gradual 
thinking     
-.40***   
  
Extensiveness of 
thinking (Studies 4-5)     
-.26* -.10   
Positive mood        .50
***  .42*** 
Belief that story is real        .19
†  .16 
Implicit evaluations  .30**  .16†  .14  .32***   .24†  .48***  .27**  .35** 
 
Note. Cell values are Pearson correlations. In Experiments 1a and 2-6, the correlations involving 
implicit evaluations are partial correlations with the proportion of ideographs on Francis trials 
judged more pleasant than average, controlling for the proportion of ideographs on Control trials 
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judged more pleasant than average. The exception is the IAT used in Experiment 1b, which is a 
relative measure of positivity toward Francis (vs. control faces); thus, the D scores were used, 
without any covariates. On all implicit and explicit liking measures, higher scores indicate more 
positive evaluations toward Francis West. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. † p < .1. 
 
Discussion 
 Experiment 1a shows that participants strongly revised their implicit evaluations toward a 
novel target person, once given a reinterpretation of the original information.  Whereas those in 
the control condition showed a persistence of their initial, negative evaluations, those in the fire 
rescue condition switched to significant implicit positivity toward Francis West after reading the 
revelation. Experiment 2 will begin to examine mechanism, but first Experiment 1b replicates 
the basic pattern with a different implicit evaluation measure. 
Study 1b: From Burglar to Hero – II 
In Experiment 1b, we sought to replicate the revision effect using the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). In addition, in order to induce 
an even stronger initial negative evaluation (and hint at a possible motive in the control 
condition), we added a new detail to suggest in the first part of the story that Francis’ actions 
were a hate crime against the town’s first interracial families in the neighborhood. We 
anticipated that the revelation that he actually was saving the children from a fire would 
effectively counter this suspicion and produce reversal just as it had in Experiment 1a. As a final 
addition, we measured explicit evaluations after both IATs.  This allows us to show how implicit 
liking of Francis West is indeed changing in a similar way to explicit liking. 
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Method 
 Participants. Three hundred and one participants recruited from Mechanical Turk were 
paid $1.00 to participate in this study (55.6% male; Mage = 32.0 years, SD = 11.8). We sought to 
collect data from approximately 150 participants for each of the two between-participants story 
conditions, and so intended to collect data from 300 participants. The number is more than in 
Experiment 1a because we thought that the IAT, which relies on response times, might produce 
noisier data than the AMP used in Experiment 1a.  One additional participant completed the 
study without subsequently submitting it for compensation.  
 Materials. The story that participants read at time 1 was identical to that from 
Experiment 1a, except for the addition of a new event at the very start: “Francis' small town was 
about 99% white, but recently the Griffins and Wards, the town's first ever interracial families, 
had moved in.” By providing the hint of a motive for Francis’ actions, we thought that this might 
reduce the persistent difference in expressed confusion between the two conditions, as well as 
provide even more initial negativity toward Francis that must later be overcome. 
 IAT. The IAT included the same eleven faces used in the AMP in Experiment 1a, with 
one of the eleven having been randomly assigned to be used as Francis West for each participant.  
Positive adjectives presented during the IAT included wonderful, excellent, good, great, 
appealing, outstanding, lovely, fantastic, beautiful, and amazing. Negative adjectives included 
horrible, terrible, awful, disgusting, offensive, hideous, revolting, bad, dreadful, and nasty. 
During the critical blocks, participants quickly sorted stimuli into one of four categories: 
Francis West, Other People, Good Words, and Bad Words. At any one time, two of these 
category labels (one person category and one adjective category) were displayed on the left side 
of the screen, and the other two were presented on the right side. A single stimulus from one of 
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the four categories appeared on each trial. Half of the person trials consisted of an image of 
Francis West, while the other half displayed randomly chosen images from the other 10 images 
(control faces). Likewise, on half of the adjective trials a positive adjective was randomly 
selected from the list, while on the other half a negative one was. Each stimulus was displayed 
until the participant registered a response by pressing one of the two keys. If the response was 
correct, the next trial began; if it was incorrect, a red “X” appeared on the screen until the 
participant gave the correct response. The intertrial interval was 250 milliseconds. The IAT 
consisted of seven blocks, with 20 trials in practice blocks 1, 2, 3, and 6, and 40 trials in test 
blocks 4 and 7 as well as transition practice block 5 (for details, see Greenwald, Nosek, & 
Banaji, 2003). The order of the Francis West + Bad and Francis West + Good blocks was 
counterbalanced across participants. 
 Procedure. Participants first completed the story procedure in the same fashion as in 
Experiment 1a. Then, they took the first IAT and the same explicit evaluation items from 
Experiment 1a. Participants were next presented with the time 2 story information in the same 
manner as before, either the fire rescue or control information. Immediately thereafter they 
completed the second IAT, the explicit evaluation scale, the story comprehension items, the 
photo identification, the confusion items, a new multiple-choice manipulation check question 
asking them to directly identify the final story information that they had been presented with, and 
demographic questions. They were then debriefed, thanked, and compensated for their time.  
Results 
 Data preparation. We calculated implicit positivity toward Francis West for both IATs 
according to the D1 scoring algorithm (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). The differences 
between blocks were computed so that higher scores meant faster responding during the “Francis 
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West + Good” pairing. On this measure, more positive scores are taken to suggest more implicit 
positivity toward Francis West, and more negative scores are taken to suggest more implicit 
negativity toward him, relative to the control faces. Due to server error, IAT data were not 
recorded for 8 participants. Eleven participants were excluded for responding faster than 300 ms 
on over 10% of trials, following scoring recommendations (Greenwald et al., 2003), leaving the 
final sample with 282 cases (54.6% male; Mage = 32.2 years, SD = 11.8). 
 Implicit evaluations toward Francis West. We analyzed implicit positivity toward 
Francis West by submitting D scores to a 2 (Measurement Time: time 1 and time 2) x 2 (Story 
Condition: control or fire rescue) mixed ANOVA, with the first factor manipulated within-
participants. This analysis revealed a main effect of time, qualified by the time by story condition 
interaction, F(1,280) = 10.65, p = .001, ηp2 = .037. Simple effects tests demonstrated that, as 
expected, implicit evaluations toward Francis did not vary by story condition at time 1, F(1,280) 
= 1.11, p = .292, but were significantly negative (M = -.066, SD = .394) across the sample, one-
sample t(281) = -2.82, p = .005, Cohen’s d = .336. At time 2, however, implicit positivity of 
Francis was higher in the fire rescue condition (M = .197, SD = .34) than the control story 
condition (M = -.021, SD = .33), F(1,280) = 45.44, p < .001, ηp2 = .140. Although implicit 
evaluations toward Francis were significantly greater than zero in the fire rescue condition at 
time 2, one sample t(147) = 7.04, p < .001, d = 1.16, they were no longer significantly below 
zero in the control condition, one sample t(133) = -.72, p = .474. Thus, the significant change in 
positivity across time in the fire rescue condition paralleled the shift observed in Experiment 1a, 
F(1,280) = 45.44, p < .001, ηp2 = .140, while a marginal shift in the positive direction also 
occurred in the control condition that was not present in the prior study, F(1,280) = 3.64, p = 
.057, ηp2 = .013 (see Figure 2 for the mean D scores in each condition). 
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Figure 2. Mean D scores in Experiment 1b, by measurement time and story condition. Error bars 
are standard errors. 
 
 Auxiliary analysis. The shift toward neutral implicit evaluation of Francis West from 
time 1 to time 2 in the control condition might suggest that a portion of the sample is relatively 
unconvinced of Francis West’s badness at time 1 and, after being similarly unconvinced at time 
2, lose whatever tenuous negativity toward him they might have possessed at time 1, producing 
the condition’s overall shift to neutral at time 2. In order to show reason-based revision, we need 
to demonstrate that for those individuals that are induced with an initial evaluation, new 
information can quickly and significantly reverse it. Otherwise, a finding that the group as a 
whole exhibits reversal at time 2 could be a product of shifts in these unconvinced participants, 
rather than shifts in those who acquired the initial evaluation. As such, we undertook a more 
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conservative auxiliary test of the revision hypothesis by examining the means of time 2 IAT 
scores solely among those participants who displayed initial negativity at time 1 (D scores less 
than zero). In this subsample, IAT scores at time 2 differed between story conditions, t(159) = 
5.73, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .91, such that scores were still significantly below zero in the control 
story group (M = -.14, SD = .31), one sample t(76) = -3.80, p < .001, and were now significantly 
above zero in the fire rescue group (M = .16, SD = .34), one sample t(83) = 4.32, p < .001.8 
Although like any measure D scores are not a process-pure measure of underlying evaluations 
(Conrey et al., 2005) and thus their absolute values and even rank order are subject to extraneous 
variation, this time 2 pattern of only those individuals below zero on the IAT distribution at time 
1 corroborates our prediction and demonstrates continued deviation from zero in the control 
story. This even more conservative test of our revision hypothesis builds support for the theory 
and corroborates the pattern from Experiment 1a (the results reported in Experiment 1a hold as 
well when submitted to this same analysis). 
 Explicit evaluations toward Francis West. Explicit evaluations toward Francis West 
were measured at time 1 and time 2. Analysis using a 2 (Measurement Time: time 1 and time 2) 
x 2 (Story Condition: control or fire rescue) mixed ANOVA revealed that a main effect of 
measurement time was qualified by the expected time X story condition interaction, F(1,280) = 
1030.93, p < .001, ηp2 = .786. Simple effects tests revealed that explicit liking of Francis West 
increased from time 1 (M = 1.30, SD = .71) to time 2 (M = 5.93, SD = 1.47) in the fire rescue 
                                                
8 This analysis differentially includes participants who completed the compatible-first order 
(Francis+bad) over the incompatible-first order (Francis+good), as the compatible-first order 
tends to produce more negative scores. However, we find the same results when splitting by 
order: D scores become positive in the fire rescue condition in both orders, M = .16, SD = .33, 
t(43) = 3.21, p = .003, and M = .16, SD = .35, t(39) = 2.86, p = .007, while D scores are still 
negative in the control story condition in both orders, M = -.12, SD = .31, t(50) = -2.78, p = .008, 
and M = -.16, SD = .32, t(25) = -2.60, p = .015, respectively. 
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condition, F(1,280) = 2129.35, p < .001, ηp2 = .884. No such change from time 1 (M = 1.17, SD 
= .46) to time 2 (M = 1.12, SD = .43) took place in the control group, F(1,280) = .17, p = .680. 
Story condition effects on other questionnaire measures. As in Experiment 1a, 
confusion with the story was higher in the control condition (M = 2.79, SD = 1.67) than in the 
fire rescue condition (M = 2.19, SD = 1.62), t(281) = 3.07, p = .002, Cohen’s d = .365. The 
addition of the hate-crime element to the story did not appear to stem this trend of higher 
confusion in the control condition. But once more, controlling for (centered) confusion did not 
reduce the time X condition interaction to nonsignificance, p = .007.  
Discussion 
 We replicated reason-based revision using a different implicit measure. Whereas 
participants’ negative implicit evaluations toward Francis West were not qualified by time in the 
control condition, those in the fire rescue condition showed a significant reversal from negative 
to positive.  Those positive evaluations in the fire rescue condition after receiving the final 
information were also significantly more positive than the neutral point; however, the final 
negative evaluations in the control condition did not differ from neutral overall, departing from 
the results in Experiment 1a with the AMP. A follow-up analysis, however, showed that among 
those participants most critical for the demonstration of revision – those who did show an initial 
negative implicit evaluation – negative evaluations persisted in the control group and were 
reversed in the fire rescue group.  
 As of yet, our results do not yet address the how or why of implicit evaluation revision.  
Our argument is that it is the relevance of the fire rescue information to the initial story that 
prompts revision through reinterpretation. The story presented in the Francis West paradigm 
appears to fit this bill, but the work to demonstrate the operative mechanisms has yet to be done. 
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In fact, the failure of self-reported extent of thinking to moderate revision in Experiment 1a 
could be seen as an initial point against this idea, if reinterpretation of prior story events requires 
any amount of deliberation about the story, as we suspect that it might. However, this single 
questionnaire item may not adequately tap the degree to which reinterpretation took place, either 
because introspective access to this mechanism is weak (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), or the 
reinterpretation that is required is easy to execute in this particular case. As such, we examine the 
conditions under which reason-based implicit evaluation change occurs in Experiment 2. 
Experiment 2 
 To identify whether reinterpretation of the initial information is critical for revision, we 
compared evaluation change in the fire rescue condition with another condition in which 
extremely positive information about Francis is presented, but does not prompt a reinterpretation 
of Francis’ initial, negative actions. To the extent that these conditions differ, our account that a 
change in the meaning of the initial information plays a crucial role in revision is supported. 
Method 
 Participants. Two hundred ninety-nine participants were recruited on Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk website (mturk.com) for this study in return for $0.75 in compensation (50.3% 
male; Mage = 33.9 years, SD = 11.7). We intended to collect data from 300 participants, but a 
technical error prevented one participant from completing the study, and that person was still 
compensated; thus, the study received data from only 299 individuals. As in Experiment 1a, this 
number of participants allowed us to fill each of our between-participants story conditions with 
data from approximately 100 people. 
 Materials. The story was identical to that used in Experiment 1a, except with an 
additional between-participants story condition added which served as a positive control 
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condition. This was meant to present participants with a piece of information about Francis West 
at time 2 that would be equally as positive as the fire rescue, but not providing an explanation for 
his initial, seemingly negative behaviors.  Thus, the positive control condition would associate 
strong positive information with Francis just as the fire rescue condition does, while not 
justifying the recasting of the prior negative information. This comparison could illuminate 
whether the effect observed in Experiments 1a and 1b is due to the addition of an extremely 
positive piece of information to the participant’s corpus of knowledge about Francis West to 
such a degree that it “swamps out” the previously learned negative information without any 
revision of the prior associative expressions per se, or as we predict, depends on a 
reinterpretation of the prior information.  
 In the positive control condition at time 2 participants read the following statement, 
pretested in a separate sample to be equally as positive to the action of saving two children from 
a raging fire:9 “At a different point in time, Francis West was in the news because he was at a 
subway station when he noticed that a baby had crawled and fallen onto the tracks below. Seeing 
a rapidly approaching train, Francis jumped down onto the tracks, grabbed the baby, and climbed 
up to safety a split-second before the train came roaring past.”  Besides this difference, the new 
positive control condition proceeded in an identical fashion to the other two.  
 Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1a, except for the addition of 
the positive control condition, and the manipulation check asking participants to identify the final 
                                                
9 Fifty Mturk workers read eight heroic actions that a hypothetical individual might do (e.g., 
“Waded into the water above Niagara Falls to save two stranded kids”) along with a description 
similar to the fire rescue condition (“Ran into two burning homes to save two children from a 
fire”). These nine actions were presented in random order on a single screen, and participants 
evaluated how positively they would view a person who did the action on a 1-100 scale (Not 
positive at all to As positive as possible). The fire rescue behavior (M = 92.4, SD = 10.5) and the 
subway rescue scenario (M = 91.7, SD = 16.1) did not differ, t(49) = .54, p = .595. 
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information they read about Francis, with 3 answer choices reflecting the time 2 information 
presented in the three story conditions. Besides these changes, participants viewed the same 
stories and took the same AMPs and questionnaire measures as used in Experiment 1a. At the 
end of the study, participants completed measures for an unrelated investigation. 
Results 
 Data preparation.  In line with Payne et al. (2005), 14 participants familiar with 
Mandarin or Cantonese (4.7% of cases), and 17 participants who used a single key on every trial 
of at least one of the two AMPs (5.7% of cases), were excluded, leaving 268 cases for analysis.  
Implicit evaluations toward Francis West. We assessed implicit evaluations toward 
Francis West by analyzing judgments of ideographs in a 2 (Measurement Time: time 1 and time 
2) x 2 (Prime Person: Francis West and neutral) x 3 (Story Condition: control, fire rescue, or 
subway rescue) mixed design, with the first two factors manipulated within-participants and the 
third manipulated between-participants.  
 Every effect in the design was statistically significant, but of most interest, the three-way 
interaction between time, prime person, and story condition obtained, F(2,265) = 20.004, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .131. There was once again no interaction between time and prime person in the 
control condition, F(1,265) = .16, p = .692, with only a main effect of prime person, F(1,265) = 
57.17, p < .001, ηp2 = .177, such that Francis West was evaluated less positively (M = .40, SD = 
.26) than neutral faces (M = .64, SD = .20).  
Once more, in the fire rescue condition there was a significant interaction between time 
and prime person, F(1,265) = 76.87, p < .001, ηp2 =.225. At time 1, Francis was significantly less 
implicitly positive (M = .39, SD = .27) than the neutral faces (M = .64, SD = .19), F(1,265) = 
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41.43, p < .001, ηp2 = .135. However, at time 2, Francis was significantly more positive (M = .67, 
SD = .23) than the neutral faces (M = .53, SD = .21), F(1,265) = 14.78, p < .001, ηp2 = .053.  
In the subway condition, there was also a significant interaction between time and prime 
face, F(1,265) = 12.65, p < .001, ηp2 = .046. At time 1, Francis was significantly less implicitly 
positive (M = .36, SD = .27) than the neutral faces (M = .64, SD = .21), F(1,265) = 54.83, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .171. At time 2, Francis was still significantly less positive (M = .50, SD = .30) than 
the neutral faces (M = .62, SD = .24), F(1,265) = 11.45, p = .001, ηp2 = .041. The increase in 
implicit positivity of Francis West from time 1 to time 2 was significant, F(1,265) = 17.74, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .063. Thus, though the subway rescue condition significantly attenuated the implicit 
negativity of Francis relative to neutral faces, only the fire rescue condition evidenced a 
significant revision of a negative evaluation into a positive one. Figure 3 displays the mean 
proportion of ideographs judged more pleasant than average at time 2 for both Francis and the 
neutral faces within each story condition. 
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Figure 3. Mean proportion of ideographs judged more pleasant than average in Experiment 2, by 
measurement time, story condition, and face prime. Error bars are standard errors. 
 
 Explicit evaluations toward Francis West. The effect of story condition on explicit 
evaluations toward Francis West at time 2 was assessed using a one-way ANOVA (control, fire 
rescue, or subway rescue). As before, explicit evaluations toward Francis West at time 2 varied 
between conditions, F(2,265) = 430.42, p < .001, ηp2 = .765. Participants explicitly liked Francis 
the most in the fire rescue condition (M = 5.86, SD = 1.35), followed by the subway rescue 
condition (M = 2.45, SD = 1.18), and finally the control condition (M = 1.21, SD = 0.60). Each of 
the simple comparisons between conditions was significant, all ps < .001. In addition, one-
sample t-tests revealed that each group mean significantly diverged from the midpoint, all ps < 
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.001; thus, as with implicit evaluations, the subway rescue information did not make Francis 
West explicitly positive, though he was seen as less negative than in the control condition. 
 Story condition effects on other questionnaire measures. Subjective confusion with 
the story was lowest in the fire rescue condition (M = 2.01, SD = 1.58), higher in the control 
condition (M = 3.15, SD =1.95), and highest in the subway rescue condition (M = 3.62, SD = 
1.96), F(2,265) = 18.85, p < .001, ηp2 = .125. Including subjective confusion in the analysis of 
implicit evaluations did not produce any interactions or change the significance of any effects.  
 As in Experiment 1a, there was also a story condition effect on the reported extent to 
which participants thought about the new information that they were presented with at time 2, 
F(2,265) = 3.03, p = .05, ηp2 = .022. Participants thought the most about the information in the 
fire rescue condition (M = 5.96, SD = 1.40), and less in both the control condition (M = 5.56, SD 
= 1.34), and the subway rescue condition (M = 5.49, SD = 1.42). Extent of thinking was greater 
in the fire rescue condition relative to the others, F(1,265) = 5.93, p = .016, ηp2 = .022, but the 
subway rescue and control conditions did not differ, F(1,265) = .10, p = .758. This suggests that 
participants thought most about the information in the fire rescue condition.   
 Moderation by extent of thinking. Although the revision effect was not moderated by 
the self-reported “extent of thinking about the story” measure in Experiment 1a, when we added 
this as a covariate in the implicit evaluations analysis in the present experiment, the four-way 
interaction (between time, prime person, story condition, and extent of thinking) was marginal, 
F(2,262) = 2.74, p = .066, ηp2 = .021. Examining the story conditions separately revealed that the 
time X prime person X extent of thought interaction was not significant in the control or subway 
rescue conditions, both ps > .5, but was in the fire rescue condition, F(1,93) = 6.14, p = .015, ηp2 
= .062. The effect was such that the time X prime person interaction (the revision effect) was 
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stronger at high levels of thinking about the story (+1 SD) (F[1,93] = 55.00, p < .001, ηp2 = .372) 
than at low levels (-1 SD) (F[1,93] = 12.03, p = .001, ηp2 = .115, though as the numbers show, 
the revision effect was still significant with less reported thinking. 
Discussion 
 Building on the initial studies, the control positive condition appeared markedly different 
from the fire rescue condition. Whereas reading about the fire rescue produced significant 
reversal, reading about the subway story reduced, but did not eliminate, participants’ initial, 
negative impression.  These results are consistent with our account that the ability of new 
information to prompt reinterpretation of prior information is key to full revision in this 
paradigm.  The reduction, but not reversal, of negative implicit evaluations in the subway 
condition is consistent with the idea that the subway information was simply added to, but did 
not reverse, the initially learned negative information. In this sense the subway control condition 
bears some similarity to learning in the Bob paradigm, in which counter-attitudinal learning 
proceeds by presenting participants with unconnected statements about Bob that are opposite in 
valence, but do not contradict the previously learned information in any other way; in this 
paradigm, implicit evaluation revision generally proceeds slowly (e.g., Rydell & McConnell, 
2006; Rydell et al., 2007) unless the initial impression is positive, and the new behavior is 
extreme and negative (Cone & Ferguson, in press).  Although Cone and Ferguson (in press) 
found that a single, sufficiently extreme negative behavior was enough to significantly alter 
initial positive implicit evaluations toward a novel target, they too found that a single, extreme 
positive behavior was not enough to overturn an initial negative implicit impression.  Together 
with the findings of the current study, this suggests that revision might be especially effective if 
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new information is added in such a way that also changes the meaning of the original 
information. 
 These findings also speak to some theoretical assumptions about how propositional 
information might modify implicit evaluations.  The APE model (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 
2006) assumes that the affirmation of new, counter-attitudinal propositional information can 
create a new counter-attitudinal association, which could then affect implicit evaluations.  
However, here, participants in both the fire and subway conditions presumably affirmed (i.e., 
believed, processed) the new information, but reversal only happened in the former and not the 
latter case.  This finding thus illustrates the (theoretical) importance of identifying when new 
propositional learning can modify implicit evaluations. 
 We still, however, do not know much about the process of reinterpretation.  Are 
participants effortfully reinterpreting the previous information? Though self-reported extent of 
thinking marginally moderated the overall revision effect, the phrasing of this single question 
(“When you read that final piece of information about Francis West, to what extent did you think 
about the details you read earlier in the study?”) made it specific to how much the participants 
felt that they explicitly revisited the previous details. As such, it likely did not adequately tap 
other forms of thinking, such as extent of thinking about the new information or rapid 
comprehension that did not require deliberate revisiting of the old information. The item also 
does not indicate what participants did with the old information when revisiting it (reinterpret, 
rehearse, reject, etc.). We therefore take this marginal effect as only suggestive evidence that 
some type of active thinking is involved in revision in these studies, and in the following studies 
we examine which aspects of active thinking are most important in producing revision.   
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In our next study, we tested whether some minimal degree of effortful processing is 
required to produce revision of implicit evaluations. To do so, we examine if this revision 
requires effort, and therefore will be reduced when one is under high cognitive load.    
Experiment 3 
Method 
 Participants. Four-hundred fifty-one individuals were recruited from Mturk to 
participate in exchange for $1.00 (47.9% male; Mage = 34.86, SD = 11.8). A priori, we wanted to 
collect data from 450 participants so as to fill each of six between-participants conditions with 75 
participants each. Given the results of our previous experiments, we determined via power 
analysis that a full 100 per cell was not necessary to achieve our effects, and reduced this amount 
to 75 for reasons of cost (while remaining above 90% power). Data from an additional 
participant were collected because one person completed the study without submitting the 
request for payment on Mturk. 
Materials. The story used in Experiment 1a was used, and the stimuli were identical to 
those used in the previous studies. From the questionnaire, we dropped the item gauging 
difficulty making sense of the story after learning the final information (due to redundancy with 
the general confusion question) and the item asking the extent to which participants thought 
about the prior story details when learning the final information. That item had seemed to affect 
the revision results in one of the two studies in which it had been included (marginal interaction 
in Experiment 2) but not the other (Experiment 1a). We suspected that given the unburdened 
ability of all participants to consider the final information for as long as they wished, this “extent 
of thinking” measure might not effectively tap into meaningful variation in effortful thinking. To 
get more specifically at the type of thinking that might matter to the revision effect, we used the 
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following two items, solely in the low- and high-cognitive load conditions: One asking 
participants how much they went back to think about the new story details after they no longer 
had to remember the number, and a second item asking the same about the old story details, both 
on a scale from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much). We did not ask participants to self-report their 
extent of thinking in the no-load conditions, as we chose to focus here on which type of 
information participants would selectively choose to mentally revisit once given the opportunity 
to after the relieving of cognitive load.  
 Procedure. All participants completed the first story session and the first AMP, and were 
then told that they would be reading one final piece of information about Francis West. 
Participants in the no load condition were then presented with this information and moved on to 
the second AMP as was done in Experiments 1-2.  In the two cognitive load conditions, 
however, participants were informed that they would do an additional task while considering this 
information: they would need to maintain a number in memory, to be reported immediately after 
moving on from the new story information. Such a cognitive load induction technique has been 
used successfully in prior research (see, e.g., Gilbert & Osborne, 1989).  When they understood 
these directions and were ready to proceed, participants were presented with either a random 2-
digit number (low load) or random 8-digit number (high load) for twenty seconds. Then, the 
page automatically advanced to the final information about Francis West (either fire rescue or 
control). When participants were ready to advance, they were then presented with a textbox in 
which they had up to fifteen seconds to enter the number they were previously presented with. 
Following this, the page automatically advanced to the second AMP.  All participants then 
completed the explicit questionnaire items, and finally an unrelated experiment.  
Results 
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 Data preparation. Following the same procedure as our previous studies, 6 participants 
familiar with Mandarin or Cantonese were excluded from all analyses (1.3% of cases), as were 
34 additional participants who used only one of the two response keys on all of the trials of at 
least one of the two AMPs (7.5% of cases), following established procedure (Payne et al., 2005). 
This left 411 cases for analysis. 
 Memory for the number in the low and high load conditions. We coded the numbers 
that participants recalled in the low and high load conditions for errors (omitted or extra digits, 
digits out of order). Predictably, perfect recall of the number occurred more frequently in the low 
load (99.25%) than high load condition (80.42%), χ2(1) = 26.18, p < .001. To ensure that all data 
from the low and high load conditions are drawn from participants who had engaged in the 
cognitive load task (and thus experienced the manipulation as intended), we included in all 
analyses only those participants who perfectly recalled the number (Gilbert & Osborne, 1989). 
Getting the number correct had no effect on comprehension score, F(1,407) = .072, p = .788, nor 
did its interaction with story condition, F(1,407) = .064, p = .800. Where instructive, we also 
report findings for those participants who failed to correctly recall the number assigned to them. 
 Implicit evaluations toward Francis West. We submitted the proportion of ideographs 
judged as more pleasant than average to a 2 (Measurement Time: time 1 and time 2) x 2 (Prime 
Person: Francis West and Neutral) x 2 (Story Condition: Control or Fire Rescue) x 3 (Cognitive 
Load: No Load, Low Load, or High Load) mixed ANOVA, with the first two factors 
manipulated within-participants and the latter two manipulated between-participants.  
 Replicating the previous studies, the three-way interaction between measurement time, 
person, and story condition was significant, F(1,376) = 36.55, p < .001, ηp2 = .089. However, this 
effect was significantly moderated by cognitive load, F(1,376) = 3.43, p = .034, ηp2 = .018. 
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Planned follow up analyses indicated that the contrast of high load vs. the other conditions (no 
load and low load) moderated the revision effect, F(1,376) = 6.39, p = .012, ηp2 = .017, while the 
comparison of no load vs. low load did not, F(1,376) = .46, p = .498.  In the high load condition, 
there was no significant interaction between time, person, and story, F(1,376) = 1.70, p = .193, 
whereas in the other two conditions there was, F(1,376) = 43.75, p < .001, ηp2 = .104. As a result, 
in the high load condition Francis West did not exceed the neutral faces in positivity at time 2 in 
the fire rescue condition, F(1,376) = .245, p = .621, while he did in the other two load conditions 
combined, F(1,376) = 25.102, p < .001, ηp2 = .063. Figure 4 displays the mean proportion of 
ideographs judged pleasant for both Francis West and the neutral faces within each story and 
cognitive load condition at time 2.10 The interaction between the revision effect and the high load 
vs. other conditions contrast remains significant even if including only those participants who 
had perfect comprehension, correctly identified Francis in the photo lineup, and/or correctly 
identified the final story detail they had been presented with, all ps < .05. 
Although the exclusion of those not perfectly remembering the number during the 
cognitive load task reduces the sample size by 28 individuals in the high load condition to 115 
(80.42%), this is not likely to be responsible for the lack of a time X person X story effect in the 
high load condition. This is because when we conducted our revision analysis on solely those 28 
participants in the high load condition who failed to recall the number, we found significant 
revision among this sample, evidenced by a significant interaction between time, person, and 
story, F(1,26) = 6.78, p = .015, ηp2 = .207. If the 28 participants who failed to recall the number 
                                                
10 The lack of interaction between time, person prime, and story in the high load condition is not 
due to differences at time 1. At time 1, there was no interaction between person, story condition, 
and cognitive load, whether the latter is coded as the original three-level factor, F(2,376) = .71, p 
= .492, or a contrast of the high load group vs. the other two: no load and low load; F(1,378) = 
1.33, p = .250. Indeed, in the high-load condition at time 1, Francis was more negative than 
neutral faces in both the control and fire rescue conditions (both ps < .001). 
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in the high load condition show significant revision, then reduced sample size is unlikely to be 
the explanation for why the 115 participants who did remember the number failed to show it.  
  
 
Figure 4. Mean proportion of ideographs judged more pleasant than average in Experiment 3 at 
time 2 by cognitive load condition, story condition, and face prime. Error bars are standard 
errors. 
 Moderation by extent of thinking. We conducted two additional analyses to determine 
whether, in the load conditions, the extent to which participants reported that they went back to 
consider the new information and the old information moderated the size of the revision effect.  
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In the first analysis, we examined the moderating effect of thinking about the new information. 
The three-way effect of time, person, and story condition was moderated by the amount of 
thinking about the new information, F(1,244) = 4.27, p = .04, ηp2 = .017. Probing this interaction 
1 SD above and below the mean level of thinking about the new information, we found that the 
revision effect (time X person X story condition) was significant at high levels of going back to 
think about the new information in the story, F(1,244) = 15.76, p < .001, ηp2 = .061, but not at 
low levels of going back to think about the new information, F(1,244) = .89, p = .347. Adding 
cognitive load condition to this model (low vs. high load) did not qualify the effect, F(1,240) = 
.12, p = .731.  Thus, the experience of going back to think on the new information appears to 
moderate the revision effect, and this was the case regardless of the amount of cognitive load. 
In the second analysis, we examined the moderating effect of thinking about the old 
information. The three-way revision effect was not qualified by the amount of thinking about the 
old information, F(1,244) = .03, p = .854. However, when cognitive load was added to the 
model, there was a significant interaction between time, person, story condition, cognitive load, 
and extent of thinking about the old information, F(1,240) = 9.52, p = .002, ηp2 = .038. 
Investigating this interaction revealed that for low levels of thinking about the old information, 
cognitive load did not moderate the revision effect, which was strong. However, at high levels of 
thinking about the old information, cognitive load moderated the revision effect, F(1,240) = 
12.403, p = .001, ηp2  = .049. This effect is such that in the fire rescue condition, there is reversal 
only for low load (F(1,240) = 19.103, p < .001, ηp2 = .074), but not high load (F(1,240) = .608, p 
= .436). In high load, Francis is only neutral at time 2, with unfamiliar faces and Francis not 
differing, F(1,240) = .989, p = .321, even though he's significantly negative at time 1. Thus, 
when participants reported thinking a lot about the old information after no longer needing to 
 55 
remember the number, this tended to worsen the revision effect in the high cognitive load 
condition. Although one might have plausibly supposed that such thinking indicates active 
efforts at reinterpretation, it seems that such thinking is not an indicator of successfully making 
sense of the story. If thinking about the new information but not the old information seems to be 
linked with strong revision, this may mean that changing one’s interpretation of the story is 
experienced as extensive thought about the new information, but not the old. 
Explicit evaluations toward Francis West. We assessed explicit liking of Francis West 
in a 2 (Story Condition: Control vs. Fire Rescue) x 2 (Cognitive Load: No Load, Low Load, or 
High Load) ANOVA. Results indicated a main effect of story condition, F(1,376) = 1281.76, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .773, such that liking was higher in the fire rescue condition (M = 5.69, SD = 1.59) 
than in the control condition (M = 1.25, SD = 0.61). There was no main effect of cognitive load 
condition, F(2,376) = 1.66, p = .192, or interaction between story condition and cognitive load 
condition, F(2,376) = 2.17, p = .116. Thus, while cognitive load affected implicit evaluations, it 
did not affect explicit evaluations toward Francis. 
Discussion 
 Consistent with our account that active thinking about the information is central to our 
reinterpretation effects, these results show that the availability of at least minimal cognitive 
resources is a necessary condition for full revision.  Those in the high load condition, in 
comparison with those in low load or no load conditions, showed no moderation of their implicit 
evaluations by condition.  Participants with less or no load, meanwhile, showed the pattern of 
results observed in our previous studies: significant reversal in the fire rescue condition and no 
change in the control condition. The failure of those in the high load condition to show the 
revision effect was not attributable to a failure to learn the new story information, or even an 
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inability to come to the correct conclusions about the story when answering the comprehension 
questions. Instead, it seems that the high load burden interrupted not the ability to process the 
new information, which participants were able to do when queried, but rather their tendency to 
do so. The moderation of the revision effect by extent of going back to think about the new 
information suggests that among those who did, the reversal effect occurred. However, the 
failure of revision overall in the high load condition does suggest that on the whole, participants 
in this condition moved on to the AMP without doing this. 
 One interesting question is why did the self-report measure of going back to think about 
the new information produce a stronger reversal effect, while thinking about the old information 
seemed to do the opposite (at least under high cognitive load)? This question raises the issue of 
the type of active thinking required for revision in our studies. It is hard to interpret what 
participants might mean when they report thinking about the “old” versus the “new” information.  
These questions are too broad to pinpoint whether participants are rehearsing, reinterpreting, 
elaborating, rejecting, etc.  Thus, in the next study we more precisely measured the type of 
thinking that we predict should produce revision: recognition that the new information produced 
reinterpretation of what had been previously learned about Francis.  
Experiment 4 
The comparison of the fire rescue and subway rescue conditions in Experiment 2 
suggested that the revision effect emerged because of reinterpretation.  In other words, revision 
occurred in the fire but not in the subway condition because of the degree to which the new, 
counter-attitudinal information was able to explain away the initial information only in the 
former.  The first goal of Experiment 4 was to extend the evidence in support of this argument by 
measuring the degree to which participants report reinterpreting the earlier story information 
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after learning the fire rescue information about Francis West, to show that such subjective 
reinterpretation does indeed predict the revised implicit evaluations of Francis. 
A second goal of Experiment 4, however, was to begin to address how reinterpretation 
might relate to, or differ from, other forms of thinking about the new information that could be 
responsible for our effects. In particular, to this point it is unclear how reinterpretation relates to 
research on elaboration.  Much research has suggested that the extent to which one thoughtfully 
processes new information is an important predictor of its effect on explicit evaluations (for 
reviews, see Barden & Tormala, 2014; Petty, Haugtvedt, & Smith, 1995). When persuasive 
information is more thoroughly elaborated, it has a more powerful impact on impressions. A few 
studies have found similar effects of elaboration on established (Briñol, Petty, & McCaslin, 
2009; Horcajo, Briñol, & Petty, 2010) or novel (Smith, De Houwer, & Nosek, 2013; Wyer, 
2010) implicit evaluations.  Of most relevance to our present purposes, Wyer (2010) found in 
one study that new information that suggested a reinterpretation of prior details did not produce 
revision of implicit evaluations unless participants were able to revisit all of the prior information 
upon which they had based their first impressions. Wyer (2010) argued, in line with Petty et al. 
(2006), that this suggested that for the old evaluation to be effectively tagged as false such that it 
would no longer impact implicit evaluations, participants needed this opportunity to carefully 
elaborate on the new revelation.  
 Is the reinterpretation in our studies effective because it forces participants to engage in 
extensive amounts of elaboration on the new information, but not necessarily reinterpretation in 
particular?  That is, perhaps the critical ingredient in reinterpretation in our paradigm is that it 
simply is an effective way to get people to do a lot of thinking about the new information, 
regardless of whether those thoughts are specifically about reinterpreting the meaning of Francis’ 
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earlier actions.  From this perspective, the reason we have not seen revision in the subway 
condition (Experiment 2), for instance, is because that information, for whatever reason, was not 
sufficiently surprising or interesting to trigger enough elaboration (on that new information) to 
produce revision.11 And, the findings from Experiment 3 – that high cognitive load prevented full 
revision of implicit evaluations – show that some amount of active thinking is necessary to 
produce revision, but do not disambiguate what sort of elaboration participants are engaging in 
(reinterpreting the earlier details or otherwise).  
If the critical aspect of our paradigm is that it produces a large amount of general 
elaboration on the new information, such that change is driven by the degree to which people 
think carefully about the new information in general rather that reinterpretation of the earlier 
details in particular, then just the degree of thinking about the new information should predict 
revision, and any self-reported reinterpretation would not independently contribute to the effect.  
However, if reinterpretation is the specific form of elaborative thinking that drives the effects, 
then we should find that the belief that new information changes the meaning of the old 
information predicts revision, even when the extent of thinking more generally is controlled.  
Such a finding would imply that the proximal mechanism in our studies is the recognition that 
the new information changes the meaning of the old.  We test these two accounts in the next 
study.  
                                                
11 Indeed, we found that participants in the subway rescue condition in Study 2 reported thinking 
about the prior story details less than those in the fire rescue condition. However, when we went 
back and compared the fire rescue and subway rescue conditions with only those participants 
selecting the highest value of “7” on the thought extent scale, story condition still moderated the 
interaction between time and person, F(1,71) = 11.66, p = .001, ηp2 = .141. At time 2, Francis 
was still significantly more negative than control faces in the subway condition (F(1,71) = 5.29, 
p = .024, ηp2 = .069) but significantly more positive than control faces in the fire condition 
(F(1,71) = 14.52, p < .001, ηp2 = .170). So, reporting the max value on the measure of how much 
they thought about the story does not fully account for the difference in revision between the two 
conditions.   
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 We included only the fire rescue condition, and added three items: an item about 
reinterpretation (how much does the new information change the meaning of the prior events), 
and two items gauging degree of thinking about the new information more generally (how 
rapidly vs. gradually one’s thinking proceeded, and how extensively one deliberated about the 
new information).  We predicted that degree of thinking carefully (either gradually and/or 
extensively) might significantly predict revision, in line with previous research (Briñol et al., 
2009; Petty et al., 2006; Wyer, 2010).  However, we also predicted that the reinterpretation item 
would also uniquely predict revision even while controlling for careful thinking.  This would 
suggest that the reinterpretation happening in our studies – which is responsible for the revision 
effects – is a more specific mechanism than general elaboration on the new information. 
Method 
 Participants. We recruited 75 participants from Mechanical Turk to participate in the 
current study in exchange for $1.75 (36% male; Mage = 36.56 years, SD = 11.47). This smaller 
sample size was determined a priori based on the lack of between-participants conditions in the 
current study. 
 Materials. To assess whether revised implicit evaluations of Francis West would be 
predicted by the degree to which participants reinterpreted the earlier story details, we asked 
participants to respond to the following question: “When you got the new information about 
Francis West a moment ago, how much did this new information change the meaning of Francis 
West's earlier actions?” on a scale from 1 (Not at all) to 9 (A large amount). 
 To begin to address whether reinterpretation in particular is predictive of revised implicit 
evaluations of Francis West, rather than elaborative thinking more generally, we added two 
further questions. The first was designed to measure the sense participants had of how quickly or 
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gradually their thoughts about Francis came together after learning the new information. 
Specifically, they read: “Sometimes, our thoughts come together quickly. At other times, our 
thoughts come together more gradually. When you got the new information about Francis West a 
moment ago, did your thoughts about the meaning of Francis' actions come together quickly or 
more gradually?” Participants responded on a scale from 1 (quickly) to 9 (gradually). Our second 
question aimed at tapping into the degree to which participants elaborated more generally (vs. 
reinterpretation in particular) focused on how extensive participants felt their thinking to be. 
They read: “Sometimes, we deliberate a lot, and our thinking is very extensive.  At other times, 
we deliberate less, and our thinking is less extensive. When you got the new information about 
Francis West a moment ago, how much thinking did you do - not much deliberation or a lot of 
deliberation?” and responded on a scale from 1 (Not much deliberation) to 9 (A lot of 
deliberation). All of the other explicit measures from Experiment 3 were included, except for 
those dealing with the cognitive load manipulation from that study (including the extent to which 
they went back to think about the new and old information after no longer needing to remember 
the number), since the cognitive load task was not included here. 
 Procedure. All participants completed the fire rescue condition. They first read the Time 
1 information, followed by the first AMP, and then were presented with the Time 2 fire rescue 
information as presented in Experiments 1a, 2, and 3, with one alteration to their instructions: To 
encourage more variability in the extent of reinterpretation, we simply asked participants to think 
about the final information, rather than specifically to think about how it relates to what they had 
previously read. 
 Next, right after reading the Time 2 (fire rescue) information, but before the second 
AMP, participants responded to the three questions regarding the nature of their thoughts at the 
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time of learning the final details about Francis West. To increase the chance that participants 
would discriminate between these three (potentially highly related) questions, we presented all 
three questions on the same screen and required participants to read all of them in advance, for at 
least 30 seconds, before moving on to answer them. To reduce potential noise from different 
question orders, we fixed the order of the questions, such that the meaning change question came 
first, followed by the thought speed question, and finally the deliberation extent question. 
Participants then completed the second AMP, the rest of the explicit measures, and were 
thanked, debriefed, and compensated. 
Results 
 Data preparation. Following our procedure from the previous studies, we excluded from 
all analyzes the data from those participants who reported that they knew Mandarin or Cantonese 
(2 participants; 2.67%), and any additional participants who used a single response key on all 
trials of at least 1 AMP (4 participants; 5.33%). This left 69 participants in the analysis. 
 Implicit evaluations toward Francis West. Implicit evaluations were once again 
measured from the average proportion of pleasantness judgments of ideographs following the 
different face primes on the AMP. These AMP judgments were analyzed in a 2 (Measurement 
Time: time 1 and time 2) x 2 (Prime Person: Francis West and control faces) repeated-measures 
ANOVA. The anticipated interaction between measurement time and prime person was 
significant, F(1,68) = 23.33, p < .001, ηp2 = .255. At time 1, Francis West was significantly less 
implicitly positive than control faces: Ideographs following Francis primes were judged to be 
more pleasant than average significantly less often (M = .37, SD = .28) than ideographs 
following control face primes (M = .57, SD = .20), F(1,68) = , p  < .001, ηp2 = .260. At time 2, 
however, implicit evaluations had reversed. Ideographs following Francis primes were judged to 
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be more pleasant than average significantly more often (M = .66, SD = .27) than ideographs 
following control faces primes (M = .53, SD = .23), F(1,68) = 9.30, p = .003, ηp2 = .120. 
 Subjective thought measures and implicit evaluations. Next, to examine the relationship 
between the type of thinking that participants reported doing when reading the final information 
about Francis West and revised implicit evaluations toward him, we conducted a planned 
multiple linear regression analysis. The dependent variable was the average proportion of 
“pleasant” judgments following Francis West primes at time 2 for each participant, with average 
pleasantness judgments of ideographs following Francis primes at time 1, and control face 
primes at time 1 and time 2 entered as three covariates. The three measures of thought type 
(extent to which the new information changed the meaning of the old, speed of thought, and 
extent of deliberation) were the key predictors. All six of the model predictors were entered 
simultaneously in a single step. This allowed us to examine the potential for each predictor to 
have independent influences on final implicit evaluations of Francis West. 
 Results showed that self-reported extent to which the new information changed the 
meaning of the prior details had a uniquely predictive relationship with final implicit positivity of 
Francis West, β = .287, t(62) = 2.30, p = .025. However, the measure of whether participants felt 
their thoughts came together rapidly vs. gradually had no relationship with time 2 implicit 
evaluations of Francis, β = .001, t(62) = .009, p = .993, and neither did the measure of how 
extensive participants reported their thinking to be, β = .052, t(62) = .420, p = .676. To check the 
robustness of the relationship between the measure of meaning change and implicit evaluations 
of Francis, as well as to determine whether either of the other two thought measures would 
predict implicit evaluations if the other thought measures were omitted, we conducted a series of 
exploratory follow-up regressions. Specifically, we examined regressions that included all 
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possible subsets of the three thought measures (with the same covariates of other AMP trial 
types), and found that in none of these models did either the thought speed or deliberation extent 
measure produce a significant effect, all ps > .5. Additionally, the meaning change measure 
never became non-significant, all ps < .05.  
 The sample as a whole also strongly endorsed the view that the new information changed 
the meaning of the prior events (M = 8.59 out of 9, SD = .99), that their thinking proceeded 
quickly rather than gradually (M = 2.41 out of 9, SD = 2.10, where higher values indicate more 
gradual thinking), and that their deliberation was not very extensive (M = 2.87 out of 9, SD = 
2.44), suggesting that revision here tends to be experienced as relatively easy (provided that 
cognitive resources are not maximally strained as in Experiment 3). Indeed, the reported extent 
to which the meaning of the initial story had changed was negatively correlated with both the 
degree to which thinking proceeded gradually, r(67) = -.41, p < .001, and extent of deliberation, 
r(67) = -.36, p = .002. The degree to which thinking was gradual (vs. fast) correlated positively 
with the extent of deliberation, r(67) = .45, p < .001. 
 Explicit evaluations toward Francis West. We once again used an average of responses 
on the 6 questions gauging liking of Francis West to assess changes in explicit liking over time. 
In a paired-samples t-test we found that, unsurprisingly, explicit liking of Francis West was 
much higher at time 2 (M = 6.27, SD = .97) than at time 1 (M = 1.21, SD = .51), t(68) = 38.83, p 
< .001. 
 Further, we conducted a similar multiple regression analysis to that performed on implicit 
evaluations toward Francis West. The index of explicit liking at time 2 was regressed on liking at 
time 1, as well as the belief that the new information changed the meaning of the old, the 
gradualness of thought, and the extent of thought. Paralleling the results with implicit 
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evaluations, we found that the extent to which participants felt the new information changed the 
meaning of the old information predicted time 2 explicit liking of Francis, β = .664, t(64) = 6.87, 
p < .001. However, both the thought speed measure (β = -.178, t[64] = -1.70, p = .095) and the 
deliberation extent measure (β = .070, t[64] = .69, p = .494) did not. 
Discussion 
The results supported our account that reinterpretation in the Francis West paradigm 
operates through a separate mechanism from general elaborative thinking. Although greater 
contemplative thought (in terms of either self-reported thought speed or extensiveness of 
deliberation) did not correlate significantly with greater revision, there was a unique, strong 
impact of belief that the new information changed the meaning of the prior story. Additionally, 
the distributions of responses on the measures and their negative correlation suggested that 
recognition of the new information’s explanatory value was linked with having thoughts come 
together quickly rather than gradually, and with less extensive thinking.  Reinterpretation seems 
to require at least a brief revisit of the prior story details so as to reframe their meaning, which 
requires the availability of at least some cognitive resources (Experiment 3), but it is not akin 
simply to extensive, general elaboration. 
Experiment 5 
Experiment 2 demonstrated that information that reinterprets the prior events produced 
much stronger change (indeed, a reversal) than equally positive information that does not 
reinterpret the prior events. Building the case that reinterpretation is the operative mechanism in 
driving the revision effect in the fire rescue condition, Experiment 4 showed that the extent to 
which participants believed that the final information altered the meaning of the previous events 
was significantly correlated with final implicit evaluations of Francis West, while more general 
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measures of elaboration were not. However, we have not yet demonstrated that reinterpretation 
per se mediates the greater revision in the fire rescue condition relative to other conditions.  
 In this next experiment, we tested mediation by including solely the fire rescue and 
subway rescue control conditions from Experiment 2. In both conditions, we expected that the 
extent to which participants reported the new information to alter the meaning of the prior story 
events should predict the degree of their revision (some reinterpretation might occur among 
participants in the subway condition if they, say, suspected that his heroics might suggest that 
there was some unknown good reason behind his seemingly negative actions in his neighbors’ 
homes). And, because the fire rescue information was expected to prompt this reinterpretation to 
a larger degree than the subway rescue information, we predicted that reinterpretation would 
mediate the effect of story condition on implicit evaluations.  In addition, we retained the more 
direct measure of general elaboration from Experiment 4 (extent of thinking) to demonstrate that 
only reinterpretation, and not elaborative thinking more generally, would mediate the effect of 
story condition on revised implicit evaluations of Francis West. 
Method 
 Participants. Two-hundred ninety-six participants recruited on Mturk participated in 
return for $1.75 (49% male; Mage = 33.72 years, SD = 10.58). We intended to recruit 300 
participants (150 per between-participants condition), but a transient server error interrupted the 
experiment for 4 individuals, making it impossible for them to continue the study. They were 
compensated for their time, but their incomplete data were not included in any analyses. 
 Materials. Participants viewed the events from the same initial story used in Experiments 
1a, 2, 3, and 4. The time 2 information consisted of that from either the fire rescue or subway 
rescue stories conditions used in Experiment 2. To measure the extent to which participants 
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subjectively reinterpreted the earlier story events in light of the new information, we asked 
participants to respond to the following single item adapted from Experiment 4: “When you got 
the new information about Francis West a moment ago, how much did this new 
information change the meaning of Francis West's earlier actions?” on a scale from 1 (Not at all) 
to 9 (Completely). To measure extent of more general elaborative thinking, participants 
responded to the same deliberation question from Experiment 4. All of the other explicit 
measures from Experiment 4 were included in this study, except for the item that gauged the 
speed with which thoughts came to mind. 
 Procedure. Participants were assigned to either the fire rescue or subway rescue 
condition, and completed the study in an identical fashion to Experiment 4. Immediately after 
reading the Time 2 information, participants responded to the subjective meaning change 
measure and the deliberation extensiveness measure before moving on to the second AMP. The 
order of these two questions was counterbalanced. To reduce the chance that the order in which 
the two questions were asked might influence participant responses, we again presented the 
questions on the same screen and asked participants to read both for at least 20 seconds before 
answering them. (The order of the two questions on the screen produced no significant effects in 
any analyses and is thus not discussed further.) 
 After answering the two questions about their thoughts when presented with the fire or 
subway rescue information, participants completed the second AMP, the rest of the explicit 
measures, and were thanked, debriefed and compensated. 
Results 
 Data preparation. In keeping with the exclusion criteria from our previous studies, we 
dropped all data from 9 participants for familiarity with Mandarin and/or Cantonese (3.0%) and 
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21 more for using a single key on every trial of at least one of the two AMPs, thus failing to 
follow instructions (7.1%). This left 266 cases for analysis. 
 Implicit evaluations toward Francis West. We analyzed average pleasantness 
judgments of ideographs on the AMP in a 2 (Measurement Time: time 1 and time 2) x 2 (Prime 
Person: Francis West and control faces) x 2 (Story Condition: fire rescue or subway rescue) 
mixed ANOVA, with the first two factors varying within-participants and the third between-
participants. The anticipated interaction between time, prime person, and story condition 
obtained, F(1,264) = 44.41, p < .001, ηp2 = .144. Simple effects tests revealed that at time 1, 
ideographs following the image of Francis West were rated more negatively than those following 
control faces in both the fire rescue condition (MFrancis = .38, SDFrancis = .28; MControl = .61, 
SDControl = .20; F[1,264], = 56.69, p < .001, ηp2 = .177) and the subway rescue condition (MFrancis 
= .36, SDFrancis = .28; MControl = .65, SDControl = .23; F[1,264], = 75.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .223). At 
time 2 in the fire rescue condition, implicit evaluations toward Francis West had reversed: 
ideographs following Francis primes were rated significantly more positively (M = .70, SD = .26) 
than those following control primes (M = .51, SD = .24), F(1,264) = 27.52, p < .001, ηp2 = .094. 
However, at time 2 in the subway rescue condition, the initial implicit evaluations were 
attenuated but not reversed. Ideographs following Francis primes were still rated significantly 
more negatively (M = .41, SD = .28) than ideographs following control face primes (M = .66, SD 
= .25), F(1,264) = 48.35, p < .001, ηp2 = .155. The interaction between time and prime person 
was significant in the fire rescue condition, F(1,264) = 108.58, p < .001, ηp2 = .291, but not in the 
subway rescue condition, F(1,264) = .55, p = .459. 
 Mediation by reinterpretation. Next, we turned to our central interest in this experiment: 
Examining whether subjective degree of change in the meaning of the old story details in light of 
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the new information would uniquely mediate the fire rescue vs. subway rescue condition 
difference in final positivity toward Francis West, even when controlling for extent of general 
elaboration. Using the PROCESS tool for SPSS (Hayes, 2013), we conducted a bias-corrected 
bootstrap mediation analysis using 10,000 samples. The dependent variable was the proportion 
of ideographs judged pleasant following Francis West primes at time 2, with proportions 
following neutral primes at time 1 and 2 and Francis primes at time 1 entered as covariates. The 
independent variable was story condition (fire = 1, subway = 0) and the mediators were self-
reported extent of change in the meaning of the initial story information and amount of 
deliberation. The two potential mediators were entered into a single model in parallel, but the 
interpretation of the results does not change in significance or direction if the mediators are run 
in separate analyses. Table 2 shows the zero-order correlations among all variables included in 
the model. 
 
Table 2. Zero-order correlations between all variables in the mediation model in Experiment 5 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Story condition       
2. Time 2 Francis pleasantness  .47***      
3. Time 2 control pleasantness -.29*** -.36***     
4. Time 1 Francis pleasantness  .03  .29***  .04    
5. Time 1 control pleasantness -.08  .01  .44*** -.08   
6. Meaning change  .89***  .49*** -.35***  .02 -.11  
7. Extent of deliberation -.12† -.07 -.07 -.07  .00 -.03 
  
Note. Cell values are Pearson correlations. Story condition is coded 0 = subway rescue, 1 = fire 
rescue. Pleasantness covariates refer to the average portion of ideographs judged to be more 
pleasant than average, by time and prime type. 
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*** p < .001. † p < .1.   
 The analysis yielded a significant indirect effect for the mediation of story condition 
through reinterpretation, estimate = .146, 95% CI: [.0361, .2438], Sobel Z = 2.56, p = .011. 
There was no parallel indirect effect through extent of deliberative thinking, estimate = .004, 
95% CI: [-.0034, .0177], Sobel Z = .78, p = .436. Figure 5 illustrates the mediation model. 
 
Figure 5. Mediation of story condition effect on time 2 judgments of ideograph pleasantness 
following Francis West primes, through subjective change in meaning of the time 1 information 
and general extensiveness of thinking in Experiment 5. Slopes are unstandardized regression 
coefficients. Model controls for judgments of ideographs following Francis West primes at time 
1 and control face primes at times 1 and 2. 
 a Coded 0: subway rescue, 1: fire rescue. *** p < .001, * p < .05. 
 
 Explicit evaluations toward Francis West. We assessed changes in explicit evaluations 
of Francis West in a 2 (Measurement Time: time 1 and time 2) x 2 (Story Condition: fire rescue 
or subway rescue) mixed ANOVA, with measurement time varying within-participants and story 
condition varying between-participants. The dependent variable was the average of the six 
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explicit liking scales used in each of the prior experiments. Story condition significantly affected 
the change in explicit liking over time, F(1,264) = 826.91, p < .001, ηp2 = .758. Francis increased 
in explicit positivity in the fire rescue condition from time 1 (M = 1.26, SD = .78) to time 2 (M = 
6.29, SD = 1.15), F(1,264) = 2488.31, p < .001, ηp2 = .904, as well as in the subway rescue 
condition from time 1 (M = 1.22, SD = .53) to time 2 (M = 2.06, SD = 1.00), F(1,264) = 62.43, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .191, but was significantly more positive at time 2 in the fire rescue condition than 
the subway rescue condition, F(1,264) = 1017.61, p < .001, ηp2 = .794. Furthermore, in a 
mediation analysis similar to that performed on implicit evaluations, we found that change in 
meaning of the initial story details mediated the effect of story condition on time 2 explicit liking 
of Francis West (controlling for time 1 explicit liking), estimate = 2.75, 95% bias-corrected 
bootstrap CI (10,000 samples): [2.1452, 3.2683], Sobel Z = 12.61, p < .001. On the other hand, 
there was no significant indirect effect through extent of deliberation, estimate = -.01, 95% bias-
corrected bootstrap CI (10,000 samples): [-.0391, .0107], Sobel Z = -.45, p = .650. 
Discussion 
 As predicted, the extent to which participants reported that the new information changed 
the meaning of the earlier details of the story mediated the effect of the new information (fire 
rescue vs. subway rescue) on revised implicit evaluations of Francis West. That is, participants 
tended to engage in more reinterpretation in the fire rescue condition, and the extent to which 
they did so predicted the greater revision in that condition. Importantly, we also found no 
evidence that a more general measure of elaborative thinking – which asked participants to report 
whether they deliberated over the new information more or less extensively – mediated the 
condition difference in revision. Even when controlling for a potential indirect effect of general 
extent of thinking, the degree to which participants reported the meaning of the old information 
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was changed by the new information significantly mediated the difference between the fire 
rescue and subway conditions. 
Experiment 6 
 For our final study, we addressed a potential concern that the revised implicit evaluations 
produced in this work might not be durable, “real” change, but perhaps a transient effect in 
which the powerful new information is especially salient. This might produce a brief shift that 
masquerades as real change, only to revert back to the initial evaluation after the passing of time.  
 We thus sought to demonstrate the longevity of the revised implicit evaluations. Indeed, a 
changing temporal context has been noted as a potential source of spontaneous recovery of 
conditioned responses (Bouton, 1993; Bouton, Westbrook, Corcoran, & Maren, 2006), and so 
demonstrating no return of the initial negative implicit evaluation of Francis West in the revision 
condition would be informative. In showing the endurance of the revised implicit evaluations, we 
can therefore suggest that there is nontrivial durability and thus “realness” to these evaluations.  
 To examine the effects of time on implicit evaluation revision, we repeated our basic 
revision procedure. Then, participants were invited to return for a follow-up study three days 
later. At that time, they were told simply that they might remember reading a story about a man 
named Francis West, but that before they would be asked about this they were to complete a 
different task (a third implicit measure). To show the durability of revision, we expected to 
observe relatively no change in revised implicit evaluations across the delay. To keep things 
simple, we used only the fire rescue and control conditions. 
Method 
 Participants. Three hundred and one participants were recruited from Mechanical Turk 
to take part in this two-session study in return for $1.50 paid compensation (53.5% male; Mage = 
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32.02 years, SD = 10.08). Because we were uncertain about how much attrition there would be 
between the two study sessions, and about whether the effect size would be much reduced after a 
delay, we opted a priori to collect data from 300 participants so as to fill each of two between-
participants conditions with 150 participants. Data from an additional participant were recorded 
because one person completed the study without submitting the request for payment on Mturk. 
 Materials. The story materials and AMP stimuli used in this study for time 1 and time 2 
were identical to those used in the previous experiments, including the control and fire rescue 
conditions, with one exception: At time 2, participants in that condition now read that he had a 
criminal history, yelled at children, and broke into the houses in revenge against them as well as 
to steal valuables (rather than that he started throwing rocks at the houses). This change was 
made to better equate the two conditions on the degree to which the final information provided 
motive for his actions. At time 3, the AMP used the same prime images as the preceding AMPs 
and one of two new randomly chosen sets of 40 ideographs as targets. Thus the same ideographs 
were never rated twice by an individual participant. The explicit evaluation toward Francis at 
time 3 was measured using the same scale as used at times 1 and 2. For exploratory purposes, we 
added a single item right before the demographic questions at time 2 asking participants to self-
report their mood (“Indicate how you feel right now, that is, at the present moment”) on a scale 
from 1 (very bad) to 7 (very good), and an item gauging the extent to which they thought the 
story depicted “real” events (“To what extent do you believe that the Francis West story is based 
on real events?”) from 1 (not at all) to 7 (completely).  
 Procedure. After being assigned to either the fire rescue or control story conditions, 
participants completed the same procedure as in Experiment 3’s no cognitive load condition, 
without the questions about thought type. To minimize noise, all participants completed the 
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AMP prior to the explicit evaluation scale at each measurement instance. After completing the 
various questionnaire items at time 2 (explicit evaluation scale, comprehension checks, 
manipulation checks, mood, belief the story was real, and demographic questions), participants 
were then informed that they had the option of entering an email address so that we could contact 
them in three days with a short follow-up study, which they would receive extra compensation 
for completing. They were told that not doing so would have no impact on their compensation 
for what they had already completed. All but 6 did so. Approximately 3 days later, participants 
received an email inviting them back for the short final session of the study, and were given a 
window of 24 hours in which to complete it. 63.1% of participants returned and completed the 
final session.  Attrition was equally likely in the two story conditions, χ2(1) = .12, p = .725.  
 Upon beginning the final session, all participants were told, “Three days ago you read a 
story about a man named Francis West. You will be asked to answer questions about him in a 
few moments; please do your best to answer these questions regardless of how much you 
remember. But first, there is another task to do.” They then completed the third AMP, followed 
by the third administration of the explicit evaluation scale (dubbed “time 3” hereafter).  
Results 
 Data preparation. Implicit evaluations on each of the three AMPs were computed in the 
same manner as done in previous studies, as were the three repetitions of the explicit evaluation 
scale. All analyses were conducted solely on those participants who completed the second 
session of the study. In addition, 10 participants were dropped for using one key on every trial of 
at least one AMP, thus disregarding instructions, and 1 more was dropped for familiarity with 
Mandarin or Cantonese. This left 179 cases for analysis. 
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 Implicit evaluations toward Francis West. Implicit positivity on the AMP toward 
Francis West was assessed in a 2 (Story Condition: fire rescue or control) x 2 (Prime Person: 
Francis West vs. control faces) x 3 (Measurement Time: time 1, time 2, and time 3) Mixed 
ANOVA, with the first factor varying between-participants and the latter two within-participants. 
All effects were significant, including the crucial three-way interaction, F(2,175) = 25.60, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .226. In Figure 6 we show the means and standard deviations of positivity toward the 
Francis and control primes in each of the story conditions and each of times 1, 2, and 3. 
Importantly, Francis West was significantly more negative than the control faces in the control 
condition at all measurement instances, as well as the fire rescue condition at time 1, all ps < 
.001; additionally, he was more positive than the control faces in the fire rescue condition at 
times 2 and 3, both ps < .001. Thus, with only the barest of reminders about the study, implicit 
evaluations toward Francis persevered in both the fire rescue and control conditions (positive and 
negative, respectively) for the three days between session 1 and session 2 of the experiment. 
Time effects showed that in the control story condition, positivity toward Francis did not shift 
between any two measurement times, all ps > .1. In the fire rescue condition, Francis West was 
significantly more positive at time 2 (M = .70, SD = .23) than at time 1 (M = .41, SD = .27), p < 
.001, and was marginally less positive at time 3 (M = .66, SD = .23) relative to time 2, p = .071. 
However, even at time 3 he was still more positive than at time 1, p < .001. 
 Consistent with prior testing, neither the degree of belief that the study depicted true 
events nor subjective mood moderated these results. Also, neither reduced the significance of the 
key interaction when added to the model. 
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Figure 6. Mean proportion of ideographs rated as more pleasant than average in Experiment 6 by 
measurement time, story condition, and face prime. Error bars are standard errors. 
 
 Explicit evaluations toward Francis West. Explicit liking of Francis West was 
analyzed in a 2 (Story Condition: fire rescue or control) x 3 (Measurement Time: time 1, time 2, 
and time 3) mixed ANOVA, with the former factor varying between-participants and the latter 
varying within-participants. Both main effects were significant, as was the hypothesized 
interaction, F(2,175) = 617.26, p < .001, ηp2 = .876. Simple effects tests showed that explicit 
liking of Francis did not differ between story conditions at time 1, F(1,176) = .127, p = .722, but 
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that Francis was significantly more liked at time 2 in the fire rescue condition (M = 6.18, SD = 
.98) than in the control condition (M = 1.11, SD = .27), F(1,176) = 2181.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .925. 
At time 3, Francis was also more liked in the fire rescue (M = 6.00, SD = 1.21) than the control 
condition (M = 1.43, SD = .99), F(1,176) = 760.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .812. Figure 7 illustrates the 
explicit liking of Francis West at each measurement time in both story conditions. 
 
 
Figure 7. Mean explicit liking of Francis West in each story condition at each measurement time 
in Experiment 6. Error bars are standard errors. 
 
Discussion 
 After three days, implicit evaluations were still significant and positive (and thus revised 
from time 1) in the fire rescue condition, and still significant and negative (i.e., unchanged) in the 
control condition. Participants were not even re-exposed to his image until it was primed during 
the final AMP, and his name was not a prime on the task. This durability of the implicit 
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evaluations supports our claim that these revised evaluations are not merely transient effects of 
the testing situation that will revert back to their initial levels after the passing of a bit of time.  
General Discussion 
Across seven studies, we found strong and consistent evidence that initial implicit 
evaluations can be undone. Importantly, we identified one factor capable of prompting such 
revision: reinterpretation of all the knowledge that formed the basis of the initial evaluation.  In 
Experiments 1a and 1b, participants who had formed an initial negative implicit evaluation 
toward Francis West fully reversed those evaluations when they learned a reason for his bad 
behavior.12  Experiment 2 showed that this reversal occurred only when participants read that his 
prior actions were aimed at saving children from a fire, but not when they read about a similarly 
positive action that did not explain his prior behavior (saving a baby from an oncoming train). 
This suggests that this revision depends on a recognition of the relationship between this new 
information and the old. Experiment 3 showed that this recognition requires at least minimal 
cognitive resources by demonstrating that high cognitive load at the time of reading the new 
information, relative to low load or no load, prevented full revision. Experiment 4 showed that 
subjective change in meaning of the earlier details of the story predicted more positive final 
implicit evaluations of Francis West in the fire rescue condition, and also showed that change in 
                                                
12 As one anonymous reviewer pointed out, in most of our experiments in the fire rescue 
condition there was not only a significant increase in the proportion of “pleasant” responses on 
trials with Francis West primes from time 1 to time 2, but a significant decrease in that 
proportion on trials with neutral face primes. We see two possibilities for why this occurs.  One 
is that this may be simply an artifact: only one prime is highly relevant (Francis West), and the 
others are distractors of a sort.  This may amplify the tendency to respond on those trials in an 
opposite way compared with the Francis West trials, and would be especially pronounced if a 
participant is trying to use the two response keys relatively evenly (see Scherer & Lambert, 
2009, for an investigation of such contrast effects in priming tasks).  Another possibility is that 
this effect demonstrates revision due to implicit social comparison.  We view this as an exciting 
theoretical possibility.  But, regardless, this effect does not pertain to our main finding of 
interest, which is the implicit positivity or negativity of Francis West relative to the control trials. 
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this paradigm is specific to the degree to which participants reinterpreted the earlier story rather 
than how much they thought about the information more generally. Experiment 5 demonstrated 
that reported change in the meaning of the earlier story details mediated the enhanced revision in 
the fire condition relative to the subway condition, which presented equally positive, but non-
reinterpreting, information.  Once again, a more general measure of elaborative thinking was not 
a significant mediator. Finally, Experiment 6 showed that the implicit evaluations formed in both 
the control and fire rescue conditions were not fleeting. After three days, implicit positive and 
negative evaluations were still apparent in the fire rescue and control conditions, respectively. 
 Collectively, these studies represent a closer examination of the conditions under which 
durable revision of implicit evaluations is possible, and identify one mechanism: reinterpretation. 
The empirical record to date has suggested that implicit evaluations are often resistant to efforts 
to undo a prior impression, even mere minutes after their initial formation (Gregg et al., 2006; 
Wilson et al., 2000). When they have shifted at all, it has been toward neutrality or ambivalence 
(Boucher & Rydell, 2012; Petty et al., 2006, Study 1; Peters & Gawronski, 2011, Experiment 3), 
or not occurred unless participants were compelled to engage in substantial elaboration (Wyer, 
2010). Recent work by Cone and Ferguson (in press) found that initial positive implicit 
evaluations can indeed be overturned by new and highly diagnostic negative information, but the 
precise cognitive mechanism through which such change occurs, as well as whether revision 
could overturn an initial negative implicit evaluation, remained to be examined. Our work both 
shows negative-to-positive change in implicit evaluations and identifies a powerful mechanism 
driving it: not only must new information imply the opposite evaluation of the target, but the 
initial information must also be reframed. In other words, the reinterpretation that we used both 
invalidated the initial learning, and replaced it with new meaning. 
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In combination, our studies suggest that reversal of implicit evaluations can occur 
through reinterpretation, we have characterized some of the features of this process, finding it to 
be deliberate enough to require at least minimal cognitive resources but not to be interchangeable 
with just any extensive thinking about the story information. Although the task of identifying the 
complete set of requirements for implicit evaluation change through reinterpretation will extend 
beyond this set of studies, we now turn to a discussion of theoretical implications.   
Reconciliation: What was Different This Time? 
The present studies identify the role of reinterpretation in implicit evaluation revision. 
However, one might note that in prior studies that failed to find full reversal, researchers 
similarly attempted to make appeals to the irrelevance of the initial information (e.g., Gregg et 
al., 2006; Peters & Gawronski, 2011, Experiment 3; Petty et al., 2006, Study 2). There are 
numerous possibilities for why our paradigm showed reversal while prior similar attempts did 
not. For one, the instructions in these prior studies prompted a reinterpretation of the old 
information that was somewhat different from our version of reinterpretation.  Whereas in our 
studies the actions of Francis are no longer negative in light of the revelations about the situation, 
in those prior studies they suggested that the targets of the old information should be changed. In 
other words, in prior studies, the actions of aggressors (for example) are still negative, but just do 
not correspond to the group or person one initially thought they did. This type of reinterpretation 
may not be as easily implemented as in our case where an understanding of the new information 
basically compels the overturning of the initial impression (i.e., If Francis West was trying to 
save those kids, then his earlier actions were highly likely to have been enacted for that effort).  
It also may be that trying to realign behavior with new targets is ineffective at eliminating all 
traces of the initial information, as is the case with directed forgetting (Bjork & Bjork, 2003) or 
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adding new information to the old but not replacing it, as in the formation of contextualized 
evaluations (Gawronski & Cesario, 2013) and implicit ambivalence (Petty et al., 2006). Lastly, 
studies in which the targets change over time might also not produce as unified an impression as 
the paradigm we used here (e.g., Rydell et al., 2007). Ultimately, however, the task of identifying 
the differences between our paradigm and previous paradigms remains to be taken up. 
Our findings offer new empirical support for the theoretical claim that reason-based 
routes to implicit evaluation revision should be possible.  For instance, under the APE model 
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 2011), propositional reasoning is assumed to be capable of 
changing associative structure when new information is validated, but the parameters of this 
route of change have not been fully specified. Some studies have assumed that this change 
operates through the associative pairing of information contained within the propositions (Peters 
& Gawronski, 2011). But, the APE model does not outline when some kinds of affirmations will 
be more effective than others.  Our results suggest that the effect of affirmation of new 
information will be especially strong when the new information recasts prior details, and that 
this process can produce full revision to the point where little evidence of the prior evaluation 
remains.  Indeed, this recasting is able to force revision even in the case of an initial negative 
implicit evaluation turning to positive, an effect that has been particularly difficult to obtain 
(Cone & Ferguson, in press).  
Likewise, under the metacognitive model (Petty et al., 2007), new “false” tags on old 
associations are assumed to be able to negate beliefs, but the conditions under which this occurs 
remain unspecified.  Although the results in Wyer (2010) suggested that revisiting the prior 
details in light of the new information was necessary for the initial evaluation to be undone, the 
mechanism of change was unclear. Our results suggest that reinterpretation can lead to revision 
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without re-presenting the initial information, and pinpointed reinterpretation in particular as the 
type of reasoning that drives change in this paradigm, beyond more general elaborative thinking. 
As such, our results can be read as expanding the routes of revision of implicit evaluations under 
current theories, providing evidence of when and how such change occurs.  
Implications for Established Evaluations 
Despite our results, a consistent finding in research on implicit evaluations is that 
people’s implicit evaluations can be at odds with what they explicitly believe (Banaji & 
Greenwald, 2013). Our results do not imply that any and all implicit evaluations can be easily 
and rapidly changed through reasoning (reinterpretation or otherwise), just that there may be 
routes through which established implicit evaluations can be changed which have not been 
highlighted before, and which future investigations may profitably explore. Our view is that 
although we have explored implicit evaluation change in a specific scenario, we suspect that the 
mechanisms it illuminates operate in a variety of more mundane settings. That is, any time that a 
person construes new information to require a reinterpretation of prior knowledge about an 
evaluation object, we would expect shifts to occur in implicit evaluations proportionate to the 
amount and extremity of reinterpretation. An important future direction for this line of work is to 
examine situations in which this will be true.  We examine some of these considerations below. 
 Insight into the basis of the initial implicit evaluation. In our studies, it is safe to 
assume that participants are quite aware of the basis for their evaluative feelings toward the 
target person, Francis West. However, with evaluations formed over a long period of time, 
people may have relatively poor introspective access to which content in memory actually affects 
their implicit evaluations. Insight into which information shapes judgments and impressions is 
often poor and based on inaccurate inferences or selective sampling of reasons (Wilson, Dunn, 
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Kraft, & Lisle, 1989). Although the claim that implicit evaluations are inaccessible to 
consciousness (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) has been challenged (Gawronksi, Hofmann, & 
Wilbur, 2006; Gawronski, LeBel, & Peters, 2007; Hahn et al., 2013), it remains likely that 
similar to the lack of source awareness of explicit evaluations (Bornstein, 1989; Hovland, 
Lumsdaine, & Sheffield, 1949; Kumkale & Albarracín, 2004; Wilson et al., 1989; Zajonc, 1968), 
people are not always aware of or may not remember the sources of their implicit evaluations 
(e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004; Olson & Fazio, 2001, 2002; Rydell et al., 2006; see Gawronski et al., 
2006). Thus, the reasons for an evaluation that people bring to mind when reflecting on their 
impressions of a person or group may differ from those that actually guide behavior.  If rejection 
or reinterpretation of the basis of an initial evaluation is capable of revising even established 
implicit evaluations, as we posit here, this may be difficult if those sources in memory are 
forgotten, were never known, or are inaccurately identified (see also Lane, Ryan, Nadel, & 
Greenberg, in press). To the extent that they are able to identify reasons that do contribute to 
their current implicit evaluation, they may be able to enact a greater amount of revision then they 
could otherwise, a possibility for future investigation.  
Lack of information that prompts a full reinterpretation. In the Francis West 
paradigm, the scenario is designed to allow for a single piece of new information to completely 
recast everything that was previously learned about the target person. One explanation for why 
implicit evaluation change might be more difficult for many established evaluations is that this 
type of new information may not be encountered. But, such cases exist, such as when a Nazi 
seems like he is supporting the holocaust when in fact he is saving over 1,000 people. In fact, 
any situation in which ulterior motives come to light is a potential case for revision of first 
impressions to occur. 
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 Motivational considerations. Another relevant consideration is that people are not 
always willing or able to process information in an unbiased way (Frey, 1986; Kunda, 1990; 
Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). Under such circumstances, even when information that contradicts 
a current position is attended, it is often held to a higher bar than information that supports one’s 
position (Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Ditto et al., 2003; Eagly, et al., 2000). 
The Francis West paradigm all but compels participants to change their minds about the 
target person; preserving the initial evaluation is quite indefensible. Though this may sometimes 
be the case in real life (e.g. discovering someone to be the victim of false and malicious 
accusations), it may be more typically the case that the effect of new information on an existing 
impression is a function less of the properties of that information itself than the manner and 
extent to which it is elaborated (Greenwald, 1968; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Petty, Ostrom, & 
Brock, 1981). Often, sweeping recalibration of past beliefs about an evaluation object may 
primarily occur when one is motivated to construe new information as prompting such revision, 
rather than new information inherently requiring such recalibration to occur.  
Implicit vs. explicit evaluations: How do they relate to one another? 
 The central theoretical contribution of the present work is the demonstration that changes 
to the meaning of prior information can lead to a full reversal of previously learned implicit 
evaluations.  And yet, what does this mean for the presumed relations between implicit and 
explicit evaluations?  After all, claims about (two) different processes underlying each type of 
evaluation have been used to explain the many examples of dissociation among them (e.g., 
Gawronski & LeBel, 2008; Gawronski & Strack, 2004; Petty et al., 2006; Rydell et al., 2006).  If 
the processes underlying them are not as distinct as assumed – as our findings might imply – 
then why do we see so much evidence for dissociation elsewhere?  One potential explanation for 
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such dissociations concerns the lack of “structural fit” among explicit versus implicit measures, 
including features such as format, stimuli, instructions, etc. (Payne, Burkley, & Stokes, 2008).  
These differences could explain dissociation without necessarily invoking any claims about 
underlying processes.  Although there is a small amount of data suggesting that implicit and 
explicit evaluations differ even when controlling for fit (see Payne et al., 2008), this remains an 
open empirical question. 
 Another consideration is the tendency to assume that differences in behavior are due to 
dissociated processes.  It is difficult (for us) to think of any behavioral evidence that would alone 
adjudicate between propositional versus associative processing, because any behavioral evidence 
can always be explained by boot-strapped versions of one’s favorite propositional or associative 
account (see Ferguson, Mann, & Wojnowicz, 2014; Moors, 2014).  What we can do, however, is 
specify the circumstances under which implicit and explicit evaluations form, change, and 
predict behavior.  One can then create computational models that formally test theories of 
associative versus propositional processing, as has been done frequently in cognitive psychology 
(e.g., Botvinick & Plaut, 2006; Read & Montoya, 1999; Sun, Slusarz, & Terry, 2005).  For now, 
we have demonstrated one way in which implicit evaluations can be completely undone through 
a propositional, or reason-based, route.  What remains is the work of figuring out what these 
findings mean for how implicit and explicit evaluations relate to one another. 
Conclusion 
 Implicit evaluations are not immune to revision through reason. Far from being “stuck” in 
dogged opposition to our reasoned conclusions about the validity of prior impressions, our 
implicit evaluations can reflect our updated interpretations of the world. Our findings suggest 
that to change unwanted implicit evaluations, we may marshal reason to undermine the bases of 
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our evaluations, if we can identify and edit them. Future work can examine other routes to 
implicit evaluation change and identify the conditions under which they are successful. 
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Appendix A: Story Details Across Studies 
Time 1 Story Sentences 
1) [Experiment 1b only] Francis' small town was about 99% white, but recently the 
Griffins and Wards, the town's first ever interracial families, had moved in. 
2) Francis West knew that the couples that owned the two other homes on his street, the 
Griffins and Wards, had gone out for a bit. 
3) After a few minutes, he looked out the window at the Griffin house, and decided that he 
just had to go over there. 
4) Francis grabbed an axe from his cellar and went across the backyard to the Griffins' porch 
door. 
5) He started hacking away at the door, cursing and occasionally kicking, as the door 
groaned and finally yielded under the force of Francis’ blows. 
6) The door splintered into a million pieces, ruining a tiny painting of a butterfly that the 
Griffins' daughter Zoe had painted on its lower left corner only days before. 
7) Treading mud onto the Griffins’ freshly installed beige carpet, Francis made his way 
through the family room of the home. 
8) As he went, Francis knocked over and shattered a set of priceless vases handed down to 
Mrs. Griffin by her grandmother. The pieces scattered on the floor, mixing with the mud from 
Francis’ boots. 
9) As he entered the kitchen, Francis spotted a large pot full of water sitting on top of the 
stove. He grabbed the pot and proceeded to throw the water all over the kitchen, drenching and 
destroying Zoe’s first laptop, which was sitting on the countertop. 
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10) Francis took the pot with him as he moved on into the stairwell to the second floor, 
throwing the remaining water all over the hallway. Much of it doused a painting that Mrs. 
Griffin’s mother had made for her years before her passing; it was Mrs. Griffin’s favorite. 
11) As Francis arrived at the second floor, he methodically searched the bedrooms for 
precious things, stomping all over some pictures that young Zoe had left on the floor by the top 
of the stairs. Francis didn’t even care. 
12) Francis found what he was looking for, and left the house with it. 
13) After leaving the Griffin house, Francis identified the adjoining Ward home as his next 
target. 
14) Traipsing right through Mrs. Ward’s prized garden, destroying years worth [Experiment 
1b: countless hours] of careful cultivation, Francis arrived at the big bay window next to the 
back door. 
15) The window was adorned with home-crafted stained glass; Francis thought nothing of 
smashing right through it with a brick from a nearby pile. 
16) As he climbed through the Wards’ window, Francis knocked over the family’s large big-
screen TV, which crashed roughly onto the hardwood floor. 
17) As he moved from the family room to the hallway, Francis stepped on the Wards’ cat 
Paws, which squealed and fled off down the hall. 
18) Francis awkwardly made his way up the stairs, often swaying from side to side, and 
knocked down several pieces of ceramic art that the Wards had on display alongside their 
staircase. And Francis didn’t care. 
19) As he arrived on the second floor, Francis made his way through the bedrooms, as he did 
at the Griffins, looking for precious things. 
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20) Finding what he was looking for, Francis turned back to the stairs. 
21) Looking toward the front door, Francis saw the cat Paws lying dead in front of it. He 
didn’t really care. 
22) Francis slowly made his way toward the basement door, and after descending the stairs, 
started kicking and shoving boxes and things left and right, like a madman. 
23) The prized china that filled a few boxes shattered under the force of Francis’ kicks. 
24) Francis stepped on and walked across an open bin of family photos, spreading mud all 
over some of the baby pictures of the family’s young son Mark. 
25) Reaching the basement door, Francis roughly shoved it open and moved out into the yard. 
A few family photos stuck to the heel of his shoes. 
26) Francis moved toward the sidewalk. 
27) He faced the two houses, now quite damaged, and sat there with the things he had taken 
from them. He looked down the road and waited for the return of the Griffins and Wards. 
Time 2 Story Sentences 
Fire Rescue Condition [All experiments]:  
Francis West broke into the adjoining Griffin and Ward homes because he saw that they were on 
fire.  The only precious things he removed from either home were the young kids Zoe and Mark, 
and he waited on the sidewalk with them until their worried parents’ return. 
Control Condition [Experiments 1a, 1b, 2, and 3]: 
While he waited on the sidewalk to confront the Wards and Griffins, Francis started picking up 
rocks from the roadside and hurling them at the houses. By the time the horrified families 
returned, nearly all of the windows had been smashed by rocks, and dents covered the front of 
both houses. 
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Control Condition [Experiment 6]: 
It turned out that Francis West had been arrested previously for multiple crimes, including armed 
robbery and physical assault. Neighbors reported that he often screamed at neighborhood kids, 
and had yelled at Zoe and Mark for playing tag near the corner of his property the previous day. 
He apparently trashed the families’ homes in search of valuables, as well as in revenge. 
Subway Rescue Condition [Experiments 2 and 5]: 
At a different point in time, Francis West was in the news because he was at a subway station 
when he noticed that a baby had crawled and fallen onto the tracks below. Seeing a rapidly 
approaching train, Francis jumped down onto the tracks, grabbed the baby, and climbed up to 
safety a split-second before the train came roaring past. 
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Chapter III. Mechanisms and Boundary Conditions 
Although the work presented in Chapter II builds the case that initially negative implicit 
first impressions can be rapidly reversed, a critical next step is to ask, under what broader set of 
conditions can such revision occur? Given that efforts to attenuate implicit bias toward real 
stigmatized groups have been of limited success even in the short term (Lai et al., 2014) and 
even less effective after a delay (Lai et al., 2016; see also Peters & Gawronski, 2011), it is 
critical to identify the minimal and broadest conditions under which successful reversal of 
negative implicit first impressions can be achieved.  The work in Chapter II did provide some 
evidence for boundaries and predictors of reinterpretation-driven reversal.  First, I showed that 
reinterpretation information led to implicit revision only when participants were under low 
cognitive load (rehearsing two digits) or none.  When they were under high load (rehearsing 8 
digits), implicit revision was reduced.  Second, participants’ reported cognitive content predicted 
the degree of implicit revision.  The more participants reported thinking about how the new 
information changed the meaning of the earlier events in the story, the more implicit revision 
they showed.  
The evidence so far shows, then, that information that reinterprets the original 
information is a kind of evidence that produces robust implicit revision, and that it requires some 
moderate degree of cognitive resources.  It remains unknown, however, how generalizable the 
findings of Chapter II might be to a wider variety of contexts.  The goal of Chapter III is to 
broaden the investigation to begin to address that unknown.  
One question about the generalizability of the kind of revision shown in Chapter II is, just 
how unique is reinterpretation-type evidence is in facilitating the revision of implicit responses?  
Is reinterpretation one instance of a broader class of strategies through which implicit 
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impressions can be readily updated, or is reinterpretation relatively exceptional in its 
effectiveness?  Studies 7 and 8 will probe this question by conceptualizing reinterpretation in 
terms of more basic constituent process elements that might be shared by a larger family of 
strategies for producing implicit revision. The studies reveal evidence that supports the idea that 
other cases that pair a negation of the validity of earlier information about a person with new, 
countervailing information can be similarly effective to reinterpretation, and impact implicit 
responses in a similar manner. 
Study 9 moves to another form of external validity by testing whether reinterpretation can 
produce updating even after days have passed since the original learning, an important test of the 
wider efficacy of reinterpretation given that impressions of real people may not be as 
immediately corrected as they were in the original studies of Chapter II (or most other work on 
implicit impression formation and change; e.g., Gregg et al., 2006; Peters & Gawronski, 2011; 
Rydell & McConnell, 2006). This study presents a paper published with coauthor Melissa J. 
Ferguson in the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, titled “Reversing implicit first 
impressions through reinterpretation after a two-day delay.” 
Finally, it is not yet clear how generally effective reinterpretation can be as a route of 
changing implicit impressions under a broader set of contexts.  Though cases of clear, extreme, 
uncontestable reinterpretation – along the lines of the Francis West story – undoubtedly occur, 
and might be likely to produce strong implicit revision in light of the findings in Chapter II, there 
are many other times in real life in which reinterpretation might be milder.  A reinterpretation 
might contradict a broader stereotype, might change only some of one’s prior reasoning about a 
person, or might simply be less extreme; in such cases, can reinterpretation still be effective? 
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Studies 10-12 will test the possibility of reinterpretation-driven change in the contexts of a 
contentious issue, racial prejudice, and gender stereotyping.  
Reinterpretation and Other Routes to Revision 
In Studies 7-8, I sought to establish the general nature of information that can lead to a 
rapid revision of negative implicit first impressions, abstracting away from the particularities of 
reinterpretation.  First, can other strategies that, like reinterpretation, involve a combined 
rejection of an initial impression and its replacement with a new one be just as effective in 
revising implicit responses?  Second, do such “negation + replacement” strategies—including, 
but not limited to, reinterpretation—impact implicit impressions in a similar way, by changing 
the evaluative information associated with that person, vs. merely changing response biases? If 
reinterpretation and other information that involves joint negation and replacement are similarly 
effective in producing revision, and impact the processes underlying implicit impressions in a 
similar manner, this would provide evidence that a broader class of strategies involving the 
combined negation and replacement of initial impressions might be effective for updating 
implicit impressions.  Below, I discuss my approach in more detail. 
Reinterpretation as a Form of Negation + Affirmation 
Can any features of reinterpretation be abstracted in such a way as to suggest other 
strategies that might be similarly effective in reversing implicit evaluations? Possibly, 
reinterpretation may consist of at least two generalizable cognitive steps: first, the negation of an 
aspect of the initial information, and second, the affirmation (or, addition) of new information 
that supports an impression opposite in valence from the original one.  With reinterpretation, the 
meaning of the initial information (and the first impression that it implies) is negated, and new 
details that support a different meaning (and an opposite impression) are affirmed. Past research 
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has examined these steps of negation and affirmation mostly in isolation, as reviewed in Chapter 
II under the terminology of “subtraction” and “addition”, and again here briefly. 
Negation. Although negation – a rejection of the truth-value of previously learned 
information– can readily update explicit judgments, empirical findings and theoretical positions 
are more mixed about whether negations can reverse implicit impressions. On the one hand, 
some experiments have found that such negation attempts do not change implicit impressions 
(Gregg et al., 2006; see also Wilson et al., 2000), with some models (e.g., APE; Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006, 2011) arguing that the activation of associations that are posited to drive 
implicit impressions are unaffected by negations, which simply keep the associations that 
underlie the rejected information active (Gawronski, Deutsch, Mbirkou, Seibt, & Strack, 2008).  
On the other hand, some findings have suggested that under some circumstances, negation can 
impact implicit impressions (Boucher & Rydell, 2012; Deutsch, Kordts-Freudinger, Gawronski, 
& Strack, 2009; Johnson, Kopp, & Petty, in press; Peters & Gawronski, 2011). Peters and 
Gawronski (2011) found that when negations were presented partially simultaneously with the 
to-be-negated information during an impression formation task, they were effective in producing 
negation-consistent implicit impressions. However, a delay of even a few minutes made them 
less effective, suggesting that the window for effective negation may be restricted to the moment 
of learning. Boucher and Rydell (2012) found that negations can be effective if they are made 
particularly strong and salient at the time when they are processed, and suggested that a longer 
delay may lead to weaker integration of the negation. Consistent with the idea that the strength of 
negations can vary in impactful ways, recent work found that instructions to think “THAT’S 
WRONG!” in response to stereotype-consistent statements produced a reduction in implicit race-
based prejudice, whereas instructions to think “NO!” did not (Johnson et al., in press).  The 
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Metacognitive Model (MCM; Petty et al., 2006; Petty, Briñol, & DeMarree, 2007) accounts for 
such findings by proposing that negations can be directly reflected in the associations underlying 
implicit impressions, and other theories that assume that implicit evaluations are based in part or 
wholly on propositional representations (De Houwer, 2014; Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & De 
Houwer, 2011) would also predict that negation should be able to change implicit evaluations. 
As this perspective holds that the representations underlying implicit evaluation are 
propositional, a negation stored in memory could directly impact implicit responses. 
Affirmation.  Another form of propositional reasoning that may drive implicit change is 
affirmation—judging information that implies a new impression to be true.  Multiple studies 
have presented varying amounts of behavioral details that imply an opposite impression from the 
first impression (e.g., Gawronski et al., 2010; Petty et al., 2006; Rydell & Gawronski, 2009; 
Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Rydell et al., 2007), with mixed success.  Studies have found that a 
large amount of relatively mild to moderate new information is needed to reverse implicit 
impressions (e.g., Rydell & McConnell, 2006). Similarly, Cone and Ferguson (2015) found that 
new, extreme information did succeed in revising implicit impressions, but reversal only 
occurred when going from positive first impressions to revised negative ones.  
 Such findings are consistent with models that argue that affirming a new proposition can 
lead to the activation of different associations; for example, if one currently has an active 
association between “Bob” and “bad” but then affirms the belief that “Bob is always kind,” this 
may activate different associations (“Bob-kind”) that might then drive implicit responding, 
associations which could then be strengthened (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 2011). The 
MCM, on the other hand, holds that validity information can itself be represented as a “true” tag 
associated with an impression. As with the “false” tags resulting from negation, its strength will 
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be a product of extent and depth of elaboration (Petty et al., 2007; Wyer, 2010).  Finally, 
propositional models (De Houwer, 2014; Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & De Houwer, 2011) also 
predict that affirming new propositions reflecting countervailing information should lead to 
implicit revision of first impressions.   
 Combining Negation + Affirmation.  The effect of reinterpretation on implicit 
evaluations might be effective at least in part because it draws upon these two cognitive 
processes of negation and affirmation.  Either one alone may be inconsistently effective, as prior 
work has shown, but their combination may be the explanation for why reinterpretation seems so 
robust and effective.   
The question is, do these two steps have to be linked, or related, in some way to be 
effective in driving implicit updating?  It may be that reinterpretation works simply because the 
original evidence is negated, and then new countervailing evidence is affirmed.  However, the 
alternative possibility is that the negation of the earlier information has to be related to the 
affirmation of the new information, as it is in reinterpretation types of evidence.  That is, telling 
people that a man who broke into the homes of his neighbors was actually saving kids from a fire 
accomplishes these two steps in one fell swoop.   
Is reinterpretation, then, relatively unique in its ability to revise negative implicit 
impressions, or is it a subtype of a broader set of effective routes of change that all involve the 
steps of negation and affirmation?  Studies 7-8 were designed to test exactly this question. I 
presented participants with either negation or affirmation information alone, or a combination of 
negation and affirmation information. Moreover, I manipulated whether the negation was related 
or unrelated to the affirmation information. This design can then demonstrate, in one study, the 
necessary and sufficient conditions required for reversing impressions.  
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 What do contemporary theories predict about the relative effectiveness of these types of 
evidence?  Although they do not weigh in on whether the relatedness (of the negation and 
affirmation) matters, they do make claims about how negation + affirmation (related or not) 
should compare to the other conditions.  For example, the APE model suggests that negation, 
when combined with affirmation, should not generally be more effective than affirmation 
alone—and may in fact be less effective than the latter. Under the APE model, the most 
straightforward explanation of the strong effects of reinterpretation on implicit impressions 
would likely be that the new details, which reframe earlier behavior in a new light, lead to the 
strong affirmation of a new proposition (e.g., “the man is a hero”), which builds a strong new 
association between the target and a positive evaluation. Though the reinterpretation could also 
be viewed as negating the earlier, erroneous, negative impression of the target’s actions, dwelling 
on this negation itself (“the man is not a criminal”) could not contribute to implicit change, 
because it would serve only to maintain activation of the association between the target and a 
negative impression. However, the negation element of reinterpretation is strongly implicated in 
revision, because the results of Chapter II found that equally positive new information that was 
unrelated to (and did not overturn) the earlier interpretation of the story did not similarly lead to 
a reversal of the implicit impression (consistent with evidence also from Cone & Ferguson, 
2015).   
 On the other hand, the MCM would more readily accommodate the proposal that 
reinterpretation works through the joint operation of negation and affirmation: when participants 
notice the high relevance of the new information to the prior impression, they engage in thorough 
elaboration, if able, which makes the “false” tag produced by negation particularly strong (Wyer, 
2010, 2016). The new impression will be linked with a strong “true” tag in the same way.    
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Finally, theories highlighting propositional reasoning (De Houwer, 2014; Hughes, 
Barnes-Holmes, & De Houwer, 2011) would also predict that negation plus affirmation would 
lead to implicit revision. Because this perspective proposes that propositional representations can 
directly drive implicit processes, it does arguably the best job of accommodating findings of fast 
revision through propositional negation and affirmation, as propositions of both of these types 
could be stored in memory and directly impact implicit responses once learned. 
Comparing Strategies: Effects on Constituent Processes of Implicit Impressions 
Even if I find evidence in support of the idea that different types of information (beyond 
just reinterpretation) that prompt joint negation and affirmation can effectively update implicit 
impressions, this does not reveal anything about what precise effects the information might be 
having.  Although it is clear that reinterpretation can alter the evaluative impressions captured by 
implicit measures (Chapter II), these responses are themselves the products of multiple 
processes, as no task is a process-pure measure of a single representation or process. The Implicit 
Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998), for example, can be construed as tapping a 
combination of association activation, controlled detection of the target category, overcoming 
bias, and response bias (Conrey, Sherman, Gawronski, Hugenberg, & Groom, 2005; Sherman et 
al., 2008). Likewise, the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & 
Stewart, 2005)—which is the measure overwhelmingly used in the current work—can be 
understood as jointly tapping the activation of a response to a prime, the activation of a response 
to a target, and misattribution of the response triggered by the prime to the target (Payne, Hall, 
Cameron, & Bishara, 2010).  Although the finding that reinterpretation and other forms of 
information that involve negation + replacement revise implicit impressions would be suggestive 
of a broader family of strategies for producing effective revision, it is possible for similar shifts 
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on an implicit measure to be produced in very different ways.  On the AMP, shifts in implicit 
impressions can occur via changes in the evaluative impression activated by the face of the 
person (the “prime” in the AMP), but they can also be produced via shifts in other processes that 
are not as relevant, such as likelihood of misattributing, or the responses activated by the “target” 
in the AMP.  If reinterpretation alters the impression activated by the prime stimulus but other 
negation + replacement information alters, say, the likelihood of misattribution, such evidence 
would strongly challenge the claim that reinterpretation can be abstracted into a broader 
mechanism of implicit revision through negation + replacement. 
In the current work, I use multinomial process trees to model the effects of 
reinterpretation on the processes occurring during implicit evaluation (e.g., Batchelder & Riefer, 
1999; Conrey et al., 2005; Jacoby, 1991; Payne, 2001; Payne et al., 2010; Sherman et al., 2008). 
Acknowledging that no behavioral response is process-pure (reflective of a single mental 
process), mathematical process models develop systems of equations designed to reflect the 
processes underlying the range of behavioral responses that are possible on a task, and then use 
the response data to estimate the degree to which these processes operate in different conditions. 
Mathematical process models have yielded numerous insights in social psychological research, 
such as that higher implicit bias in older adults is largely a function of diminished control rather 
than more negative associations to racial outgroups (Stewart, Von Hippel, & Radvansky, 2009), 
that differences in implicit pro-White/anti-Black evaluations between White and Black 
participants are driven primarily by differences in evaluative associations rather than controlled 
processing (Sherman et al., 2008), and that a public context both decreases controlled detection 
of correct responses and strengthens processes of overcoming bias (Conrey et al., 2005). 
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   In Studies 7 and 8, I test whether the combined negation and replacement of an initial 
impression can lead to the updating of implicit impressions, and compare the effectiveness of 
that combination to reinterpretation. The overall hypothesis is that new information that prompts 
a combination of negating an earlier impression and replacing it with a new, countervailing one, 
will lead to the reversal of negative implicit first impressions, regardless of whether these two 
steps are intrinsically linked (in reinterpretation) or performed as separate steps. I test this 
possibility both by examining overall changes in implicit impressions in each condition (Study 
7), and by using multinomial modeling to test for similarities and differences in the constituent 
processes that are affected (Study 8). I examine if both forms of negation + replacement lead to 
shifts in the alteration of evaluative responses that are unintentionally activated by a face, rather 
than the alteration of other processes that underlie the measurement of an implicit impression, 
such as misattribution. Note that prior to Study 7, I was agnostic on whether the reinterpretation 
and negate + affirm conditions would show equivalent revision, and remained open to the 
possibility that they would not; I thus view this study as relatively exploratory, and sought to 
replicate and extend its findings in Study 8. 
Study 7: Components of Reinterpretation 
What are the “ingredients” of reinterpretation that make it effective in revising implicit 
impressions?  Can reinterpretation be understood in terms of constituent mental processes—
propositional negation and affirmation—such that information that prompts both steps without 
reinterpretation might be similarly effective? As reviewed above, reinterpretation seems to 
trigger a combination of “negating” an initial impression and simultaneously “replacing” it with 
another, in that the new behavioral details compel both. In the standard Francis West fire rescue 
condition, the new information not only suggests that the earlier impression of the target as a 
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villain is wrong, but also delivers an alternative – that he is a hero. An advantage to this view of 
reinterpretation is that it helps conceptualize these findings in closer proximity to current theories 
that draw on similar concepts (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 2011; Petty et al., 2007).   
In this study, I compared the effectiveness of information that prompts a reinterpretation 
to information that produces a joint negation and affirmation without reinterpretation. I made use 
of the Francis West materials first introduced in Chapter II, comparing the “fire rescue” 
reinterpretation condition to four other conditions: a control condition in which participants 
learned one more negative detail about the target (consistent with their prior impression), a 
“negate only” condition in which they were told that everything they had read previously about 
the target actually did not occur, an “affirm only” condition in which they were told that the 
target performed a heroic act unrelated to his earlier, negative behaviors, and a combined negate 
+ affirm condition in which they were informed both that none of the earlier story had actually 
taken place and that instead, the target had performed an unrelated heroic action.  To support the 
idea that combined negation and replacement strategies might be broadly effective in reversing 
implicit impressions whether they involve reinterpretation or not, it is critical that the negate + 
affirm information show greater revision than either the negate only information or affirm only 
information, and that the effect in this joint condition be similar to that in the reinterpretation 
condition. 
Method 
Participants and design. I recruited 375 participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(mturk.com) to participate in the study in return for $1.75 (Mage = 32.31 years, SDage = 10.01 
years; 193 women, 181 men, 1 genderqueer). I planned a priori to recruit a total sample of this 
size to achieve approximately 75 participants per between-participants cell of the design, in the 
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range of prior studies and within budget constraints. An additional 8 participants began the study 
but did not complete it, so their partial results were not included in any analyses. Each participant 
was randomly assigned to one of 5 story conditions. 
 Initial learning task. After recruitment on Mturk, participants read through the Francis 
West story (Chapter II). Identical to the procedure in the earlier studies, for each participant, one 
image of the face of a white man was randomly selected from a set of 11 such images to be 
Francis West, and the remaining 10 were set aside to serve as control prime stimuli on the 
subsequent implicit measures. The images were drawn from a bank of face stimuli used in prior 
research (Minear & Park, 2004).  
 First implicit measure. After participants learned the information about Francis West, I 
assessed implicit evaluations of him using the AMP as presented in the studies within Chapter II. 
As before, 20 trials featured an image of Francis West as prime, and 20 trials featured one of the 
10 control faces as prime.  Comparing the proportion of “pleasant” responses between trials with 
different prime types thus allows for an assessment of implicit impressions of the primes (Payne 
& Lundberg, 2014; Payne et al., 2005, 2013; cf. Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2012). 
First explicit attitude scale. After the AMP, participants completed the six-item scale 
assessing explicit evaluations of Francis West used throughout Chapter II.  
Second learning task.  Participants were next told that they would now read some 
additional information about Francis West, which depended on their story condition. In all 
conditions, participants were instructed to take at least 15 seconds to consider the new 
information, and then advanced to the next task at their own pace after at least that much time 
elapsed. 
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In the control condition, participants were informed that Francis performed one 
additional negative behavior in the context of the initial story. Specifically, they read that he 
began chucking rocks at the two houses that he had previously invaded.  
In the reinterpretation condition (fire rescue), participants read the information that 
reframed Francis’ earlier actions from negative to positive (Chapter II). Specifically, they read 
that Francis had in fact entered the two homes because they were on fire, and the only “precious 
things” he removed from the bedrooms were the two young children who he knew were trapped 
inside. This new information was designed to produce a reinterpretation of the basis of their first 
impression of Francis, by reframing Francis’ earlier actions from negative to positive. 
In the negate only condition, participants were informed that everything they had 
previously read about Francis was actually false; he did not perform any of the actions described 
earlier.  
In the unrelated new information (affirm only; subway rescue) condition, participants 
were told an additional detail about Francis West that described a positive behavior he had 
performed, but which was not directly related to the earlier information about Francis. 
Specifically, they read that Francis had once been at a subway station when a baby fell onto the 
tracks as a train approached; he heroically jumped down onto the tracks and climbed to safety 
with the baby mere moments before the train would have struck and killed them both.  
In the negate + affirm condition, participants viewed a combination of the negation and 
unrelated new information descriptions – that everything they had previously read about Francis 
was false, and that instead, he had rescued a baby that fell onto the subway tracks as a train 
approached. 
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 In all conditions, participants were instructed to take at least 15 seconds to consider the 
new information, and then advanced to the next task at their own pace after at least that much 
time elapsed. 
 Second implicit measure. Participants next completed the 40-trial AMP again, which 
was identical to the first except that the pictographs were drawn from the set not used in the first 
AMP. 
 Second explicit attitude scale. The same explicit attitude scale that participants 
previously completed was administered again. 
 Final questionnaire items. Finally, participants were asked whether they know 
Mandarin and/or Cantonese, to identify Francis West from the set of 11 face images presented 
during the study, to identify the final information they read about Francis West from short 
summaries of the five conditions, to provide their age and gender, and to give open-ended 
feedback regarding what they thought the study was about and any other comments they had. 
They were then debriefed, thanked, and compensated.  
Results 
 Data preprocessing. In accordance with established protocol for the AMP (Payne et al., 
2005), I excluded a priori all participants who speak Mandarin and/or Cantonese, as the 
pictographs would not be neutral for such participants (2.7%), and all participants who used a 
single response key on every trial of at least one of the two AMPs, showing a disregard for 
instructions (5.9%). This left a final sample of 344 participants. 
 For both the Time 1 and Time 2 AMPs, for each participant I calculated the proportion of 
trials on which the pictograph was judged to be more pleasant than average following the Francis 
West prime image, and a similar proportion for trials following control face images, yielding 
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four AMP measures for each participant within a 2 (Time: time 1, time 2) x 2 (Prime: Francis 
West, Control) design. Explicit evaluations of Francis West at Time 1 and Time 2 were 
computed by averaging the six liking measures at each time point. 
 Implicit evaluations. I computed the proportion of “Pleasant” responses to the 
pictographs on trials following the different prime types, at both Time 1 and Time 2, and used 
these proportions as measures of implicit evaluative impressions of the primes. I then analyzed 
these proportions in a 2 (Time: time 1, time 2) x 2 (Prime: Francis West, control faces) x 5 (Story 
Condition: control, reinterpretation, negation only, affirm only, negate + affirm) mixed ANOVA, 
with the last factor manipulated between-participants. 
 All main effects and interactions in the model were significant, with the exception of the 
main of effect of story condition. Most critical, however, was the significant three-way 
interaction between time, prime, and story condition, F(4, 339) = 10.694, p < .001, η2p = .112. 
Breaking down this interaction, I found that the interaction between time and prime was not 
significant in the control condition, F(1, 72) = .958, p = .331, η2p = .013, but was significant in the 
other four (see below). Among those four conditions, there remained a significant interaction 
between time, prime, and story condition, F(3, 267) = 4.970, p = .002, η2p = .053, which indicates 
that the highest-order interaction cannot be attributed solely to the difference of the control 
condition from the other four conditions. 
 I next constructed three orthogonal contrasts to compare the size of the time*prime 
interaction in the different between-participants story conditions, setting aside the control 
condition: The first tested the reinterpretation and negate + affirm conditions (pooled) against the 
negate only and affirm only conditions (pooled), the second tested the reinterpretation condition 
against the negate + affirm condition, and the third tested the negate only condition against the 
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affirm only condition. The first contrast was significant, F(1,267) = 13.006, p < .001, η2p = .046, 
suggesting that collectively, the fire rescue (reinterpretation) condition and the combined negate 
+ affirm condition differed from the negate only and affirm only conditions in regards to changes 
in implicit evaluations of Francis West. However, the second contrast was not significant, 
F(1,267) = 2.575, p = .134, η2p = .008, and neither was the third, F(1,267) = .071, p = .791, η2p < 
.001, indicating no evidence for differences between the reinterpretation and negate + affirm 
conditions on the one hand, or the negate only and affirm only conditions on the other hand. 
Figure 8 shows the average implicit evaluations for both prime types (Francis West and control) 
across time in all five story conditions. 
 
Figure 8. Mean proportion of pictographs judged as more pleasant than average in Study 7 by 
measurement time, story condition, and face prime. Error bars are standard errors. 
 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
Time 1 Time 2 Time 1 Time 2 Time 1 Time 2 Time 1 Time 2 Time 1 Time 2 
Control Affirm Only Negate Only Negate + Affirm Reinterpretation 
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 P
ic
to
gr
ap
hs
 J
ud
ge
d 
M
or
e 
Pl
ea
sa
nt
 th
an
 A
ve
ra
ge
 
Control Faces 
Francis West 
 119 
 The interaction between prime and time was significant in both the reinterpretation 
(F[1,71] = 24.579, p < .001, η2p = .257) and negate + affirm conditions (F[1,64] = 46.260, p < 
.001, η2p = .420). In the reinterpretation condition at Time 1, Francis West was less implicitly 
positive (M = .420, SD = .263) than control faces (M = .590, SD = .202), t(71) = 3.652, p < .001, 
Hedges’ gav = .717 (using the effect size measure recommended by Lakens, 2013; this can be 
interpreted as similar to a between-participants Cohen’s d, with correction for bias due to sample 
size). In the negate + affirm condition at Time 1, Francis was also less implicitly positive (M = 
.344, SD = .284) than control faces (M = .583, SD = .180), t(64) = 5.501, p < .001, Hedges’ gav = 
.991. At Time 2, implicit evaluations had reversed in both conditions. In the reinterpretation 
condition, Francis West was more implicitly positive (M = .641, SD = .251) than control faces 
(M = .498, SD = .261), t(71) = 3.056, p = .003, Hedges’ gav = .553. In the negate + affirm 
condition, Francis was also more implicitly positive (M = .694, SD = .261) than control faces (M 
= .495, SD = .197), t(64) = 4.991, p < .001, Hedges’ gav = .850. The reinterpretation and negate + 
affirm conditions, then, showed very similar patterns of results. 
 The interaction between time and prime was also significant in the negate only (F[1,70] = 
11.568, p = .001, η2p = .142) and affirm only conditions (F[1,62] = 7.085, p = .010, η2p = .103).  In 
the negate only condition at Time 1, Francis West was less implicitly positive (M = .427, SD = 
.305) than control faces (M = .628, SD = .176), t(70) = 4.781, p < .001, Hedges’ gav = .802. In the 
affirm only condition at Time 1, Francis was also less implicitly positive (M = .341, SD = .289) 
than control faces (M = .595, SD = .221), t(62) = 5.864, p < .001, Hedges’ gav = .972. Unlike in 
the reinterpretation and negate + affirm conditions, however, the implicit evaluations did not 
reverse at Time 2. In the negate only condition, implicit evaluations of Francis West (M = .573, 
SD = .293) and the control faces (M = .601, SD = .213) did not significantly differ at Time 2, 
 120 
t(70) = .675, p = .502, Hedges’ gav = .109. In the affirm only condition, Francis West remained 
marginally less implicitly positive (M = .467, SD = .299) than control faces (M = .570, SD = 
.220), t(62) = 1.852, p = .069, Hedges’ gav = .385. 
 Explicit evaluations. The six items measuring explicit liking of Francis West showed 
high reliability both at Time 1 (Cronbach’s α = .94) and Time 2 (Cronbach’s α = .99), and were 
thus merged into a single aggregate score for each point in time. I analyzed these scores in a 2 
(Time: Time 1, Time 2) x 5 (Story Condition: control, reinterpretation, negation only, affirm 
only, negate + affirm) mixed ANOVA, with Time manipulated within-participants and Story 
Condition manipulated between-participants. 
 There was a main effect of time, F(1,339) = 1824.50, p < .001, η2p = .843, and a main 
effect of condition, F(4,339) = 202.24, p < .001, η2p = .943, but both were qualified by a 
significant interaction between time and condition, F(4,339) = 229.89, p < .001, η2p = .731. At 
Time 1, there was no effect of story condition on liking, F(4,339) = .616, p = .651, η2p = .007, 
with average liking of Francis falling significantly below the midpoint of the scale (M = 1.24, SD 
= .59, t[343] = -86.81, p < .001). At Time 2, however, story condition had a significant effect on 
liking, F(4,339) = 275.86, p < .001, η2p = .765. 
 Looking at the specific conditions, I first determined that in the control condition, there 
was no effect of time on explicit liking, t(72) = 1.445, p = .153, Hedges’ gav = .135. Next, I found 
that the interaction between time and condition was significant across the other four story 
conditions, F(1,267) = 110.52, p < .001, η2p = .554.  To investigate this interaction, similar to 
what I did with implicit evaluations, I constructed three orthogonal contrasts to compare the size 
of the time effect in the different between-participants story conditions, setting aside the control 
condition: The first tested the reinterpretation and negate + affirm conditions (pooled) against the 
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negate only and affirm only conditions (pooled), the second tested the reinterpretation condition 
against the negate + affirm condition, and the third tested the negate only condition against the 
affirm only condition. 
 The first contrast was significant, showing that the effect of time in the reinterpretation 
and negate + affirm conditions was collectively different from the effect of time in the negate 
only and affirm only conditions, F(1,267) = 307.32, p < .001, η2p = .535. The second contrast was 
also significant, F(1,267) = 5.29, p = .022, η2p = .019, suggesting that at the explicit level (unlike 
at the implicit level), the reinterpretation and negate + affirm conditions were significantly 
different. Finally, the third contrast was also significant, F(1,267) = 28.83, p < .001, η2p = .097, 
indicating that the negate only and affirm only conditions also differed in their impact on explicit 
liking over time, departing from the lack of difference between these conditions on the implicit 
measure.  
At Time 2 in the reinterpretation condition, Francis West was rated as significantly more 
positive (M = 5.89, SD = 1.59) than in the control condition (M = 1.16, SD = .31), affirm only 
condition (M = 2.62, SD = 1.46), and negate only condition (M = 4.01, SD = .91), all ps < .001. 
However, he was rated as less positive than in the negate + affirm condition (M = 6.44, SD = 
.78), unequal variances t(105.99) = 2.583, p = .011, Hedges’ gs = .439. Next, though at Time 2 in 
the affirm only condition Francis West was more explicitly positive than in the control condition, 
unequal variances t(66.96) = 7.814, p < .001, Hedges’ gs = 1.336, he was less positive than in the 
negate only condition, unequal variances t(101.03) = 6.522, p < .001, Hedges’ gs = 1.122. 
Importantly, even though the negate only condition produced more positive explicit evaluations 
of Francis West at Time 2 than the affirm only condition, they were still significantly less 
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positive than in the reinterpretation condition, as reported above.   Figure 9 shows the average 
explicit liking ratings of Francis West across time in each of the five story conditions. 
 
Figure 9. Mean explicit liking of Francis West in Study 7, by story condition and measurement 
time. Error bars are standard errors. 
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the initial impression and replaces it with an updated one can update implicit responses to the 
person, regardless of whether those two steps are intrinsically related (as is the case with 
reinterpretation) or realized in a piecemeal fashion.  This possibility was further supported by the 
lack of a significant difference in the size of the revision in implicit evaluations between the two 
conditions. Though the negate + affirm condition was actually more effective than the 
reinterpretation condition in changing explicit evaluations, this difference was not hypothesized 
and failed to replicate in the following Study 8; I thus hesitate to draw strong conclusions from 
that effect.  
 Though these data clearly show that combining negation of an earlier impression with the 
addition of a new one is more effective than either step in isolation, the similar degree of revision 
in the negate + affirm condition and the reinterpretation condition is only suggestive of an 
underlying commonality between them. Indeed, it is possible that they operate through different 
mechanisms and only happen to show similar levels of revision. In Study 8, I make use of formal 
processing modeling to further support the proposal that reinterpretation and negate + replace 
produce similar revision in implicit impressions. In doing so, I turn to the question of how both 
types of new information impact responding on the implicit measure.  Does the new information 
actually alter the implicit evaluative impressions of Francis West, or instead does it primarily 
impact other processes that contribute to responding on the AMP, such as the frequency of 
misattribution (i.e., the likelihood that the evaluation of the prime will determine the response to 
the pictograph)?  Although I found in Study 7 that reinterpretation and negate + replace brought 
about similar levels of revision overall, it is possible that reinterpretation alters the evaluative 
impression spontaneously activated by the target person, whereas other strategies for negating 
and replacing a negative impression merely alter the degree to which evaluative impressions of 
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the person drive responses on the implicit measure (i.e., the likelihood of misattribution on the 
AMP). Study 8 tested these possibilities. 
Study 8: A Process Model of Reinterpretation 
In the previous study, I found that the level of revision in the reinterpretation and negate 
+ affirm conditions was very similar, suggesting that reinterpretation might be just one form of a 
broader category of strategies combining the negation and replacement of an earlier impression 
to effectively reverse implicit impressions. The goals of Study 8 were twofold. First, I aimed to 
further test the similarity of reinterpretation and other combinations of negation and affirmation 
by examining the similarity of implicit evaluations in the reinterpretation and negate + affirm 
conditions, but in a different manner from Study 7. Whereas in Study 7 I focused on the overall 
proportion of positive responses on the implicit measure, in Study 8, I made use of multinomial 
process tree modeling to test whether the two conditions would affect the processing parameters 
that are fitted to those response data in a similar way. While similarity in overall levels of 
implicit revision was established in Study 7 using the response data on the AMP, with 
mathematical process modeling I can examine whether the parameters meant to represent the 
processing components underlying responding on the task are also similar between the two 
conditions after the equations are fit to the data. To the degree that the parameters are similar, the 
proposal that both forms of information update implicit impressions in a similar manner is 
corroborated. Formal process modeling thus allows for similarity between the reinterpretation 
and negate + affirm conditions to be assessed at another level.  
This leads naturally into the second goal of Study 8: To begin testing more finely the 
nature of the effect that the new information in both conditions has on implicit impressions. 
Though it is clear that reinterpretation and negate + replace information both shift implicit 
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impressions, this shift tells us little about the processes of implicit evaluation that are impacted. 
While I hypothesize that changes to the evaluative response that is activated by the person prime 
is chiefly (or solely) responsible for the effects of the information, it is also possible that the 
likelihood of misattributing that response to the pictograph is also affected.  Multinomial process 
tree modeling provides one approach to testing these possibilities. 
In such models, equation parameters are designed to reflect posited mental operations, 
and their values signify the likelihood of that operation’s occurrence. The response data are then 
used to fit the parameters algebraically (e.g., Jacoby, 1991, Payne, 2001) or through maximum 
likelihood estimation (e.g., Conrey et al., 2005; Payne et al., 2010; Sherman et al., 2008). The 
fitted equations can then be used to generate predicted response data, with the performance of the 
model assessed by computing the error between the predicted and actual responses. This 
procedure then allows for an examination of the effect of manipulations on model parameters, 
which provides evidence for an effect on the underlying process that the parameter represents. 
The validity of the parameter’s interpretation, of course, must also be assessed, usually by testing 
whether the parameters are affected in expected ways by manipulations during pretesting.  
I made use of a previously validated multinomial process model of responding on the 
AMP (Payne et al., 2010). Figure 10 shows the process tree of this model. The AMP model 
construes responses on the AMP as driven by three processes, each captured by a unique 
parameter: The A parameter models the probability that a “pleasant” impression will be activated 
by the prime, the M parameter estimates the probability that the impression of the prime will be 
misattributed to the pictograph, and the P parameter estimates the probability that, absent 
misattribution, a pleasant impression will be activated by the pictograph itself. The probability of 
giving a “pleasant” or “unpleasant” response to each pictograph through a particular pathway in 
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the model is equal to the product of all of the parameters in that pathway, and the total 
probability of giving each type of response is equal to the sum of all branches that result in that 
type of response. The total probabilities of giving a “pleasant” or “unpleasant” response are thus 
represented by the equations: 
 
p(Pleasant response) = M·A + (1–M)·P     (1) 
p(Unpleasant response) = M·(1–A) + (1–M)·(1–P)    (2) 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Multinomial process tree for the AMP model in Study 8 for pleasant (+) and 
unpleasant (-) responses, adapted from Payne et al. (2010). 
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This decomposition of AMP responses into three underlying processes has previously fit 
AMP data well (Payne et al., 2010), making it suitable for lending support for or against the 
proposal that the reinterpretation and negate + affirm conditions would show similarities in their 
underlying processes.  For example, even if revision in overall AMP responses is similar 
between the two conditions, it might be the case that reinterpretation produces a smaller change 
in the activation of a pleasant response to the Francis West prime relative to the negate + affirm 
condition (A parameter), but an increase in the likelihood of misattribution (M parameter), 
resulting in similar levels of revision in the overall responses. My prediction, however, was that 
just as with the overall pattern of responses on the AMP, the parameters capturing subsidiary 
processes would also not significantly differ between the reinterpretation and negate + affirm 
conditions. In contrast, I expected that both of these conditions would differ in some way from 
the control story condition (in which Francis performs one more negative action, consistent with 
the earlier story). While I thought it likely that the A parameter would show a substantial 
difference between the control condition and the others at Time 2 (being lower in the control 
condition, indicating a lower probability of activating a positive impression of Francis in that 
condition), I did not have strong expectations about whether the M parameter (likelihood of 
misattribution) would vary as well. 
Method 
 Participants and design. Three hundred seventy-seven undergraduates participated in 
the study in return for partial course credit. Of these, only partial data was recorded on one of the 
implicit measures for 26 participants due to a server error, and I determined prior to looking at 
the data to exclude these participants from all analyses. This left full data for 351 participants. Of 
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these, 7 were excluded for only pressing a single response key on at least one of the implicit 
measures and a further 34 for familiarity with Mandarin or Cantonese (Payne et al., 2005) in 
accordance with protocol. This left a final sample size of 310 participants (105 men, 205 women, 
MAge = 18.60 years, SD = 1.61). I initially aimed a priori to collect enough data to achieve 75 
participants per each of three between-participants conditions after planned exclusions (225 
total), but increased this to 100 per cell (prior to all analyses) due to an increased supply of 
participants. Each participant was randomly assigned to either the control, reinterpretation, or 
negate + affirm condition. 
 Materials and procedure. The materials and procedure were identical to those used in 
Study 7, with the following exceptions. First, the negate only and affirm only conditions were not 
included. Second, each AMP was modified to accommodate the multinomial modeling analysis. 
Fitting the AMP process model to AMP data requires that half of the trials present pictographs 
that are known to be relatively less pleasant than average, and that the other half of the trials 
present pictographs that are known to be relatively more pleasant than average. To generate two 
sets of pictographs that differ in known pleasantness, I recruited 40 participants from Mechanical 
Turk to complete a single AMP, consisting of 200 trials of only pictograph targets (no primes 
were included). For each of the 200 pictographs, I calculated the proportion of participants in the 
sample who responded that the pictograph was more pleasant than average, and then I sorted the 
pictographs according to their average pleasantness. The 60 pictographs with the highest average 
pleasantness became the “pleasant” set (M = .67, SD = .04, range = .63 - .78), and the 60 
pictographs with the lowest average pleasantness become the “unpleasant” set (M = .48, SD = 
.04, range = .38 - .53), in that they were relatively less pleasant than the others. Because I 
planned to administer the AMP twice in the main experiment (at Time 1 and Time 2), I randomly 
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assigned 30 pictographs from the “pleasant” group and 30 pictographs from the “unpleasant” 
group to one set and the remaining pictographs from each group to the other set, creating two 
final sets of 60 pictographs (each half pleasant and half unpleasant). For each participant, one set 
of 60 pictographs was used during the Time 1 AMP, and the other set was used during the Time 
2 AMP, order counterbalanced. Each AMP in this experiment thus consisted of 60 trials, with 30 
trials including Francis West as the prime, and 30 including a control face as the prime. This 
resulted in 15 trials of each of the following types being presented during each AMP: Francis 
West + pleasant pictograph, Francis West + unpleasant pictograph, control face + pleasant 
pictograph, control face + unpleasant pictograph.  
 With the exception of these differences, the rest of the materials and procedure of this 
experiment proceeded in an identical fashion to Study 7. 
Results 
 Data preprocessing. For both the Time 1 and Time 2 AMPs, for each participant I 
calculated the proportion of trials on which the pictograph was judged to be more pleasant than 
average following the Francis West prime image, and a similar proportion for trials following 
control face images, separately for the “pleasant” and “unpleasant” pictographs, yielding 8 AMP 
measures for each participant within a 2 (Time: Time 1, Time 2) x 2 (Prime: Francis West, 
Control) x 2 (Pictograph Valence: Pleasant, Unpleasant) design. Story Condition (Control, 
Reinterpretation, Negate + Affirm) was the sole between-participants factor in the design. 
Explicit evaluations of Francis West at Time 1 and Time 2 were computed by averaging the six 
liking measures at each time point, as done in Study 1. 
 Implicit evaluations. I conducted a factorial mixed ANOVA on implicit pleasantness, 
fully crossing the four factors mentioned above (time, prime, pictograph valence, and story 
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condition). A significant interaction between time, prime, and story condition obtained, F(2,307) 
= 14.44, p < .001, η2p = .086. This three-way effect was not moderated by pictograph valence, 
F(2,307) = 1.77, p = .173, η2p = .011. There was a main effect of pictograph valence, F(1,307) = 
48.59, p < .01, η2p = .137, such that pleasant pictographs were indeed judged as more pleasant (M 
= .53, SD = .14) than unpleasant pictographs (M = .47, SD = .14). This was moderated by time, 
F(1,307) = 6.51, p = .011, η2p = .021, such that this average pleasantness difference between the 
pictograph types was larger at Time 2 (MDiff = .072, SE = .01) than at Time 1 (MDiff = .047, SE = 
.009), but the difference was significant at both Time 1, F(1,307) = 25.32, p < .001, η2p = .076, 
and Time 2, F(1,307) = 48.27, p < .001, η2p = .136. Pictograph valence did not significantly 
moderate any other effects, all Fs < 2.38, all ps > .093. 
 Turning back to the interaction of between time, prime, and story condition, I next tested 
two orthogonal contrasts, the first comparing the size of the interaction between time and prime 
in the control condition to the size of that interaction in the reinterpretation and negate + affirm 
conditions (pooled), and the second comparing the size of the interaction between time and 
prime in the reinterpretation condition to the size of that interaction in the negate + affirm 
condition. The first contrast was significant, F(1,307) = 27.29, p < .001, η2p = .082, suggesting 
that the control condition did indeed differ from the other two (reinterpretation and negate + 
affirm). The second contrast, however, was not significant, F(1,307) = 1.40, p = .238, η2p = .005, 
suggesting that the reinterpretation and negate + affirm conditions were similar in the size of the 
interaction between time and prime, replicating the null effect observed in Study 7. Figure 11 
displays the mean proportion of pictographs judged to be more pleasant than average in each cell 
of the interaction between time, prime-type, and story condition. 
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Figure 11. Mean proportion of pictographs judged as more pleasant than average in Study 8 by 
measurement time, story condition, and face prime. Error bars are standard errors. 
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.640, but he was significantly more pleasant than control faces at Time 2 (Francis: M = .66, SD = 
.20, Control: M = .46, SD = .17), t(1,307) = 7.20, p < .001, Hedges’ gav = 1.049. Thus, the 
reinterpretation information produced a significant reversal in implicit evaluations from Time 1 
to Time 2, replicating the result obtained in Study 7. 
 In the negate + affirm condition, there was also a significant interaction between time and 
prime, F(1,101) = 42.82, p < .001, η2p = .298. Francis was significantly less pleasant than control 
faces at Time 1 (Francis: M = .42, SD = .22, Control: M = .56, SD = .16), t(101) = 5.44, p < .001, 
Hedges’ gav = .731, but he was significantly more pleasant than control faces at Time 2 (Francis: 
M = .63, SD = .20, Control: M = .50, SD = .18), t(101) = 4.80, p < .001, Hedges’ gav = .687. 
Thus, there was a significant reversal of implicit evaluations from Time 1 to Time 2 in the negate 
+ affirm condition, which was also consistent with the findings of Study 7.  
 Explicit evaluations. The six items measuring explicit liking of Francis West showed 
high reliability both at Time 1 (Cronbach’s α = .84) and Time 2 (Cronbach’s α = .99), and were 
thus merged into a single aggregate score for each point in time. I analyzed these scores in a 2 
(Time: Time 1, Time 2) x 5 (Story Condition: control, reinterpretation, negate + affirm) mixed 
ANOVA, with Time manipulated within-participants and Story Condition manipulated between-
participants.  
 There was a significant main effect of time, F(1,307) = 3869.54, p < .001, η2p = .926, and 
story condition, F(2,307) = 1198.39, p < .001, η2p = .886, which were both qualified by an 
interaction between time and story condition, F(2,307) = 1001.15, p < .001, η2p = .867. I next 
compared the time effect in the different conditions using two orthogonal contrasts, the first 
testing the size of this effect in the control condition vs. the reinterpretation and negate + affirm 
conditions (pooled), and the second comparing the size of the time effect in the reinterpretation 
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condition vs. the negate + affirm condition. The first contrast was significant, F(1,307) = 
2000.23, p < .001, η2p = .867, suggesting that the effect of Time in the control condition did 
indeed differ from the effect of Time in other two. The second contrast was not significant, 
F(1,307) = .509, p = .476, η2p = .002. This indicates that the explicit evaluations of Francis West 
changed equally from Time 1 to Time 2 in the reinterpretation and negate + affirm conditions, 
paralleling the results on the implicit measure (and not replicating the explicit attitude difference 
found between these conditions in Study 7). At Time 2, Francis West was rated as more positive 
in the reinterpretation condition (M = 6.25, SD = .74) than in the control condition (M = 1.29, SD 
= .53), unequal variances t(194.501) = 56.045, p < .001, Hedges’ gs = 7.749, but he was not rated 
any differently in the reinterpretation condition than in the negate + affirm condition (M = 6.25, 
SD = .77), t(208) = .046, p = .963, Hedges’ gs = .006. 
 AMP process model. I next turned to fitting the AMP process model to the data obtained 
from the Time 1 and Time 2 AMPs (Payne et al., 2010). Because each response given by a 
participant falls into one cell of a 3 (Story Condition: control, reinterpretation, negate + affirm) x 
2 (Time: Time 1, Time 2) x 2 (Prime: Francis, control) x 2 (Pictograph Valence: Pleasant, 
Unpleasant) design, there are 24 independent response categories for model fitting.1 The AMP 
model specifies three parameters that can be permitted to vary across response categories: A 
(probability of activation of a pleasant response to the prime), M (probability of misattributing 
the response produced by the prime to the pictograph), and P (probability of activation of a 
pleasant response to the pictograph). Each parameter can also be understood as 1 – the 
probability of the opposite; for example, A can be understood as one minus the probability of 
activation of an unpleasant response to the prime. 
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Because the model has degrees of freedom equal to the number of independent response 
categories (24) minus the number of model parameters, it is not possible to allow all 3 
parameters to vary within each response category, as this would produce a model with negative 
degrees of freedom (24 – 72 = - 48). Thus, I specified the following a priori model: 
Parameter A. A is free to vary across cells of the story condition, time, and prime 
factors, but not pictograph valence (this adds 12 A parameters to the model). 
Parameter M. M is free to vary across cells of the story condition and time factors, but 
not prime or pictograph valence (This adds 6 M parameters to the model). 
Parameter P. P is free to vary across cells of the pictograph valence factor, but no others 
(This adds 2 P parameters to the model). 
The model thus assumes that the likelihood that a pictograph itself will activate a pleasant 
or unpleasant response depends only on the valence group that the pictograph belongs to (the 
unpleasant pictographs set or the pleasant pictographs set), consistent with specifications of this 
parameter in prior work (Payne et al., 2010). Also consistent with prior work, it was assumed 
that the likelihood of a prime activating a pleasant response (A), or the likelihood of 
misattributing the response triggered by the prime to the pictograph (M), would not vary with the 
pictograph valence. I allowed M to vary by time and story condition, but assumed that the type 
of prime on each trial (Francis or control) would not affect the probability of misattribution, also 
similar to choices made in prior work (Payne et al., 2010). Finally, A was given the most leeway 
to vary, as I assumed that the probability that a prime would produce a pleasant response would 
depend on the type of prime (Francis vs. control), time, and story condition. This model thus had 
a total of 20 free parameters, resulting in 24 – 20 = 4 degrees of freedom. The responses of all 
participants in the sample within each response category were pooled to create a single set of 
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counts, and the model was fit with the “mpt” package in R (Wickelmaier, 2011), using the EM 
algorithm (Hu & Batchelder, 1994). 
Model results. Overall model fit was satisfactory (as indicated by a non-significant p-
value), G2 = 8.689, p = 0.069. Table 3 displays the values fit to each of the 20 model 
parameters.2 
 
Table 3. AMP multinomial process model parameter estimates, Study 8 
 
 
 
Control Condition 
 Reinterpretation 
Condition 
 Negate + Affirm 
Condition 
 
Parameter 
 
Francis 
Prime 
Control 
Prime 
 
Francis 
Prime 
Control 
Prime 
 
Francis 
Prime 
Control 
Prime 
 
Time 1   
 
  
 
  
 A .244 .591  .350 .563  .365 .582 
 M .582  .649  .656 
 
Time 2   
 
  
 
  
 A .246 .591  .892 .374  .752 .481 
 M .419  .383  .482 
 
 
 
More Pleasant Pictographs 
 
Less Pleasant Pictographs 
  
P 
 
.580 
 
.450 
 
Note. Parameter A = the probability of activation of a “pleasant” response to the prime, and 1 – 
the probability of activation of an “unpleasant” response to the prime. Parameter M = the 
probability of misattributing the response produced by the prime to the pictograph, and 1 – the 
probability of not misattributing the response produced by the prime to the pictograph, in which 
case the model assumes that responses are driven by parameter P. Parameter P = the probability 
of activation of a “pleasant” response to the pictograph, and 1 – the probability of activation of 
an “unpleasant” response to the pictograph. 
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 Model tests. The differences between parameters can be tested for significance by 
refitting the model while constraining the parameters to be equal, and then taking the difference 
of the G2 value of the old model and the new model. This difference is tested against the null 
value of zero in a one-tailed chi-square test with degrees of freedom equal to the difference in 
number of parameters between the two models (the test is one-tailed because the G2 value cannot 
be smaller in the more constrained model).  
 Tests of P. I first tested whether the probability of activating a “pleasant” response to a 
pictograph from the more pleasant set (.58) was significantly greater than the probability of 
activating a “pleasant” response to a pictograph from the less pleasant set (.45). As expected, this 
was the case; a model constraining the two P parameters to be equal had significantly worse fit 
than the original model, χ2(1) = 142.21, p < .001. Though this finding amounts to a manipulation 
check, it was important for suggesting that the model was performing reasonably. 
 Tests of M. Next, I tested whether the probability of misattribution varies across time and 
story conditions; examining the parameter estimates in Table 1, there is some suggestion of a 
decrease in the likelihood of misattribution from Time 1 to Time 2 in all story conditions. I thus 
fit a model constraining M to be equal in all six cells, and found that the resulting constrained 
model was not significantly worse than the original model, χ2(5) = 7.10, p = .214.  
 Tests of A. Finding no evidence for strong differences in misattribution across time and 
story conditions, I next turned to the probability of activation of a “pleasant” response to the 
primes (parameter A). First, I tested whether the probability of activation of a pleasant response 
to Francis West was lower than the probability of activation of a pleasant response to the control 
primes at Time 1 in each story condition. This was indeed the case: The A parameter was 
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significantly lower for Francis West at Time 1 relative to the control faces in the control 
condition (Francis: .244, control faces: .591), χ2(1) = 248.94, p < .001, the reinterpretation 
condition (Francis: .350, control faces: .563), χ2(1) = 124.15, p < .001, and the negate + affirm 
condition (Francis: .365, control faces: .582), χ2(1) = 124.98, p < .001. 
 At Time 2, I expected that the A parameter would remain lower for Francis relative to the 
control face primes in the control story condition, but would become higher for Francis relative 
to the control face primes in the reinterpretation and negate + affirm conditions. First, I tested 
whether the model would be significantly worse if all of the A parameters for Francis West were 
constrained to be equal at Time 2. This did significantly worsen model fit, suggesting that the 
likelihood of activating a pleasant response to Francis West at Time 2 varied across conditions, 
χ2(2) = 28.55, p < .001. This was not the case for the control faces, as constraining the A 
parameters for the control faces to be equal at Time 2 across story conditions did not 
significantly worsen model fit, χ2(2) = 3.08, p = .214. 
In the control story condition, the A parameter did indeed remain lower for Francis (.246) 
relative to control face primes (.591) at Time 2, χ2(1) = 126.67, p < .001. Also in line with my 
predictions, in the reinterpretation condition at Time 2, a pleasant response was more likely to be 
activated by the Francis West prime than by control face primes: the A parameter for Francis 
West (.892) was significantly higher than the A parameter for control faces (.374), χ2(1) = 
262.28, p < .001. Finally, as expected, a reversal in the relative size of the A parameter also 
occurred in the negate + affirm condition at Time 2, with the A parameter being significantly 
larger for Francis West (.752) than for control primes (.481), χ2(1) = 106.93, p < .001. 
Discussion 
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 The results of Study 8 were thoroughly consistent with the proposal that information that 
prompts negation of an earlier impression and its replacement with a new impression, whether 
through reinterpretation or discrete steps, reverses implicit evaluations in a similar pattern. The 
similar degree of revision between the reinterpretation and negate + affirm conditions in Study 7 
was replicated here, and the application of an established multinomial processing model to the 
data (Payne et al., 2010) showed support for the equivalence in underlying processes on the 
implicit measure between the two conditions. Both the reinterpretation and negate + affirm 
conditions, however, differed in an anticipated way from the control condition, in which Francis 
remained negative from Time 1 to Time 2: The A parameter continued to suggest the low 
likelihood of activation of a positive impression of Francis West (and the high likelihood of 
activation of a negative impression) at Time 2 in the control condition. Furthermore, the value of 
the A parameter significantly differed between the control condition and the other two 
conditions, whereas the value of the M parameter did not.  
 This finding – that the impact of the reinterpretation and negate + affirm conditions on 
implicit impressions of Francis West is driven in both cases by changes in the impression 
activated by the prime, rather than the likelihood of misattribution – supports the conclusion that 
the new information alters the evaluative impression of the target that is spontaneously primed, 
rather than other processes that impact responses. In the AMP model, another such process is the 
likelihood of misattribution, modeled by the M parameter, which did not vary across time or 
information conditions. It was thus not the case that reinterpretation (or negate + affirm) 
increased the likelihood of misattribution. If anything, the likelihood of misattribution seemed to 
decrease from Time 1 to Time 2 across conditions, though not significantly so. The results of 
Study 8, then, suggest that the effectiveness of the forms of new information examined here for 
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updating implicit impressions results in an altered evaluative impression of the target, regardless 
of whether the negation and replacement are achieved through reinterpretation. 
 Having now developed and tested a model of the constituent processes that may occur not 
only during reinterpretation, but also in other potentially successful routes of revision within a 
broader class of “negate + affirm” strategies, this chapter next turns to the question of how 
effectively reinterpretation can overturn an implicit first impression after a greater amount of 
time has passed since initial formation – a topic of critical importance for establishing the 
generalizability of reinterpretation as a mechanism of implicit updating. 
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Study 9: Revision After Delay13 
 
Abstract 
 
People are adept at forming impressions of others, but how easily can impressions be updated?  
Although implicit first impressions have been characterized as difficult to overturn, recent work 
shows that they can be reversed through reinterpretation of earlier learning. However, such 
reversal has been demonstrated only in the same experimental session in which the impression 
formed, suggesting that implicit updating might be possible only within a brief temporal 
window, before impressions are consolidated and when memory about the initial information is 
strongest.  Implicit impressions may be unable to be revised when reinterpreting details are 
learned later, due to memory consolidation or forgetting of the details to be reinterpreted.  This 
study tested whether implicit first impressions can be reversed through reinterpretation after a 
two-day delay following the initial formation. Results showed that implicit revision emerged 
after the delay, even among those with poor explicit recall or who were not cued to recall. We 
discuss implications for theory on impression formation and updating. 
 
Keywords: implicit evaluation; first impressions; AMP; reinterpretation; attitudes; recall 
 
  
                                                
13 Published as: Mann, T. C., & Ferguson, M. J. (2017). Reversing implicit first impressions 
through reinterpretation after a two-day delay. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 68, 
122–127. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2016.06.004 © Elsevier, 2017. 
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People are adept at making inferences about other people based on even minimal 
information, such as brief descriptions of single behaviors (Todorov & Uleman, 2002), facial 
characteristics (Rule et al., 2010), and group membership (Devine, 1989).  These impressions 
have consequences for judgments and interpersonal behavior, and persist even when the initial 
information can no longer be recalled (e.g., McCarthy & Skowronski, 2011; Todorov & Uleman, 
2002). But what happens when first impressions are wrong?  Is it true that we “never get a 
second chance to make a first impression”?  First impressions that are activated implicitly 
(unintentionally), rather than explicitly (intentionally), indeed have been repeatedly portrayed as 
more difficult to undo (Gregg et al., 2006; McConnell & Rydell, 2014; Wilson, Lindsey, & 
Schooler, 2000).  Explanations for this dissociation vary, but a common proposal is that implicit 
evaluations are primarily driven by slow-changing associations, which are less sensitive to 
propositional processing – suggesting that first impressions that have been explicitly rejected 
might continue to implicitly guide behavior (e.g., Rydell & McConnell, 2006).  
Recent work, however, indicates that implicit impressions can be rapidly reversed. First, 
theoretical models and data have increasingly supported the idea that propositional thinking can 
impact implicit processes (e.g., De Houwer, 2014; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Wyer, 
2010, 2016), questioning the view that implicit impressions must be inherently slow to change. 
For example, although approach-avoidance behaviors can impact implicit evaluations of stimuli 
(e.g., Kawakami, Phills, Steele, & Dovidio, 2007; Woud, Maas, Becker, & Rinck, 2013), merely 
instructing participants about approach-avoidance contingencies can similarly impact implicit 
evaluations (Van Dessel, De Houwer, Gast, & Smith, 2015; Van Dessel, De Houwer, Gast, 
Smith, & Schryver, 2016). In the context of impression change, these ideas suggest that revision 
of implicit impressions may be strongest when new information is subjectively assessed as more 
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diagnostic or important (though even propositional information that is seemingly low in 
diagnosticity may sometimes drive change; Van Dessel et al., 2016).  In support of this 
possibility, Cone and Ferguson (2015) asked participants to read 100 behavioral statements about 
a novel person that indicated his overall goodness, and formed implicit positive impressions of 
him.  After then learning an additional behavior that was extremely negative (e.g., that he had 
molested children), participants showed robust revision, switching to a strongly negative implicit 
impression of him. Furthermore, the perceived offensiveness of the single negative action 
predicted the extent of revision, and this effect was mediated by the perceived diagnosticity of 
the actions (i.e., how much the behavior was assumed to reflect the target’s true character).   
It may be harder, however, to revise an initially negative implicit impression to a positive 
one in this way, in that negative information is viewed as particularly diagnostic (Skowronski & 
Carlston, 1989). In their work, Cone and Ferguson (2015) in fact did not find reversal after 
participants learned that an initially negative person also performed an extremely positive 
behavior (donating a kidney to a sick child).  However, another set of studies (Mann & Ferguson, 
2015) showed that revising even an initial negative implicit impression is possible.  Namely, 
participants who learned new information that changed the evaluative meaning of the initial 
information showed strong implicit revision: when participants read about a man who broke into 
and damaged his neighbor’s homes, the ensuing negative implicit impression was reversed by the 
discovery that he was actually rescuing children from a fire.  The degree of updating was 
predicted by participants’ self-reported extent of reinterpretation.  Other work has also shown 
that when new information is presented that updates previously learned details, implicit 
evaluations are likely to be revised when participants can elaborate on the earlier information 
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(Wyer, 2010). This suggests that reinterpretation may be a powerful route through which even 
negative implicit first impressions can be reversed. 
A Brief Window of Opportunity for Implicit Revision through Reinterpretation? 
 One major limitation of existing work on reinterpretation (Mann & Ferguson, 2015; 
Wyer, 2010), as well as all other work showing implicit revision of first impressions toward 
novel targets (Cone & Ferguson, 2015; Peters & Gawronski, 2011; Wyer, 2016), is that in all 
cases the new evidence is presented mere minutes after the first impressions have formed.  Thus, 
even though new information that reinterpreted the meaning of a first impression was successful 
in “undoing” implicit first impressions in a single lab session (Mann & Ferguson, 2015), it is 
possible that implicit revision can occur only within this kind of short temporal window (see 
Peters & Gawronski, 2011), which would considerably limit the circumstances in which implicit 
impressions can be updated. Why might revision through reinterpretation be possible only within 
such a brief temporal window?  There are at least two lines of work that are relevant.  First, as 
time elapses after the first impression has formed, memory for the details of the initial 
information should subside, potentially undermining revision.  The details underlying one’s 
initial impression are often less impactful on judgment over time as more information about a 
person is learned, with such judgments about the subject of an impression becoming increasingly 
based on trait abstractions more than recall of specific behaviors (e.g., Klein, Loftus, Trafton, & 
Fuhrman, 1992; Sherman & Klein, 1994; see also Hastie & Park, 1986). There is sometimes 
even stronger recall for behaviors that contradict one’s overall impression than for behaviors that 
are consistent with it (e.g., Babey, Queller, & Klein, 1998; Hastie & Kumar, 1979), as the 
efficiency gains of reliance on schemas renders continued use of memories for consistent 
behaviors less necessary.  Indeed, first impressions persist and continue to impact how people 
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respond to others even after the initial behavioral information is forgotten (Castelli et al., 2004; 
McCarthy & Skowronski, 2011; Todorov & Uleman, 2002).  
Efficiency from abstraction, however, may have a cost. In particular, revision of 
impressions through reinterpretation may require recall of the specific behaviors that led to their 
formation in the first place (Wyer, 2010, 2016). Precisely because the subjective diagnosticity of 
new information is crucially important in predicting the impact of that information on 
impressions (Skowronski & Carlston, 1989), people may be skeptical of new information that 
contradicts an earlier impression if they cannot recall its initial source. If earlier source memories 
have been forgotten but a person nonetheless retains the corresponding impression they formed 
on the basis of those memories, how can one compare the strength of the original and new 
information?  This should be particularly difficult when the new information hinges on a 
reinterpretation of earlier details.  Following this logic, reinterpretation may lead to updating 
only when one can connect the new details to the initial information.  If we find this to be true in 
the present work, it would reveal an important limitation of trait abstraction in impression 
formation: a subsequent impairment in the capacity for revision, perhaps through reinterpretation 
in particular.  
 A second line of work suggesting that revision may be unlikely after time has elapsed 
concerns memory consolidation.  Implicit impressions should consolidate over time, such that 
the representations may become less susceptible to interference through processes occurring over 
multiple timescales (Dudai, 2004; McGaugh, 2000). This would suggest that implicit first 
impressions become more difficult to revise once they have consolidated.  Notably, this remains 
untested, as all research to date examining updating of implicit first impressions of novel targets 
has demonstrated such change before memory consolidation would be expected (i.e., within a 
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30-minute experiment; e.g., Cone & Ferguson, 2015; Mann & Ferguson, 2015; Peters & 
Gawronski, 2011; Wyer, 2010, 2016).  Finding that even information that directly bears on – and 
reverses – the evaluative implications of earlier learning fails to update implicit evaluations after 
two days would expand on recent findings that a delay of even minutes makes effective updating 
of implicit impressions less likely (Peters & Gawronski, 2011; see also Zanon, De Houwer, Gast, 
& Smith, 2009).  
Implicit Revision After A Delay 
 Although some work suggests that implicit revision may be unlikely after a delay of 
multiple days, other work suggests that it might emerge.  Namely, implicit evaluative 
impressions may be more reflective of recent rather than older experiences (Castelli, Carraro, 
Gawronski, & Gava, 2010; cf. Dunham, Baron, & Banaji, 2008; Rudman, Phelan, & Heppen, 
2007; Zanon et al., 2009).  For example, Castelli and colleagues (2010) found that participants’ 
self-reported recent (versus childhood) experiences, behaviors, and feelings about religion 
predicted their implicit evaluations of religion.  
Other research in cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience research shows that 
consolidation is not entirely unidirectional. A limitation of extinction and counterconditioning 
training for aversive memories is that once such initial memories are consolidated, new 
countervailing learning often is encoded into a separate memory trace, and thus does not replace 
the earlier memory (e.g., Bouton, 1994; see also Gawronski & Cesario, 2013). Recent work on 
reconsolidation, however, has shown that reactivation of memories produces instability that 
enables modification (e.g., Agren et al., 2012; Lane et al., 2015; Schiller, Kanen, LeDoux, 
Monfils, & Phelps, 2013; Schiller et al., 2010). Schiller and colleagues (2010), for example, 
found that only when participants were reminded of a conditioned stimulus 10 minutes prior to 
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extinction training did the extinguished response fail to reappear a day or even a year later. The 
plasticity of consolidated memories after reminders thus opens the door to updating even after 
considerable time has passed. Furthermore, it may be the case that reinterpretation is particularly 
likely to result in the new information being integrated into the mental representation of the 
initial impression, rather than result in a separate, contextualized representation (Gawronski & 
Cesario, 2013), given the direct relevance of the new information to the old.14 
Overview of Current Work 
In the current study, we tested whether implicit evaluative impressions of a novel person 
could be reversed by new information learned two days after formation. We led participants to 
form a negative impression of a target, and then introduced (after two days) new details that 
either did or did not reframe those actions as positive. We measured implicit evaluations of the 
target after both sets of information.  
We also examined the role of recall in revision through reinterpretation after delay. In 
order for revision to ensue, perhaps especially after consolidation, it may be necessary to be able 
to explicitly recall (and reconsider) a considerable amount of the initial information (Wyer, 2010, 
2016), or to at least be prompted to remember the details.  In contrast, if implicit revision is 
robust, it may emerge regardless of explicit memory for the details of the initial information. To 
test this question, we manipulated whether participants completed a memory quiz before they 
received the new information in the second session.  
 
 
 
                                                
14 We thank a reviewer for bringing this argument to our attention. 
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Method 
Participants 
Four hundred seventy-two participants were recruited from Mechanical Turk 
(mturk.com) in exchange for $1.00 for completing the first session and $0.50 for completing the 
second session. We determined through a power analysis to recruit enough participants to 
achieve a sample of approximately 260 participants at Time 2 for 80%+ power to detect a 
medium-small (Cohen’s d = .25) four-way mixed interaction effect.15 Participants were recruited 
in batches of 50-117 over approximately one month until we exceeded our target Time 2 sample 
size (this was our stopping rule). These small batches allowed us to monitor attrition and ensure 
that all participants in a batch would finish the first session within hours of each other, making it 
possible for the mass invitation for session 2 to be sent approximately two days later for all 
participants. Five participants failed to complete the first session, and partial data from 2 were 
lost due to server error, so they were excluded from all analyses. Of those who completed 
Session 1, 62% (289 participants) completed the second session. Data from 5 participants fluent 
in Mandarin or Cantonese, and 14 participants who used solely one response key on every trial 
of at least one administration of the implicit measure (Payne et al., 2005), were excluded from all 
analyses a priori. This left a final sample of 270 participants (43% women, Mage = 32 years; 
81.9% white, 2.2% Hispanic or Latino, 7% Black, 6.7% Asian, 1.9% other race, .4% race not 
given). 
Session One 
                                                
15 We believe that in hindsight, we performed this power analysis incorrectly; however, the 
sample size is consistent with prior studies using this same paradigm (Mann & Ferguson, 2015), 
and Westfall’s (2015) PANGEA power analysis tool (http://jakewestfall.org/pangea/) suggests 
that the power for this 4-way design with a total sample of 260 participants is estimated at 87.2% 
under default variance component assumptions, which is above our target of 80% power. 
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 During the first session, participants read a story, presented across 26 screens, in which a 
man named Francis West broke into the homes of two of his neighbors and caused extensive 
destruction. Participants proceeded through the story at their own pace, and read a variety of 
details about Francis’s actions, such as that he broke down a door, threw a pot of water all over a 
young girl’s computer, and removed precious things from the bedrooms. This story was designed 
to induce a strong negative impression of Francis (see the Supplemental Material). A photograph 
of a man labeled “Francis West” was presented on each screen. For each participant, one 
photograph of a man from a bank of 11 used in prior research (Mann & Ferguson, 2015; Minear 
& Park, 2004) was randomly selected for this purpose, with the other 10 serving as control 
stimuli during the implicit measures.    
 After reading the Francis West story, participants completed the first Affect 
Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005). On each of 40 trials, 
participants were presented with a prime image for 75 ms (Francis West on 20 trials, control 
faces on 20 trials). After a 125 ms blank interval, a Chinese pictograph was then presented for 
100 ms before being replaced by a black and white pattern mask. The participants were 
instructed to judge whether each pictograph was more or less pleasant than the average 
pictograph, while attempting to not allow the prime stimuli to have any impact on these 
decisions. The extent to which the primes are systematically associated with pleasantness 
judgments of the pictographs across trials despite these instructions thus reveals unintentional 
evaluative processing of the primes (Payne et al., 2005, 2013). The 40 pictographs were drawn 
from one of two sets (counterbalanced across participants). (Counterbalance condition produced 
no significant effects, and will not be discussed further.) 
 149 
 Following the first AMP, participants responded to six questions assessing explicit 
attitudes toward Francis West. They were first asked, “How likable is Francis West?” on a scale 
from 1 (very unlikable) to 7 (very likable). Then, they were asked to place Francis on 1-7 scales 
from bad to good, mean to pleasant, disagreeable to agreeable, uncaring to caring, and cruel to 
kind, in random order. Finally, we collected their email address so as to contact them for the 
second session (all but 6 provided one), and compensated them $1.00. 
Session Two 
 Approximately 48 hours after the end of their first session, participants were emailed a 
link inviting them to participate in the second session, for which they would receive a bonus 
($0.50) upon completion. They were given 24 hours to participate, with a reminder email after 12 
hours (mean interval between sessions = 55.30 hours, SD = 7.27, range 47.39 to 73.76). (The size 
of the delay did not impact any of the results.) Participants were randomly assigned to either 
complete a quiz assessing their recall of the events described in the first session before learning a 
final piece of information about Francis, or to skip directly to learning that final information. 
 Those in the quiz condition were asked to do their best to recall 10 pieces of information 
in an open-ended manner by typing their answer into a text box, with up to 25 seconds to answer 
each. Queried items included such things as the name of the man in the story, and what he threw 
on the laptop (see the Supplemental Material16).  
 Next, all participants were presented with one of two screens displaying new information 
about Francis. In the control condition, participants read information consistent with their prior 
negative impression: Francis had a criminal record, often screamed at kids playing near his 
property, and broke into the houses in search of valuables and revenge on the children. In the fire 
                                                
16 Provided in an attached Appendix. 
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rescue story condition, participants instead read information that provided a highly positive 
reframing of his earlier actions: Francis broke into the homes because he saw that they were on 
fire, and the “precious things” he removed were the young children who were trapped inside. 
Participants were asked to think about this new information for at least fifteen seconds before 
advancing. 
 Participants then completed the AMP again, identical to the first (except using the 
remaining ideograph set). Next, they recompleted the explicit attitude scale, and reported 
whether they spoke Mandarin or Cantonese. The remaining questions were exploratory, and thus 
not analyzed here. They answered three multiple-choice questions assessing their final 
interpretations of events in the story, including why Francis threw water (e.g., to put out a fire; to 
ruin items), why the cat died (e.g., smoke inhalation; injuries from getting stepped on), and what 
Francis removed from the houses (e.g., children; jewelry). Participants were then asked to 
identify Francis out of a lineup of the photographs of men presented during the study, one of 
which was Francis West, and the other 10 of which were the control primes. After this, they were 
asked how confused they were (from 1, not confused at all, to 7, completely confused), whether 
they thought the story was based on true events (from 1, not at all, to 7, completely), and how 
they feel right now (from 1, very bad, to 7, very good). They were also given a manipulation 
check asking them to identify the final information they had read about Francis, from a set of 
three options, and then finally reported demographic information, were offered the chance to 
provide open-ended feedback to the researchers about the study, and were debriefed and 
compensated. 
Results 
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 All but four participants correctly identified the final information they had read about 
Francis West on the manipulation check, demonstrating high levels of attention to the critical 
Time 2 information. All 270 participants were included in the analyses below, but the results do 
not meaningfully differ if those four participants are excluded.   
Implicit Evaluations 
Implicit evaluations of the primes (Francis West or control faces) were measured as the 
proportion of pictographs judged to be more pleasant than average within each cell of a 2 
(Measurement Time: Time 1, Time 2) x 2 (Prime Person: Francis West, Control Faces) x 2 
(Story Condition: Fire Rescue, Control) x 2 (Recall Condition: Quiz Present, Quiz Absent) 
mixed design, with the first two factors manipulated within-participants.  
 A mixed-ANOVA revealed that the highest-order significant effect was the interaction 
between time, prime person, and story condition, F(1,266) = 58.77, p < .001, η2p = .181. Recall 
condition did not moderate this effect, F(1,266) = .15, p = .703, η2p = .001, and produced no 
significant main effect (F[1,266] = .388, p = .534, η2p = .001) or other interactions, including two-
way interactions with time (F[1,266] = .335, p = .563, η2p = .001), prime person (F[1,266] = .530, 
p = .467, η2p = .002), or story condition (F[1,266] = .606, p = .437, η2p = .002) and three-way 
interactions with time and prime person (F[1,266] = 1.893, p = .170, η2p = .007), time and story 
condition (F[1,266] = .216, p = .643, η2p = .001), or prime person and story condition (F[1,266] = 
.338, p = .561, η2p = .001) . Figure 12 shows the mean implicit positivity of each prime type 
across conditions. Examining the three-way effect, we found that the interaction between time 
and prime person was significant in the fire rescue condition, F(1,266) = 76.56, p < .001, η2p = 
.223, such that at Time 1, implicit evaluations of Francis West (M = .41, SD = .28) were 
significantly less positive than of the control faces (M = .60, SD = .22), F(1,266) = 32.16, p < 
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.001, η2p = .108, but at Time 2, implicit evaluations of Francis West (M = .65, SD = .26) were 
significantly more positive than of the control faces (M = .50, SD = .21), F(1,266) = 21.11, p < 
.001, η2p = .074. This suggests that reversal of the implicit first impression occurred, and just as 
strongly as in previous work – the Cohen’s d comparing relative implicit preference for Francis 
over control faces (difference score) at Time 2 in the fire condition versus the control condition 
was 1.23, which is comparable to the studies in Mann and Ferguson (2015) that used the same 
measure (range 1.03 – 1.15).  In the control story condition, there was a marginal interaction 
between time and prime person, F(1,266) = 3.70, p = .056, η2p = .014. Implicit evaluations of 
Francis (M = .37, SD = .29) were significantly less positive than of the control faces (M = .61, 
SD = .23) at Time 1, F(1,266) = 53.61, p < .001, η2p = .168, and this difference was even more 
pronounced at Time 2 (Francis West: M = .37, SD = .26; Control: M = .68, SD = .21), F(1,266) = 
95.96, p < .001, η2p = .265. 
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Figure 12. Mean proportion of pictographs judged to be more pleasant than the average 
pictograph, by quiz condition, time, story condition, and person prime, in Study 9. Error bars are 
standard errors. 
 
We then tested whether individual performance on the recall quiz predicted revision.  
Two blind coders separately made yes/no determinations for each question as to whether the 
participant had correctly recalled the information from session one (98% agreement). We 
followed an a priori plan to score answers as “correct” only if both coders judged it as correct. 
For each participant, we computed recall performance as the total number of correct responses 
(MRecall = 5.18 of 10, SD = 1.84, range 0 – 9). 
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 Next, we ran a mixed ANOVA on implicit pleasantness in the recall quiz condition, with 
all interactions and main effects involving time, person prime, story condition, and the 
continuous measure of recall performance (mean-centered). Results showed that recall 
performance did not moderate the three-way interaction between time, person prime, and story 
condition, F(1,136) = .689, p = .408, η2p = .005, nor was there a significant main effect of 
performance (F[1,136] = 2.056, p = .154, η2p = .015) or other interactions, including two-way 
interactions with time (F[1,136] = 0.595, p = .442, η2p = .002), prime person (F[1,136] = .502, p = 
.480, η2p = .004), or story condition (F[1,136] = 0.008, p = .929, η2p < .001) and three-way 
interactions with time and prime person (F[1,136] = 0.077, p = .782, η2p = .001), time and story 
condition (F[1,136] = .971, p = .326, η2p = .007), or prime person and story condition (F[1,136] = 
.844, p = .360, η2p = .006). 
Explicit Evaluations 
 Explicit attitudes toward Francis also showed revision in the fire rescue condition. An 
interaction effect on the mean of the six-item explicit liking scale emerged between time and 
story condition, F(1,266) = 1084.50, p < .001, η2p = .80, such that Francis was viewed 
equivalently at Time 1 in the fire condition (M = 1.16, SD = .45) and in the control condition (M 
= 1.28, SD = .70), F(1,266) = 2.58, p = .109, η2p = .01, but at Time 2 was viewed more positively 
in the fire (M = 5.81, SD = 1.47) versus control condition (M = 1.21, SD = .45), F(1,266) = 
1251.40, p < .001, η2p = .82. The interaction between time and story condition was not moderated 
by recall quiz condition, F(1,266) = .260, p = .611, η2p = .001, and there was also no main effect 
(F[1,266] = .173, p = .678, η2p = .001), interaction with time (F[1,266] = .691, p = .406, η2p = 
.003), or interaction with story condition (F[1,266] = .855, p = .356, η2p = .003). 
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 To check for effects of recall performance on explicit evaluations, we conducted a mixed 
ANOVA in the quiz condition that included all main effects and interactions involving time, 
story condition, and recall performance. Results showed a marginally significant three-way 
interaction, F(1,136) = 3.168, p = .077, η2p = .023, such that there was an interaction between 
recall performance and story condition at Time 2, F(1,136) = 4.943, p = .028, η2p = .035, but 
(unsurprisingly) not at Time 1, F(1,136) = .267, p = .606, η2p = .002. In the fire condition, greater 
recall predicted more positive explicit evaluations of Francis at Time 2, B = .172, SE = .079, p = 
.031, η2p = .034, but there was no relationship between recall and explicit evaluations in the 
control condition at Time 2, B = -.065, SE = .072, p = .367, η2p = .006. 
Discussion 
 These results demonstrate that a route through which negative implicit first impressions 
have been reversed shortly after formation – reinterpretation (Mann & Ferguson, 2015) – 
remains effective even after a delay, despite the potential challenges to such revision through 
forgetting, trait abstraction, and/or memory consolidation.  Participants learned new information 
about a person two days after forming a first impression, which is longer than all studies to date 
examining whether implicit evaluations of novel targets can be updated and exceeds the delays 
used in many studies attempting to edit consolidated memories (e.g., Agren et al., 2012; Schiller 
et al., 2010).  Despite this delay, those given reinterpretation information showed a robust 
reversal of their implicit impression, including those who were not prompted to recall earlier 
details as well as those who had poor recall. In the control condition, as predicted, implicit 
evaluations of Francis remained negative over time. 
 The results show that implicit evaluations track relevant experiences over time, rather 
than remain stuck in initial experiences. The results also suggest that implicit evaluations do not 
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rely on (only) slow-changing associations (e.g., Rydell & McConnell, 2006), and that 
propositional reasoning can impact implicit processes (e.g., De Houwer, 2014; Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006).  They are consistent with work on the malleability of implicit evaluations 
across the lifespan (e.g., Castelli et al., 2010), using experimentally controlled first impressions 
of novel others to distinguish new learning from reactivation of preexisting contextual attitudes 
(see Fazio, 2007; Gregg et al., 2006; Cone & Ferguson, 2015; Mann & Ferguson, 2015).  This 
suggests that the window for effective reversal of implicit evaluations does not close 
immediately (cf. Peters & Gawronski, 2011), at least within a reinterpretation paradigm and with 
highly relevant new information.  Though we can only speculate on the reason for the differences 
across paradigms, it may be that the form of revision attempted in previous work – simply 
negating the earlier information – may be less effective without replacing the impression with 
something new. The rejection of the earlier impression may also be perceived as more valid and 
diagnostic when such a replacement is available, and reinterpretation may constitute an effective 
case of this combined “subtraction + addition” approach (see discussion in Mann & Ferguson, 
2015).  Different types of new information may have unique temporal windows during which 
revision is possible. 
Diagnosticity is an important factor driving explicit (Skowronski & Carlston, 1989), as 
well as implicit impressions (Cone & Ferguson, 2015; Mann & Ferguson, 2015).  In our view, 
new information that reinterprets earlier information can be construed as diagnostic in that it 
changes what earlier behaviors diagnose about the person (Mann, Cone, & Ferguson, 2015); as 
such, the current work builds on the importance of diagnosticity, demonstrating its importance 
not just for implicit impression formation, but also for updating over time. The strength of this 
revision after two days, regardless of recall cues or performance, suggests that whatever initial 
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memory consolidation, trait abstraction, and forgetting of specific details about the source of an 
impression may occur over the course of at couple days do not preclude the possibility of 
effective implicit impression change through reinterpretation. 
Although the current paradigm used new information that completely explained the initial 
information, it is also possible that new information would only partially do so, and it may be 
that explicit recall of the initial details determines extent of updating in such cases.  For instance, 
with more ambiguous new information, explicit recall of the initial details might determine 
extent of updating (see Wyer 2010, 2016). Collectively, this might suggest that some reactivation 
of memories for earlier details is important for revision – in line with work on retrieval-driven 
memory updating (e.g., Lane et al., 2015) – but that new information that strongly reframes 
earlier details can intrinsically produce sufficient reactivation without other external prompting.  
What is clear, however, is that amount of recall before learning the new information did not 
impact the extent of revision in this paradigm, suggesting that reinterpretation may be an 
effective way to update initial impressions even when some forgetting has taken place. It could 
be that when new, reinterpreting details are provided after a longer delay, the greater abstraction 
of impressions would make retrieval of the specific behavioral memories required for 
reinterpretation less likely (Klein et al., 1992; Sherman & Klein, 1994; see also Hastie & Park, 
1986).  Additionally, we obtained a (marginal) interaction involving recall performance on 
explicit evaluations, and so explicit (vs. implicit) evaluations may be more sensitive to recall, 
though more research on this is needed.  It is also possible that revision through other types of 
information after a delay (besides details that reframe the earlier impression) is more dependent 
on recall, which future research might explore.  
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The role of reactivation of earlier learning for revision of various types of responses is a 
topic of ongoing discussion (Mann, Cone, & Ferguson, 2015; Lane et al., 2015).  Future research 
can more fully test the range of the temporal window during which implicit impression updating 
is possible, as well as identify cases in which memory recall may moderate revision.  For now, 
our findings add to the emerging literature on when and how implicit first impressions can be 
updated.    
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Appendix: Text of Time 2 Recall Quiz Questions, Study 9 
Instructions 
You may recall from a few days ago that you read details from a story.  We are going to ask you 
a series of questions about that story to see how much you remember. You have up to 25 seconds 
to answer each question. Please just answer from what you remember; don't look anything up. 
 
Proceed to the next page to begin. 
Questions 
1. In the story, what was the name of the man who broke into the houses in his neighborhood? 
2. What type of animal did the man step on in one of the houses? 
3. How many houses did the man break into? 
4. What did he throw onto a laptop in the kitchen? 
5. What did he use to break down the door of the first house? 
6. What did the man knock over and shatter in the first house? 
7. What did the man walk through on his way to the second house? 
8. At the second house, what did the man use to break through the stained-glass window? 
9. What was the name of the pet at the second house? 
10. What did the man step on and walk across in the basement of the second house? 
 
  
 167 
Study 10: Revision with Real-World Targets 
 The paper presented as Study 9 examined one form of the broader generalizability and 
utility of reinterpretation as a route for updating implicit evaluations, finding that such revision is 
still efficacious days after the formation of an initial impression of Francis West.  Together with 
the result of Study 6 in Chapter II, which found that revised evaluations endured for days after 
revision, this work suggests that the passing of time need not be an uncompromisingly limiting 
factor in the potential for implicit change to occur and endure.  Given that information about 
many real social entities also flows in over time (rather than a single lab session) and that 
impressions formed of such targets can also impact behavior over a broader span of time, these 
findings were initial tests of a critical element of the general applicability of reinterpretation-
driven change.   
In Study 10, the external validity of the basic reinterpretation effects found in Chapter II 
is tested in a very different manner, by examining how initially negative implicit impressions of 
a real person are affected by arguments that offer a reinterpretation of the actions of that person.  
Importantly, the actions of this person, and the arguments offered that attempt to reinterpret those 
actions, were drawn from true, external events.  This allows a test of the ability of 
reinterpretation to update implicit impressions in a realistic paradigm, in which the actions under 
discussion were naturally produced and the arguments made about them were genuinely 
designed to sway public opinion.   
Specifically, the study introduces participants to a big-game hunter who attracted public 
controversy when he won an auction for the right to go abroad to hunt and kill an endangered 
black rhino, an act that he subsequently completed (Lavandera, 2015). To the degree that 
participants view that activity negatively, this is expected to form an initially negative implicit 
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evaluation of the hunter. The study then presents participants with a clip from the podcast 
Radiolab (http://www.radiolab.org/), which either offers a positive reinterpretation of this 
practice as beneficial to conservation by helping countries raise money to fund it, or describes an 
unrelated topic in a control condition. The goal of the study is to then assess how effectively this 
argument updates implicit evaluations, and whether any change that is observed is mediated by 
self-reported reinterpretation.  
Importantly, because the podcast offers a possible new interpretation of big-game hunting 
that – in comparison to the reinterpretation of the actions of Francis West – is less compulsory to 
endorse (given the possibility of counter-arguments), more motivationally and ideologically 
charged, and only one element of the behavior in question (because of the possibility that the 
actions of the hunter are driven not just by a passion for conservation but also for other reasons, 
like intrinsic enjoyment of the activity itself), the study provides an opportunity to test whether 
reinterpretation is still effective in shifting implicit evaluations in a “messier” real-world context. 
Due to this difference from the Francis West paradigm, a wholesale reversal of implicit 
evaluations of the hunter after participants listen to the podcast is not expected, but a significant 
shift is.  For some (or many) participants, the new information might not prompt reinterpretation 
(or have a negate + affirm effect) at all, and at most will add one new reason to view hunting less 
negatively while not negating all of their reasons for disliking the practice of big-game hunting 
or hunters themselves; for that reason, the new information could be most similar to the subway 
rescue condition in the Francis West work, rather than the fire rescue (reinterpretation) condition.  
To the extent that reinterpretation does occur after the podcast, however, the effect of podcast on 
implicit impressions will be at least partially mediated by self-reported reinterpretation, 
conceptually replicating the result of Study 5 in a very different domain. 
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Method 
 Participants.  I planned to recruit as many participants as we could for this study during 
a single semester, resulting in a sample of 213 Cornell University students who participated in 
exchange for partial course credit. Of these, 3 were excluded for failing to select the correct 
summary of the podcast they listened to during the study, and 7 more were excluded for using a 
single key on every trial of at least one of the two AMPs (both exclusion criteria were 
determined a priori), resulting in a final sample size of 203 (76% women, Age M = 19.99 years, 
SD = 1.33). Participants completed the experiment in individual computer rooms. 
 Initial learning.  At the beginning of the study, participants viewed a single screen of 
information about Corey Knowlton in order to familiarize them with his name, face, and 
activities surrounding big-game hunting that were covered in the media.  In particular, they were 
informed that Knowlton had paid $350,000 for a permit to hunt and kill a black rhino in 
Namibia, and that in part due to the status of that species as endangered, this action had attracted 
controversy in the media (Lavandera, 2015).  Nonetheless, Knowlton completed his hunt in 
2015.  This initial learning task was designed to foster a negative impression of Knowlton by 
associating him with an activity (big-game hunting of endangered species) to which most 
participants would likely have an initially negative reaction, based on the results of a pilot test. 
 First AMP.  Immediately following the initial learning task, participants completed an 
AMP similar to those used in my earlier studies, with two major differences: the composition of 
the primes, and the nature of the targets.  On 20 trials, the prime image consisted of a frontal 
view of Corey Knowlton’s face and upper body, selected from search engine results for its 
relatively neutral expression, cropped and displayed on a white background. On each of the other 
20 trials, the prime image consisted of one of 5 control faces of white males on white 
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backgrounds (each presented on 4 trials), drawn from a publicly available face database used in 
prior research (The Chicago Face Database; Ma, Correll, & Wittenbrink, 2015).  
The second change related to the targets. In my prior studies using online samples, the 
target stimuli consisted of Chinese pictographs drawn from prior research with this task (Payne 
et al., 2005; Payne & Lundberg, 2014), as these stimuli had been demonstrated to be generally 
close to neutral in visual pleasantness for most participants, a desirable feature for a 
misattribution task. However, the use of such stimuli requires the exclusion of participants who 
are familiar with the meaning of the pictographs.  On Mechanical Turk, few participants fall into 
this category, but pilot testing indicated that a number of students in the undergraduate 
participant pool used in Study 10 would need to be excluded prior to analysis.  To avoid losing 
these participants, I instead used a set of target stimuli that I initially developed with my 
colleagues for use in a different project (Mann, Katz, Ferguson, & Goncalo, in preparation). 
These consisted of 80 “paintings” that all featured a solid color background and numerous 
colorful lines.  Like the pictographs, the paintings were made visually similar to minimize the 
likelihood that participants would have strong inherent preferences between them, so as to 
increase the relative signal from misattribution of prime evaluations in their AMP responses (see 
examples in Figure 13). The paintings were randomly assigned to one of two sets, and for each 
participant, one set was selected for use during this first AMP, with the unselected set employed 
on the second AMP. 
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Figure 13. Example painting stimuli from Study 10. 
 
 Explicit evaluations.  Participants next responded to six 7-point Likert-type scale items, 
asking them to place Corey Knowlton on scales from unlikable to likable, bad to good, mean to 
pleasant, disagreeable to agreeable, uncaring to caring, and cruel to kind.  
 Podcast. Next, participants were randomly assigned to listen to one of two eight-and-a-
half minute podcast excerpts.  The excerpt used in the experimental condition was material 
drawn from the episode “The Rhino Hunter” of the podcast RadioLab (2015), which described a 
view of big-game hunting as having a positive impact on the environment and the survival of 
endangered species under some conditions.  In brief, the argument espoused by some hunters, 
African governments, and conservation organizations is that the preservation of many 
endangered species requires levels of funding that have proven difficult to maintain in the face of 
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poachers, budgetary requirements for paying game wardens and buying patrol vehicles and 
necessary equipment, and the unwillingness of communities to tolerate living in close proximity 
to dangerous animals.  Governments auctioning off the right to hunt and shoot individual animals 
(which are often chosen due to being old, post-reproductive, and a danger to other members of 
the species) creates an economic value for the survival of the species and provides a source of 
revenue for conservation efforts. The full podcast episode includes extended interviews with 
Corey Knowlton himself, details of his hunt, as well as some discussion from critics of these 
arguments. 
 To create a test of whether arguments that provide a reinterpretation of views on a real 
issue (hunting of endangered species) could shift initially negative implicit impressions of a 
person associated with that issue, we constructed an 8.5-minute excerpt of this podcast episode, 
retaining only those segments identified by a team of research assistants as most effectively 
supporting the view of this form of hunting as pro-conservation.  For the control condition, we 
produced a clip of the first 8.5 minutes of a different episode of RadioLab, describing the origins 
of units of measurement (“Weights and Measures”). 
 Second AMP and explicit evaluations.  After listening to either the experimental or 
control podcast, participants completed the AMP again, identical to the first, followed by the 
same explicit evaluation measures used prior to the podcast. They were also asked to identify the 
correct summary of the podcast they heard from a set of 4 options. 
 Reinterpretation questions.  Participants answered three questions designed to measure 
the extent to which the podcast they listened to prompted them to reinterpret their views on big-
game hunting. These included, “When you listened to the podcast clip, how much did the 
information in that clip change the meaning of Corey Knowlton's actions that you learned about 
 173 
at the beginning of the study?” “To what degree did the podcast clip that you listened to earlier in 
this study change how you think about big-game hunting?” and “After you listened to the 
podcast clip earlier in this study, to what extent did you see big-game hunting in a different 
light?” all on scales from 1 (Not at all) to 9 (Completely).  
 Exploratory items.  Finally, participants responded to two questions included for 
exploratory purposes, which for the sake of space will not be discussed further: 
“How convinced were you by the arguments that were made in the podcast that you listened to 
earlier in this study?” on a scale from 1 (Not at all convinced) to 9 (Extremely convinced), and 
“When you were listening to the podcast clip earlier in this study, how often were you thinking 
about arguments against the views expressed in the podcast?” on a scale from 1 (Not at all) to 9 
(The entire time).   
Results 
 Implicit evaluations.  Responses on the AMPs were assessed in a 2 (Time: Time 1, Time 
2) x 2 (Prime: Corey Knowlton, Control Faces) x 2 (Podcast: Hunting, Control) mixed ANOVA, 
with the first two factors manipulated within-subjects.  Scores within each cell represent the 
proportion of paintings judged to be more pleasant than average following the prime. 
 A significant three-way interaction between time, prime, and podcast obtained, F(1, 201) 
= 7.025, p = .009. At Time 1, Knowlton was less implicitly positive than control faces in both the 
hunting podcast condition (Knowlton: M=.39, SD=.20; control faces: M=.55, SD=.19), t(100) = 
5.67, p<.001, and the control podcast condition (Knowlton: M=.40, SD=.19; control faces: 
M=.57, SD=.19), t(101) = 6.52, p<.001.  At Time 2, in the control podcast condition, Knowlton 
was less implicitly positive than control faces (Knowlton: M=.40, SD=.22; control faces: M=.56, 
SD=.22), t(101) = 5.46, p<.001. However, in the hunting podcast condition, though Knowlton 
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was still less implicitly positive than control faces, the difference was much smaller and closer to 
neutral (Knowlton: M = .47, SD = .22; control faces: M = .52, SD = .22), t(100) = 2.09, p = .039.  
Figure 14 shows average implicit evaluations within each cell of the overall design. 
 
Figure 14. Mean proportion of paintings judged more pleasant than average, by podcast 
condition, time, and prime type, Study 10. Error bars are standard errors. 
 
 Explicit evaluations.  Explicit evaluations of Knowlton were analyzed in a 2 (Time: 
Time 1, Time 2) x 2 (Podcast: Hunting, Control) mixed ANOVA.  There was a significant 
interaction between time and podcast, F(1,201) = 213.18, p < .001. Explicit evaluations of 
Knowlton were significantly below the midpoint of the scale (4) in all conditions, but much more 
so at Time 1 and in the control podcast condition at Time 2 (ps < .001) than in the hunting 
podcast condition at Time 2 (p = .034). 
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 Mediation by reinterpretation.  The three questions assessing the extent to which the 
podcast prompted reinterpretation of views on big-game hunting partly can be interpreted as a 
manipulation check, as levels of reinterpretation must almost certainly be lower in the control 
podcast condition. However, they can be additionally assessed as mediators of the podcast effect 
on implicit change. The three measures correlated highly (Cronbach’s alpha = .97), even within 
podcast conditions (Alphas of .81 and .87), so I merged them into one index score of 
reinterpretation.  
In a mediation model looking at podcast condition effects on the double difference score 
reflecting change in relative implicit liking of Knowlton (vs. control faces) from Time 1 to Time 
2, mediated via the reinterpretation item, the mediation effect was significant, 95% CI: [.0283, 
.2690], Sobel p = .025. The inclusion of the mediator reduces the condition effect to non-
significance, p = .523, while the mediator remains significant, p = .025.  Thus, the pattern is 
consistent with full mediation of the podcast effect on shifts in implicit evaluations of Corey 
Knowlton through reinterpretation. 
I should note that the reinterpretation questions were asked after the final AMP, and the 
reverse mediation model (condition à AMP double difference score à reinterpretation index 
score) was also supported, 95% CI: [.0126, .1942], though the Sobel test was marginally 
significant (p = .09) and the mediator did not eliminate the condition effect in this model (p < 
.001), such that this alternative direction of the effect would only be consistent with partial 
mediation.  
Discussion 
 This study examined the potential for reinterpretation to produce revision in implicit 
evaluations in a more naturalistic context than the Francis West paradigm, and using arguments 
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that were specifically developed by an external party to inform and persuade.  The results 
showed, unsurprisingly, that revision was much milder than in the Francis West story; there are 
countless reasons why this may be, which the numerous differences between this paradigm and 
the Francis West studies do not allow me to isolate.  Critically, however, a shift in implicit 
evaluations of Knowlton did occur after the presentation of the arguments in the hunting podcast.  
This supports the idea that the arguments presented about a negative topic are capable of 
impacting implicit impressions; furthermore, the mediation pattern involving self-reported 
reinterpretation was consistent with reinterpretation being the operative mechanism through 
which the effects of the podcast on implicit evaluations were produced.   
A primary goal of future work in this line should be to determine the factors that 
moderate whether the new information about big-game hunting (or other topics) can actually 
reverse implicit impressions to a degree present in the Francis West paradigm.  Although it is 
possible that new arguments about real-world issues can never be as broadly effective as the 
revelations in the Francis West paradigm, perhaps due to ideological convictions or the 
continued relevance of other factors to the impressions under study, it seems more likely that 
such factors (when identified) may provide insight into the conditions under which robust change 
may be possible across a broader sample—for instance, if arguments can avoid ideological 
statements, appeal to both liberals and conservatives, address lingering concerns, etc.  The 
mediation analysis in the current work, identifying reinterpretation as a conduit for revision 
toward Knowlton through the arguments of the podcast, provides a plausible mechanism through 
which such moderators may impact the size of revision.  
In the next study, the goal to examine the broader generalizability of implicit revision 
through reinterpretation returns to the Francis West paradigm, by testing whether reinterpreting 
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information about Francis continues to be effective when the initial, negative impression aligns 
with group-based stereotypes. 
Study 11: Counter-Stereotypical Impressions – I 
 The studies in Chapter II were designed to establish the mere possibility of the revision of 
a negative implicit first impression, and pinpoint reinterpretation as the mechanism for such 
updating; for this purpose, the Francis West paradigm was constructed specifically such that the 
new information learned about the character of Francis West would completely reframe the 
entire source of initial negativity toward him – the breaking-and-entering story.  The results of 
Study 10, in showing far weaker (albeit still significant) revision in a context in which the 
reinterpretation is less wholesale and clear-cut, raise the more general question of how delicate 
the revision effect is in the face of complicating factors. Where Study 10 examined the 
implications of added complexity in the form of less comprehensive or less universally 
convincing reinterpretation, the present study examines complexity in the initial formation of the 
first impression itself.  Specifically, this study addresses the question of whether the implicit first 
impression of Francis West can be reversed when he is depicted as Black, and therefore a 
member of a group that is implicitly stereotyped and evaluated in a manner consistent with the 
original, to-be-overturned impression (i.e. stereotypically hostile and untrustworthy, and 
evaluatively negative; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Nosek et al., 2002). 
 Decades of research in social cognition have found that implicit evaluations in America 
remain markedly pro-White and anti-Black, despite sweeping declines in explicit prejudice and 
stereotyping (Banaji & Greenwald, 2013; Nosek et al., 2002).  Americans possess an ordered 
hierarchy of implicit preferences between social groups on numerous dimensions like age, race, 
and religion (Axt, Ebersole, & Nosek, 2014); when it comes to race, Blacks are implicitly 
 178 
evaluated less positively than Whites overall, with such biases observable from a young age 
(Baron & Banaji, 2006).  Such bias prominently manifests in the tendency to perceive anger 
more readily in Black faces (Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003, see also Hugenberg & 
Bodenhausen, 2004; Hutchings & Haddock, 2008), and a bias toward more readily perceiving (or 
misperceiving) weapons when paired with Blacks (Payne, Lambert, & Jacoby, 2002) – a bias 
which is also revealed in split-second “shoot vs. don’t shoot” decision making in simulations of 
the decisions police officers must make as to whether a Black vs. White suspect holds a gun vs. a 
harmless object (Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002). Occurrences of such group-based 
stereotyping and prejudice in implicit cognition thus reflect cultural stereotypes of Blacks as 
more hostile, aggressive, and generally negative than Whites (Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie, & Davies, 
2004; Sagar & Schofield, 1980; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997).  
 Some evidence suggests that group-based implicit impressions such as those derived 
from race may make it particularly difficult for reinterpretation to update implicit impressions in 
a counter-stereotypic way.  McConnell and colleagues (2008) found that although implicit 
impressions reflected the evaluative implications of the behaviors of individuals when the images 
of those individuals showed them to be White, of normal weight, and average attractiveness, 
implicit evaluations of Black, overweight, or particularly attractive/unattractive faces were 
impacted only by those visual cues rather than individuating information.  The researchers 
argued that although implicit evaluations could accommodate propositional knowledge in the 
absence of evaluatively charged “associative” visual cues, those cues have a privileged degree of 
access to implicit processes when they are available, although the exact demarcation of what 
makes a feature associative vs. nonassociative, and the parameters of interaction between the 
dual systems in their conception remain unclear (Ferguson, Mann, & Wojnowicz, 2014; cf. 
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McConnell & Rydell, 2014).  Nonetheless, the work of McConnell and colleagues (2008) raises 
the possibility that the heroic reinterpretation of the actions of Francis West may be far less 
effective in reversing implicit evaluations when visual features of Francis mark him as a member 
of a group stereotyped in a manner consistent with the initial impression. This could occur if 
visual or group-based cues have privileged importance in driving implicit responses (McConnell 
et al., 2008; Rule et al., 2014), or if stereotypic or prejudice-based expectations about his group 
leads to confirmation bias that disposes participants to form stronger initial negative impressions 
(Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), though the effects of race on judgment are often largest when 
information is minimal or ambiguous (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000), which the Francis West 
story is not.  
 To test whether revision in implicit evaluations through reinterpretation is still possible 
when the initial implicit impression is compatible with race-based biases, Study 11 manipulates 
the race of Francis West. Additionally, the study varies the race of the control faces – including 
both Black and White male faces as controls – to begin to test another element of the general 
consequences of reinterpretation-driven change: the extent to which implicit updating generalizes 
to other individuals from the same group as the target; in this case, people of the same race.  A 
general finding in the literature on stereotyping and prejudice is that individual exemplars who 
violate an expectation about a group are often subtyped or treated as exceptions that do not 
invalidate the stereotype (Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; Kunda & Oleson, 1995, 1997; Richards 
& Hewstone, 2001; Weber & Crocker, 1983).  Evidence also suggests that generalization is less 
likely when an individual’s actions are relatively extreme in defying a stereotype, as more 
moderate violations make a group member appear more typical and their actions thus more 
generalizable (Queller & Smith, 2002).  On the other hand, some studies have found implicit 
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generalization of new information about one target to related targets, even in cases in which 
explicit generalization does not occur; for example, findings have shown that persuasive 
messages about the color green generalize to implicit evaluations of the brand Heineken 
(Horcajo, Briñol, & Petty, 2010), evaluations of a brand generalize to a implicit impressions of a 
new product from that brand even in the presence of negative information about that product 
(Ratliff, Swinkels, Klerx, & Nosek, 2012), and – most critically for the present discussion – the 
behavior of one Black person produced implicit evaluations that generalized to unrelated Black 
people (Ratliff & Nosek, 2011; see also Ranganath & Nosek, 2008).  However, that work found 
some suggestion of stronger generalization of negative information than positive information (a 
pattern in the literature on explicit generalization as well; Dolderer, Mummendey, & 
Rothermund, 2009), and the studies informed participants that the new individuals came from the 
same social groups as the people about whom they had learned, which could have increased 
generalization.  Ultimately, then, it is an open question as to whether a strong reinterpretation 
that reverses implicit impressions of one individual will generalize to other members of a group.  
By manipulating the racial group membership of Francis West and including Black and White 
control faces on the AMP, the present study could begin to test these possibilities. 
Method 
 Participants.  Three hundred participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk completed 
the study (sample size determined a priori), with 15 excluded for using a single key on every trial 
of at least one AMP.  No participants were excluded for prior knowledge of the pictographs. A 
further 3 were dropped from all analyses due to a server timeout error that prevented AMP data 
from being recorded. This left a final sample of 282 (50.7% women; Age M = 36.85 years, SD = 
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11.95; 85% White, 5.3% Black, 6.0% Asian, 6% Latino, 3.2% other; Percentages add to over 
100 because participants could select more than one racial or ethnic identity). 
 Procedure.  The study design conformed closely to the basic Francis West procedure 
used in Chapter II, including the same Francis West story from Studies 1a and 2-6 and an AMP 
and explicit evaluation scale before (Time 1) and after (Time 2) the final information, with a few 
modifications.  First, the race of main character was manipulated, such that half of participants 
learned about a Black character during the course of the study, and the other half learned about a 
White character.  To this end, the name of the character was altered from “Francis West” to 
“Frank West” after feedback from a number of members of the research team suggested that this 
name sounded more racially neutral.  For participants in the White-Frank condition, the image of 
Frank West was randomly selected (on a per-participant basis) from the same set of 11 faces 
used in the studies from Chapter II. For participants in the Black-Frank condition, the image was 
selected from a set of 11 Black male faces from the same database within the same age range as 
the White face set (20s-early 30s).   
The structure of each AMP was adjusted to allow a comparison of the target (Frank 
West) to control faces of each race. The image of Frank West served as the prime stimulus on 
each of 30 AMP trials (per administration of the AMP).  The remaining 30 trials of the task 
served as control trials, half with Black primes and half with White primes. On 15 control trials, 
one of the 10 unselected Black faces was presented (5 randomly selected to be presented twice 
each, and the other 5 once each); on the other 15, one of the 10 unselected White faces was 
presented (5 randomly selected to be presented twice each, and the other 5 once each).  Two sets 
of 60 pictographs were used, with one randomly selected for use on the first AMP and the other 
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for use on the second AMP, per participant.  Otherwise, the AMPs were identical to those used in 
prior studies.   
A final departure from earlier studies was the inclusion of an exploratory measure of how 
guilty participants felt after learning the final information about Frank West, which participants 
responded to on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (Not at all guilty) to 7 (Very guilty). 
Participants were placed either in the original control condition, in which Frank carries 
out an action consistent with his prior behavior (throwing rocks at the two houses) or the fire 
rescue condition, in which the purpose behind his actions is revealed to be saving children from a 
fire. 
Results 
 Implicit evaluations.  The proportion of pictographs judged to be more pleasant than 
average on each AMP was computed for each participant within each of the three prime types.  
These proportions were then analyzed within a 2 (Time: Time 1, Time 2) x 3 (Prime Type: Frank 
West, Black Control Faces, White Control Faces) x 2 (Information Condition: Fire Rescue, 
Control) x 2 (Frank Race: White, Black) mixed ANOVA, with time and prime type manipulated 
within-participants, and information condition and Frank’s race manipulated between-
participants. 
 This analysis revealed the usual three-way interaction between time, prime type, and 
information condition, F(1.70, 472.95) = 45.21, p < .001, ηp2 = .140 (This and the following 
analyses used the Huynh-Feldt correction for violation of sphericity). This was qualified by a 
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four-way interaction with Frank’s race, F(1.70, 472.95) = 3.96, p = .026, ηp2 = .014 (see Figure 
15).17 
 
Figure 15. The proportion of pictographs judged to be more pleasant than the average pictograph 
in Study 11, by information condition, Frank’s race, time, and person prime. Error bars are 
standard errors. 
 
 Examining the four-way interaction revealed that the three-way revision effect (between 
time, prime type, and information condition) was larger when Frank was White, F(1.50, 204.30) 
                                                
17 These results, and all others in the present study, did not meaningfully differ when restricting 
exclusively to White-identified participants, so only analyses using the full sample will be 
discussed. The three-way interaction between time, prime type, and information condition among 
White participants was significant, F(1.74, 408.21) = 34.08, p < .001, ηp2 = .127, as was the four-
way moderation by Frank’s race, F(1.74, 408.21) = 3.75, p = .030, ηp2 = .016. 
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= 30.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .181, than when he was Black, F(1.87, 265.26) = 15.48, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.098, though the effect was clearly significant in both race conditions.  
 Initial formation at Time 1.  I first examined the formation of implicit evaluations at 
Time 1, before the manipulation of final information about Frank West.  When Frank was White, 
he was less implicitly positive (M = .39, SD = .27) than White control faces (M = .65, SD = .21), 
t(137) = 8.02, p < .001, Hedges’ gav = 1.065, and also less implicitly positive than Black control 
faces (M = .62, SD = .26), t(137) = 6.72, p < .001, Hedges’ gav = .852. A similar pattern was 
found when Frank was Black: He was less implicitly positive (M = .42, SD = .25) than White 
control faces (M = .60, SD = .23), t(143) = 5.44, p < .001, Hedges’ gav = .734, and less implicitly 
positive than Black control faces (M = .51, SD = .24), t(143) = 4.20, p < .001, Hedges’ gav =.391.  
 A difference emerged when comparing the Black and White control faces based on 
Frank’s race: When Frank was White, there was no difference in implicit responses to Black and 
White control faces, t(137) = 1.53, p = .129, Hedges’ gav = .132. However, when Frank was 
Black, White control faces were implicitly more positive than Black control faces, t(143) = 2.96, 
p = .004, Hedges’ gav = .344.  A test of the interaction between these two levels of prime type at 
Time 1 by Frank’s race condition, however, found that this difference between the Black and 
White control trials based on Frank’s race did not reach significance, F(1, 280) = 2.06, p = .152, 
ηp2 = .007. 
 Revision at Time 2.  After reading the final information about Frank West, participants in 
the control story condition continued to have a negative implicit impression of Frank relative to 
the Black and White control faces for both White and Black Frank versions, all ts > 3.8, all ps < 
.001. Participants in the fire rescue condition, however, showed reversals in their implicit 
evaluations. When Frank was White, he was marginally more implicitly positive (M = .67, SD = 
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.28) than White control faces (M = .58, SD = .29), t(62) = 1.72, p = .092, Hedges’ gav = .306, and 
significantly more positive than Black control faces (M = .49, SD = .30), t(62) = 3.19, p = .002, 
Hedges’ gav = .608. When Frank was Black, he was also directionally more positive (M = .60, SD 
= .26) than White control faces (M = .54, SD = .28), t(72) = 1.58, p = .119, Hedges’ gav = .236, 
and Black control faces (M = .44, SD = .26), t(72) = 5.22, p < .001, Hedges’ gav = .595. 
 Turning to a comparison of the Black and White control faces at Time 2, I found that in 
the control information condition, when Frank was White or Black, the Black control faces were 
only marginally less positive than the White control faces (both ps < .1).  In the fire rescue 
condition, when Frank was White, the Black control faces were significantly less positive (M = 
.49, SD = .30) than the White control faces (M = .58, SD = .29), t(62) = 2.58, p = .012, Hedges’ 
gav = .305.  Likewise, when Frank was Black, the Black control faces (M = .44, SD = .26) were 
significantly less positive than the White control faces (M = .54, SD = .28), t(72) = 2.66, p = .01, 
Hedges’ gav = .334. 
 Relationship to self-reported guilt.  An examination of the exploratory measure of the 
self-reported extent to which participants felt guilty after reading the final information about 
Francis West revealed that, unsurprisingly, guilt was higher in the fire rescue condition (M = 
3.30, SD = 1.31) than in the control condition (M = 1.45, SD = 1.10), F(1,278) = 164.21, p < 
.001,  ηp2 = .371, with no main effect of Frank’s race, F(1,278) < .001, p = .986, ηp2 < .001, or 
interaction, F(1,278) = .036, p = .850, ηp2 < .001. The guilt measure was also correlated with the 
size of the revision effect (A difference score of relative implicit preference for Frank over 
control faces at Time 2, minus the relative implicit preference at Time 1) within the fire rescue 
condition, r(134) = .321, p < .001, but not within the control condition, r(144) = -.126, p = .129. 
A mediation analysis using PROCESS (Hayes, 2013) tested the fit of guilt as a mediator of the 
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effect of information condition on implicit revision using 10,000 bias-corrected bootstrap 
samples. The 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect excluded zero, β = .1266, 95% CI: 
[.0361, .2302], Sobel Z = 2.98, p = .0029, supporting partial mediation given that the direct 
effect of condition on implicit revision remained significant when controlling for guilt, β = .290, 
t(279) = 4.29, p < .001.  It is important to note, however, that the guilt measure followed the 
implicit measures in the procedure, and there was also evidence to support the reverse mediation 
pattern (implicit revision as a mediator of the condition effect on reported guilt), β = .0657, 95% 
CI: [.0200, .1149], Sobel Z = 2.83, p = .0046, which also left a residual direct effect, β = .544, 
t(279) = 10.60, p < .001. 
 Explicit evaluations.  The index scores of explicit liking of Frank West were assessed in 
a 2 (Time: Time 1, Time 2) x 2 (Information Condition: Fire Rescue, Control) x 2 (Frank Race: 
White, Black) mixed-ANOVA. There was an interaction between time and information 
condition, F(1, 278) = 1020.19, p < .001, ηp2 = .786, which was not moderated by Frank’s race, 
F(1, 278) = .164, p = .686, ηp2 = .001; there were no significant effects of Frank’s race, all Fs < 
1, all ps > .3. 
Discussion 
 The results of Study 11 provide a direct extension of the work presented in Chapter II 
into a societally important domain in which implicit evaluations are often characterized as 
difficult to reliably change: intergroup bias (Cao & Banaji, 2016; Lai et al., 2016; McConnell et 
al., 2008).  Whereas Study 10 examined the potential for reinterpretation to produce updating in 
implicit impressions of a real person and found evidence for a (relatively weak) shift, Study 11 
made use of the same materials employed in Chapter II to facilitate a comparison in revision 
effects between individuals from stigmatized vs. non-stigmatized groups.  The results showed 
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clear support for revision in both cases: When the character was White or Black, his initial 
implicit negativity relative to control faces had reversed at Time 2 in the fire rescue condition. 
The study, however, also found support for implicit race bias, in that the revision effect was 
stronger when Frank was White than when he was Black; furthermore, simple effects tests 
showed that although Frank became more implicitly positive than Black control faces, he was 
only directionally more positive than White control faces.  A clear race-based implicit bias 
persisted on the control faces, with no apparent generalization of the positive information about 
Frank West to the Black control faces when Frank was Black. This is consistent with a large 
body of findings showing how counter-stereotypical information about individual group 
members often fails to generalize to attitudes on the larger group, due to individuation and/or 
subtyping (Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; Kunda & Oleson, 1995, 1997; Queller & Smith, 2002; 
Richards & Hewstone, 2001; Weber & Crocker, 1983).  The results do clearly show, however, 
that new information that provides a reinterpretation of earlier learning can result in reversals of 
implicit evaluations even when the person is from a group that is stereotyped as having a 
negative trait (hostility) consistent with an initial interpretation of individuating information.  
The identity dimension in question – race – is also one that is visually apparent in the prime 
images themselves, thus representing the kind of cue that has been hypothesized as most resistant 
to interference from propositional knowledge at the implicit level (McConnell et al., 2008). 
 One important difference between this study and Study 10, on big-game hunting, is that 
in the Francis West paradigm, the case for change is much more universally compelling than it is 
in the argument on big-game hunting: There can be little doubt that the revealed details about 
Francis (or Frank) West warrant a wholesale reversal in the evaluative meaning drawn from his 
actions.  In the case of the “Rhino Hunter,” however, there is more room for doubt, counter-
 188 
arguing, motivated dismissal of the arguments, and distance between the abstract arguments and 
inferences about Knowlton himself.  For instance, he might have other motives for hunting 
besides aiding conservation – like subjective enjoyment of the act – that participants might have 
found less positive, and the interpretation of which were not as impacted by the arguments made 
in the podcast.  For that reason, it is not surprising that although there is evidence for the role of 
reinterpretation in producing implicit revision in both Study 10 and Study 11, the new 
information more effectively produces change in Study 11, which draws on the unambiguous 
Francis West story.   
Collectively, Studies 10 and 11 suggest that the convincingness of new information likely 
matters greatly in determining the degree to which implicit impressions will be updated. 
However, a remaining question regarding the application of this work on implicit updating is 
whether new information that is ostensibly just as clear-cut and unambiguous as the fire rescue 
details, but less rare and extreme, can also effectively produce revision.  Although revision after 
strongly heroic actions or thorough argumentation may be possible, it is much more common in 
daily life for corrections in our construal of others to be quick and more minor and routine.  How 
effectively can new information that updates knowledge of others in a more mundane way revise 
implicit impressions?  Study 12 turns to this question. 
Study 12: Counter-Stereotypical Impressions – II 
 In recent work on the formation of counter-stereotypical person impressions, Cao and 
Banaji (2016) assessed implicit impressions of a novel man named Jonathan and a novel woman 
named Elizabeth as being relatively more associated with the concept “doctors” or “nurses”. 
They found that prior to individuating information, participants had a stronger implicit 
impression of Jonathan as a doctor and Elizabeth as a nurse than of Jonathan as a nurse and 
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Elizabeth as a doctor (the measure used – the IAT – allows only for statements about relative 
impression strength). However, after learning that Elizabeth was in fact the doctor, and Jonathan 
the nurse, the implicit impressions had shifted but not reversed; they remained significantly in 
the stereotype-consistent direction, even though participants explicitly reported that they now 
believed Elizabeth to be the doctor and Jonathan the nurse, consistent with what they had 
learned. The new information thus seemed to impact explicit judgments much more strongly than 
implicit impressions, despite the observation that, like the reinterpretation procedures used 
throughout the work presented in this chapter and the preceding one, these clarifications involve 
a seemingly straightforward and compelling reason to shift one’s construal of Elizabeth and 
Jonathan.  In fact, this seems much like the “negate + affirm” strategy in Studies 7-8, in which an 
initial interpretation is invalidated while being replaced by another; here, Elizabeth being 
revealed as the doctor and Jonathan as the nurse clearly negates the initial stereotype-consistent 
assumption and replaces it with counterstereotypical information that is asserted to be true. Why 
might revision be weaker in this case, when the prior studies of Chapters II-III have found robust 
evidence for implicit revision? 
 One possibility why revision might be weaker in the work of Cao and Banaji (2016), as 
previewed in the discussion for Study 11, is that new information may need to be more extreme 
in order to prompt large-scale revision.  After all, extremity is a generally a strong cue to 
diagnosticity (Skowronski & Carlston, 1989), and information that is diagnostic by virtue of its 
extremity has been demonstrated to strongly impact implicit evaluations (Cone & Ferguson, 
2015).  Of course, extremity may not be the only cue that information is diagnostic of the 
character of a person, and a clear statement that Elizabeth is in fact a doctor would seem on its 
face to reveal something relevant and diagnostic about her, as Cao and Banaji (2016) argued.  
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This might entail that even if new information is diagnostic and subjectively believed by 
participants, this alone may be insufficient to produce full revision at the implicit level. It may 
be, for example, that integration of the new information into implicit responses requires a 
stronger expectancy violation, which more extreme (or surprising) information delivers. If so, 
this would limit the range of circumstances under which relevant new information about a person 
can lead to rapid updating of implicit impressions. 
 A possible middle ground between these alternatives (that diagnostic information is 
always effective vs. only effective when it is extreme) is that there may be moderators that 
“boost” the effectiveness of more mundane diagnostic information in enacting implicit revision. 
For example, a more self-relevant or immersive scenario during learning may allow for implicit 
updating with less extreme forms of relevant new information about a novel person.  
Perspectives on the various forms of processing and systems involved in implicit social cognition 
have noted that the formation and change of responses in the context of instrumental learning is 
often much faster than other forms of learning (Amodio & Ratner, 2011), and implicit processes 
can be quickly calibrated by personal goals (Ferguson & Wojnowicz, 2011), fitting the idea that 
there is greater impetus to accurately process and perceive stimuli that are directly relevant to the 
actions and outcomes of a perceiver. If Elizabeth and Jonathan are seen as abstract, vague 
individuals who the participant never expects to meet, information about them may be processed 
deeply enough to accurately recall information about them when prompted, but not deeply 
enough to overcome deeply ingrained stereotype-based responses.  Though participants also do 
not expect to meet Francis West, his story is more detailed, immersive, and engaging than the 
minimal information about Jonathan and Elizabeth; furthermore, participants are told that the 
story is based on real events.  If Jonathan and Elizabeth can be portrayed as more concrete, 
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relevant people, on the other hand, then perhaps counter-stereotypical information about their 
professions will prove more impactful – conditions which the comparably elaborate materials in 
the earlier studies in this package may have produced.  The current study will begin to test this 
possibility by manipulating whether the information presented about the novel individuals is 
relatively minimal (following the materials used by Cao & Banaji, 2016) or more immersive and 
self-relevant. 
 Another possible reason for the comparably weak revision found by Cao and Banaji 
(2016) pertains to the implicit measure that was used in those studies, the Implicit Association 
Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998). Because the IAT requires participants to sort stimuli 
appearing on the screen into categories, evidence suggests that it is often more effective at 
measuring implicit impressions of the overall categories rather than particular stimuli 
themselves, because the stimuli are construed in terms of the salient categories (De Houwer, 
2001). Because Cao and Banaji (2016) used names as the category labels (“Elizabeth” and 
“Jonathan”) and nicknames as stimuli (e.g., eliza, ell, jon, johnny) – which had not actually been 
used in the information conveying the professions of the particular Jonathan and Elizabeth being 
learned about in the study – it is possible that this test captured more general information about 
the participants’ implicit impressions of the broader categories of Jonathans and Elizabeths rather 
than solely implicit impressions of this Jonathan and this Elizabeth.  Though Cao and Banaji 
(2016) attempted to address this concern in part in a follow up study (Study 3) using targets with 
the novel names Lapper and Affina, with novel nicknames for these as stimuli, the clearly 
gendered nature of these names means that it continues to be possible that an IAT using these 
names as categories would tap into the broader gender associations that these names connote, 
instead of (or in addition to) the individuating information previously presented about this 
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Lapper and this Affina. To address this possibility, the current study will modify the IAT to 
present face images of Elizabeth and Jonathan as the category labels, as well as compare 
responses on this measure to a modification of the AMP that is not designed to prompt 
participants to construe the prime stimuli as members of a shared category. 
Method 
 Participants.  To obtain responses from at least 100 participants in each of 8 between-
subjects conditions of the study, I aimed to recruit 800 participants on Mechanical Turk, and 
received complete response from 803. Of these, the following number were excluded a priori: 7 
due to loss of data due to server timeout, 4 due to familiarity with Mandarin and/or Cantonese in 
the PMP condition, 1 for using a single key on every trial of the PMP, 24 for responding more 
quickly than 300ms on at least 10% of trails in the IAT condition, and 18 for failing an attention 
check. This left 749 participants for analysis (52% women, Age M = 37.6 years, SD = 12.1). 
 Initial learning.  Participants first saw a screen of information similar to that used by 
Cao and Banaji (2016), in which they were introduced to two novel people: Jonathan and 
Elizabeth. Unlike in Cao and Banaji’s (2016) work, the present study, these introductions were 
accompanied by face photographs (for use on the subsequent implicit measures). For each 
participant, an image of Elizabeth and an image of Jonathan were randomly drawn from a set of 
5 female and 5 male photographs, respectively.  These sets were selected from a larger pool of 
stimuli in the Chicago Face Database (Ma, Correll, & Wittenbrink, 2015) by a custom algorithm 
that calculated the mean squared difference for 10,000 samples of randomly-drawn sets of 5 
female and 5 male faces across 12 pre-rated dimensions (afraid, angry, attractive, babyfaced, 
dominant, disgusted, happy, sad, surprised, threatening, trustworthy, unusual) and then selected 
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the set of 10 with the lowest difference score between sexes, so as to minimize differences 
between the male and female face sets as much as possible. 
 Following Cao and Banaji (2016), participants were informed that Jonathan and Elizabeth 
were gainfully employed in a large city, with one of the two individuals having a job as a doctor, 
and the other having a job as a nurse. It was made clear to participants that they did not yet know 
which person held which position.  The names and images of both participants were presented on 
the same page, with left/right position counterbalanced. 
 Additional information about Jonathan and Elizabeth.  Following the initial 
information screen, participants learned individuating information about the professions of 
Jonathan and Elizabeth. They were assigned to either the minimal or immersive materials 
conditions, and the stereotypical or counter-stereotypical information condition. 
 Minimal condition.  The minimal information condition followed the procedure of Cao 
and Banaji (2016). Participants viewed a single screen of information about the profession of 
Jonathan, and a single screen of information about the profession of Elizabeth, in 
counterbalanced order. Each screen included the photo of the target person. In the stereotypical 
condition, Jonathan was revealed to be the doctor and Elizabeth the nurse; in the counter-
stereotypical condition, Elizabeth was revealed to be the doctor and Jonathan the nurse. The 
descriptions of the two professions are provided below (text that varies is presented in brackets): 
[Jonathan/Elizabeth] is a doctor at a city hospital where [he/she] specializes in emergency medicine. As a 
physician working in an emergency room, [Jonathan/Elizabeth] cares for patients who arrive at the hospital 
requiring immediate medical attention. Since patients arrive with a variety of ailments, 
[Jonathan/Elizabeth] is trained in resuscitation, cardiac life support, airway management, and some surgical 
procedures. After stabilizing patients, [Jonathan/Elizabeth] decides whether to release them or admit them 
to the hospital for further treatment. 
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[Jonathan/Elizabeth] is nurse at a retirement home where [he/she] provides care to the elderly. As a nurse 
working at a retirement home, [Jonathan/Elizabeth] cares for the elderly who get sick or hurt unexpectedly 
and for the elderly with chronic ailments. Given these different needs, [Jonathan/Elizabeth] is trained to 
administer medications, bandage wounds, and monitor blood pressure, heart rates and respiration. After 
treating the elderly, [Jonathan/Elizabeth] decides whether to release them or send them to a hospital for 
additional care. 
 Immersive condition. In the immersive condition, participants were informed that they 
would be reading a description of events, and that they should imagine that the events were 
actually occurring, and happening to them. They were directly asked to attempt to “immersive” 
themselves in the situations described, and told that they will be asked questions about the 
information later. 
 On the following pages, the participants read a story in the second person (using “you” as 
pronoun) in which they are driving home after work, and suddenly experience searing pain in 
their side. It is bad enough to force them to pull over and call an ambulance in a panic (the full 
materials are available in the Appendix). After reading that they arrive at the hospital, the 
participants were presented with a screen showing the images of Jonathan and Elizabeth, with 
the following text to inform them of which person filled which role (text that varies presented in 
brackets): Once you get to the hospital, you meet your nurse, [Jonathan/Elizabeth], and lead 
doctor, [Elizabeth/Jonathan]. The two individuals were presented side-by-side, in 
counterbalanced position. 
 The story continued on a final page that also featured the names and images of Jonathan 
and Elizabeth, with the following text: 
They read the chart from the ambulance medics, and rush you into an exam room to take further 
tests.  [Jonathan/Elizabeth], the nurse, is taking your vitals again, and [Elizabeth/Jonathan], the doctor, is 
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deciding which course to follow.  You will need to ask them questions and so you should take a minute to 
remember their face and name carefully and their role in diagnosing your condition. 
 Explicit measure. After reading either the minimal or immersive materials about 
Elizabeth and Jonathan, participants were asked the single item measure from Cao and Banaji’s 
work (2016) to assess the explicit beliefs of the participant about the professions of Jonathan and 
Elizabeth, selecting a response on a 7-point Likert-type scale from -3 (Jonathan is definitely the 
doctor) to +3 (Elizabeth is definitely the doctor), with the midpoint (0) labeled Both individuals 
are equally likely to be the doctor. 
 Implicit measure.  Participants next completed either an IAT or modified AMP 
(described below), both designed to measure relative implicit impressions of Jonathan vs. 
Elizabeth as more linked with doctors or nurses. Though Cao and Banaji (2016) administered the 
implicit measure twice, once before the individuating information (to establish a stereotype-
consistent baseline) and once after the individuating information, in this study there was only a 
single administration, after the final information was presented. This was done to keep the study 
shorter for reasons of cost, and because the focus was on whether counter-stereotypical implicit 
impressions could form with these materials, with the work of Cao and Banaji (2016) already 
establishing the baseline stereotypicality of implicit impressions prior to individuating details. 
 Implicit Association Test. The IAT required participants to sort stimuli related to 
Jonathan, Elizabeth, doctors, and nurses, appearing sequentially in the center of the screen, into 
four categories using two keys.  In the critical blocks of the experiment, there were two 
categories mapped to each key, the configuration of which varied between blocks: In the 
stereotype-compatible block, Jonathan + doctor were mapped together on one key and Elizabeth 
+ nurse were mapped together on the other key, and on the stereotype-incompatible block, 
Jonathan + nurse were mapped together on one key and Elizabeth + doctor were mapped 
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together on the other key. The images of Jonathan and Elizabeth were displayed on-screen as the 
category labels, with the trial stimuli to be categorized including Jonathan, jon, John, johnny, 
and Elizabeth, ell, Ella, eliza, respectively. The doctor and nurse categories were represented by 
the labels “Doctor Words” and “Nurse Words”, with trial stimuli to be categorized including 
Doctor, Medical Doctor, M.D., Physician, and Nurse, Registered Nurse, R.N., Nursing, 
respectively. The IAT consisted of 7 blocks (including practice and test blocks) with the standard 
20-20-20-40-40-20-40 trial structure (see Greenwald et al., 2003). Participants were instructed to 
go as quickly as they could without making many mistakes.  Upon an error, participants were 
shown a red “X” and were required to press the correct key before advancing to the next trial. 
 Profession Misattribution Procedure. The AMP has attractive psychometric properties 
to rival the IAT, including high reliability, lack of reliance on response times (which are 
measured with error), lack of the block-order effects present on the IAT (as whichever blocks are 
presented second, be they either the compatible or incompatible blocks, generally suffer from 
interference effects from the mappings learned in the first half of the task). In addition, and 
particularly relevant for the present study, the AMP does not impose any category-level construal 
of the stimuli; in fact, the instructions on the AMP generally ask participants to do their best to 
disregard the primes entirely. This may make an AMP preferable for measuring implicit 
impressions of individuals (vs. the broader categories of “Jonathan” and “Elizabeth”) compared 
to the IAT. 
 The AMP in its standard form, of course, is not structured to measure implicit 
impressions of a person as a doctor or nurse, because the decision that participants make about 
each pictograph pertains to its valence – i.e., whether the pictograph is more or less pleasant than 
average. It is an affective misattribution task, such that evaluations spontaneously evoked by the 
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primes are misattributed to the pictographs that are the participant’s focus of attention.  Work 
suggests, however, that a variety of semantic impressions can be misattributed, including 
impressions of animacy (Deutsch & Gawronski, 2009), self-relevance (Sava et al., 2012), sexual 
interest (Imhoff et al., 2011), and racial stereotypes (Krieglmeyer & Sherman, 2012).  As another 
example, in other work, I have found evidence that implicit impressions of the creativity of a 
person can be measured on an AMP-like misattribution task in which images of people are 
primed directly before abstract painting stimuli that participants must judge as more or less 
creative than average (the stimuli used in Study 10).  These implicit judgments were distinct 
from implicit evaluations measured on a standard AMP and uniquely predicted judgments and 
behavioral intentions when controlling for explicit judgments of the target’s creativity (Mann, 
Katz, Ferguson, & Goncalo, in preparation).  Such work raises the possibility that a focal task 
aimed at determining the “doctor-ness” or “nurse-ness” of the pictographs could potentially tap 
misattributions of impressions of Jonathan and Elizabeth as doctors or nurses, thereby providing 
an implicit index of such impressions. 
 At the beginning of this “Profession” Misattribution Task (PMP), participants were told 
that they would be judging a number of pictographs, with some of them having a meaning more 
related to “doctors” and others having a meaning more related to “nurses.”  We gave them a 
cover story that the meaning of such pictographs can often be gleaned form their appearance, and 
that people are often remarkably good at detecting this. They were thus asked to press one key if 
the meaning of a pictograph seemed to them to be more related to doctors, and a different key if 
they thought the meaning was more related to nurses, with the usual AMP instruction to avoid 
being biased at all by the prime images that came before each. As with the regular AMP, each 
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trial consisted of the presentation of a prime for 75ms, a blank page for 125ms, a pictograph for 
100ms, and finally a black-and-white pattern mask until the participant gave a response.  
 Because the PMP allows for more than two prime categories, in addition to Jonathan and 
Elizabeth the task included control faces as well, to allow an assessment of how implicit 
impressions of Jonathan and Elizabeth in each condition compared to control individuals of the 
same or opposite sex. There were thus 20 trials each with the following stimuli as primes: 
Elizabeth, Jonathan, control women (divided evenly among the four unused images of women), 
and control men (divided evenly among the four unused images of men), for a total of 80 trials. 
 Survey questions.  Participants next completed a number of questionnaire items asking 
about various elements of the study, in the order of the following sections. The goal of most of 
these questions was to determine a) the degree to which implicit impressions formed in this study 
might relate to important judgments about the targets of those impressions, and b) whether 
responses to the questions might be impacted by the information and/or materials manipulations 
in a way that could shed light on the inferences that participants are making in each condition, 
ultimately informing why and how implicit impression formation might be stronger or weaker.  
The analyses planned for these questions were thus largely exploratory in nature. 
 Believability.  Four exploratory questions assessed the degree to which participants found 
aspects of the procedure believable.  These included, “As you were going through the 
experiment, how much did you think of the people you learned about as real-life people?” on a 
scale from 1 (Not at all) to 9 (Completely), “Do you think the people you learned about—
Jonathan and Elizabeth—are actually real people or just made-up fictional examples?” on a scale 
from 1 (Definitely fictional people) to 9 (Definitely real people), “Do you think the descriptions 
you read about Jonathan and Elizabeth are realistic?” on a scale from 1 (Not at all realistic) to 9 
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(Completely realistic), and “Do you think the descriptions of these people are just made-up 
fictional descriptions that the experimenters are using for their own purposes?” on a scale from 1 
(Not at all) to 9 (Definitely).  
 Attention check.  To identify participants who were not paying adequate attention to the 
questions given the large set of items in the questionnaire, the four believability questions above 
were divided between the 2nd and 3rd by an attention check, consisting of a paragraph ostensibly 
asking participants to insert “a fact about Jonathan” and “a fact about Elizabeth” in two boxes 
below (bearing those phrases as labels).  In fact, however, the penultimate sentence instructed 
them to disregard the rest of the question and simply type the letter “z” in each box. 
 Identity importance.  Two questions measured how much participants believed the 
professions of Elizabeth and Jonathan to be important to their self-identities. Each was asked 
twice, once for Elizabeth and once for Jonathan: “To what extent do you believe that 
[Elizabeth’s/Jonathan’s] profession is an important part of who [she/he] is as a person?” on a 
scale from 1 (Not at all) to 9 (Extremely), and “To what extent do you believe that 
[Elizabeth/Jonathan] views [her/his] profession as an important part of [her/his] identity?” on a 
scale from 1 (Not at all) to 9 (Extremely). 
Competence. In three questions, participants indicated how competent they viewed 
Jonathan and Elizabeth to be. As with the identity importance questions, each was asked twice, 
once for Jonathan and once for Elizabeth: “If you had to guess, without knowing anything else, 
how competent do you think [Jonathan/Elizabeth] is at [his/her] job?” on a scale from 1 (Not at 
all competent) to 9 (Extremely competent), “If [Jonathan/Elizabeth] were involved in caring for a 
member of your family, to what degree do you feel that your family member would be ‘in good 
hands,’ based on what you know now?” on a scale from 1 (Not at all) to 9 (Extremely), and 
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finally, “If you had to guess, what is the likelihood that [Jonathan/Elizabeth] was valedictorian of 
[his/her] graduating class for [his/her] program?” on a scale from 1 (Extremely unlikely) to 9 
(Extremely likely). 
General views on gender stereotypes. Participants indicated whether they believed that a 
randomly selected man or a randomly selected woman from the medical industry would be more 
likely to be a doctor vs. a nurse, to the best of their knowledge (and without taking into account 
what they know about Jonathan and Elizabeth), using a scale from 1 (The woman is more likely 
to be the doctor) to 9 (The man is more likely to be the doctor).  They were then asked their level 
of agreement with the statement, “In general, people tend to assume on average that doctors are 
male and that nurses are female” on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree).  
Finally, they were asked how a random person on the street would respond to a question on 
whether someone named Elizabeth or Jonathan is more likely to be a doctor, and could select one 
of three answers for this hypothetical person: Elizabeth is more likely to be the doctor, Jonathan 
is more likely to be the doctor, or They are equally likely to be the doctor. 
 Other questions.  Lastly, participants were asked the degree to which they tried to 
immerse themselves in and vividly imagine the details about Jonathan and Elizabeth on a scale 
from 1 (Not at all) to 9 (Completely), to identify both Elizabeth and Jonathan in photo lineups of 
the 5 images of women and 5 images of men, to indicate if they knew Mandarin and/or 
Cantonese (in the PMP condition), and provide demographic information. 
Results 
 Implicit beliefs.  Implicit beliefs about the degree to which Elizabeth and Jonathan were 
linked with doctors and nurses were assessed using either the IAT or PMP, depending on 
condition assignment. 
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 Profession Misattribution Procedure.  For participants in the PMP condition, I computed 
the proportion of pictographs judged to be more related to doctors (vs. nurses) separately for 
each prime type, and analyzed these proportions within a 4 (Prime Type: Jonathan, Elizabeth, 
control men, control women) x 2 (Information Condition: stereotypical, counter-stereotypical) x 
2 (Materials: minimal, immersive) mixed ANOVA, with prime type manipulated within-
participants and the latter two factors manipulated between-participants. 
 Of main importance, the interaction between person prime and information condition was 
significant, F(1.53, 574.69) = 86.30, p < .001, ηp2 = .187.  Figure 16 shows implicit evaluations 
of each of the four prime types within each condition. This interaction was not qualified by 
materials condition (minimal vs. immersive) in a three-way interaction, F(1.528, 574.69) = .56, p 
= .526, ηp2 = .001, so interpretation will focus on the two-way effect. 
In the stereotypical information condition, in which Jonathan was revealed to be the 
doctor and Elizabeth the nurse, Jonathan was more implicitly linked with doctors (vs. nurses; M 
= .69, SD = .22) than Elizabeth (M = .39, SD = .25), t(189) = 9.47, p < .001, Hedges’ gav = 1.255. 
Jonathan was also judged as more implicitly doctor-like than control men (M = .65, SD = .21), 
t(189) = 2.57, p = .011, Hedges’ gav = .153, and control women (M = .39, SD = .23), t(189) = 
10.23, p < .001, Hedges’ gav = 1.314. Implicit judgments of Elizabeth did not differ from implicit 
judgments of control women, t(189) = .061, p = .952, Hedges’ gav = .003, but Elizabeth was 
implicitly judged as less doctor-like than control men, t(189) = 9.15, p < .001, Hedges’ gav = 
1.124. Finally, control women were implicitly judged as less doctor-like than control men, t(189) 
= 9.50, p < .001, Hedges’ gav = 1.177. 
 In the counter-stereotypical condition, in which Elizabeth was the doctor and Jonathan 
was the nurse, Elizabeth was more implicitly linked with doctors (vs. nurses; M = .63, SD = .24) 
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than Jonathan (M = .45, SD = .25), t(189) = 5.658, p < .001, Hedges’ gav = .730. Elizabeth was 
also implicitly judged as more doctor-like than control women (M = .56, SD = .22), t(189) = 
4.16, p < .001, Hedges’ gav = .296, and control men (M = .49, SD = .23), t(189) = 4.55, p < .001, 
Hedges’ gav = .580. Additionally, Jonathan was implicitly judged as less doctor-like (and thus 
more nurse-like) than control men, t(189) = 3.09, p = .002, Hedges’ gav = .178, and control 
women, t(189) = 3.89, p < .001, Hedges’ gav = .469.  Finally, control women were implicitly 
judged as more doctor-like than control men, t(189) = 2.39, p = .018, Hedges’ gav = .302. 
 
Figure 16.  The proportion of pictographs judged to be more pleasant than average in Study 12 
(PMP condition), by information condition and prime. Error bars are standard errors. 
 
 Implicit Association Test. IAT scores were computed using the D1-scoring algorithm 
(Greenwald et al., 2003), which takes advantage of the built-in error penalties available in this 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
Stereotypical Counter-stereotypical 
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 P
ic
to
gr
ap
hs
 J
ud
ge
d 
 
to
 b
e 
M
or
e 
PL
ea
sa
nt
 th
an
 A
ve
ra
ge
 
Elizabeth 
Jonathan 
Control Women 
Control Men 
 203 
version of the IAT that requires participants to correct their own errors by pressing the correct 
response key. These D scores are relative measures interpretable as standardized mean 
differences, bounded between -2 and +2. As noted in the Method section, participants were 
excluded if they responded more quickly than 300ms on 10% or more trials. Positive scores 
indicate stronger implicit judgments of Jonathan as a doctor and Elizabeth as a nurse, and 
negative scores indicate stronger implicit judgments of Elizabeth as a doctor and Jonathan as a 
nurse. D-scores were analyzed in a 2 (Information Condition: stereotypical, counter-
stereotypical) x 2 (Materials: minimal, immersive) between-participants factorial ANOVA.  
 This analysis revealed a main effect of information condition, F(1, 365) = 249.57, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .406, qualified by a (marginal) interaction with materials condition, F(1, 365) = 3.84, 
p = .051, ηp2 = .01.  The nature of this interaction was such that the effect of individuating 
information about the professions of Jonathan and Elizabeth on IAT scores was stronger in the 
immersive materials condition, F(1, 365) = 161.10, p < .001, ηp2 = .306, than in the minimal 
materials condition, F(1, 365) = 93.74, p < .001, ηp2 = .204. Figure 17 shows the mean D-scores 
in each information and materials condition. 
In the minimal materials condition, when the information about Jonathan and Elizabeth 
was stereotype-consistent, D-scores were consistent with Jonathan being implicitly judged as 
more doctor-like (vs. nurse-like) than Elizabeth (M = .63, SD = .33), which was significantly 
above zero, t(76) = 16.60, p < .001. When the information was counter-stereotypical, D-scores 
still suggested that Jonathan was implicitly judged as more doctor-like (vs. nurse-like) than 
Elizabeth (M = .09, SD = .41), albeit less so, and this too was significantly above zero, t(104) = 
2.21, p = .029. 
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In the immersive materials condition, when the information about Jonathan and Elizabeth 
was stereotype-consistent, D-scores were consistent with Jonathan being implicitly judged as 
more doctor-like (vs. nurse-like) than Elizabeth (M = .71, SD = .33), which was significantly 
above zero, t(84) = 19.69, p < .001. When the information was counter-stereotypical, D-scores 
still suggested that neither Jonathan nor Elizabeth was implicitly judged as more doctor-like (vs. 
nurse-like; M = .02, SD = .40), as the mean D-score in this condition did not significantly differ 
from zero, t(101) = .38, p = .702. 
 
 
Figure 17.  Mean D-score index of relative implicit judgment of Jonathan as doctor and 
Elizabeth as nurse in Study 12 (IAT condition), by information condition and materials 
condition. Error bars are standard errors.  
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Combined analysis of PMP and IAT.  After examining the effects of information 
condition and material immersiveness separately for the PMP and IAT, a natural next question is 
to ask how these effects compare between the measures.  Is the size of the information effect 
similar on the two measures?  Is the suggestive impact of materials on the condition effect as 
measured by the IAT a significant difference from the PMP?  A comparison of the two measures 
may be useful given that the difference in pattern between them, especially the reversal of 
implicit judgments on the PMP vs. the mere shift to neutral of implicit stereotyping on the IAT, 
gives an impression of a fundamental dissimilarity between these measures. However, they may 
react similarly to the manipulations (information and materials) and produce the aforementioned 
divergence in means due to an influence exogenous to those manipulations, like relative 
sensitivity to social group memberships of the individuals presented during the task. Specifically, 
because the IAT requires participants to think about stimuli in terms of categories, it might 
incorporate category stereotypes to a greater degree than the PMP, which does not impose this 
task framing. This would result in overall higher levels of implicit gender stereotyping on the 
IAT, as was observed here. However, the IAT might also draw upon individuating information 
to the same extent as the PMP. A direct comparison between the measures can allow for a test of 
this idea. 
 In order to compare these measures that have very different scales, I carried out two 
transformations. First, because the IAT is a relative measure of implicit judgments of Jonathan 
vs. Elizabeth, I created a difference score on the PMP by subtracting the proportion of Jonathan 
trials on which the pictograph was judged as more doctor-related minus the proportion of 
Elizabeth trials on which the pictograph was judged as more doctor-related. Following this, both 
the IAT scores and PMP difference scores were standardized separately, and then combined into 
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a single measure. These scores were then assessed in a 2 (Information Condition: stereotypical, 
counter-stereotypical) x 2 (Materials: minimal, immersive) x 2 (Measure: IAT, PMP) between-
participants factorial ANOVA. Figure 18 displays the mean standard scores within each 
condition. 
 Results showed a significant and expected main effect of information condition, F(1, 
741) = 339.75, p < .001, ηp2 = .314. This was qualified by a significant interaction between 
information and implicit measure, F(1, 741) = 6.68, p = .010, ηp2 = .009, and a marginal 
interaction between information and materials, F(1, 741) = 3.35, p = .068, ηp2 = .004. There was 
no three-way interaction between information, materials, and implicit measure, F(1, 741) = .604, 
p = .437, ηp2 = .001. 
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Figure 18.  Standardized implicit judgment of Jonathan as more doctor-like (vs. nurse-like) than 
Elizabeth in Study 12, by information condition, materials, and implicit measure. Error bars are 
standard errors. 
 
 Examining the interaction between information condition and measure revealed that the 
measures significantly differed in the stereotypical information condition, but not in the counter-
stereotypical condition. In the stereotypical condition, the IAT showed stronger implicit 
judgments of Jonathan as relatively more doctor-like (vs. nurse-like) than Elizabeth (M = .72, SD 
= .69) compared to the PMP (M = .48, SD = .87), unequal variances t(348.09) = 2.80, p = .005, 
Hedges’ gs = .299.  In the counter-stereotypical condition, however, the IAT showed no stronger 
relative implicit judgments of Jonathan as the doctor (M = -.56, SD = .83) compared to the PMP 
(M = -.48, SD = .88), t(395) = -.95, p = .345, Hedges’ gs = .095. 
 Turning now to the marginal interaction between information and materials condition (p 
= .068), follow-up tests indicated that, as with the IAT analysis, the effect of information 
condition was larger with the immersive materials, t(370) = 14.13, p < .001, Hedges’ gs = 1.46, 
than with the minimal materials, t(375) = 11.74, p < .001, Hedges’ gs = 1.21. The nonsignificant 
moderation of this effect by implicit measure (p = .437) suggests that this trend does not differ 
between the IAT and the PMP. 
 Explicit judgments. The measure asking participants to indicate their view about 
whether they believed Jonathan or Elizabeth to be the doctor was analyzed in a 2 (Information 
Condition: stereotypical, counterstereotypical) x 2 (Materials: minimal, immersive) between-
participants ANOVA, and revealed only a main effect of information, F(1, 745) = 3873.67, p < 
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.001, ηp2 = .839.  There was no main effect of materials, F(1, 745) = .011, p = .918, ηp2 < .001, or 
interaction, F(1, 745) = .848, p = .357, ηp2 = .001. 
 Inference questions. The final questions in the experiment were organized broadly into 
the following categories: (a) the perceived importance of the careers of Jonathan and Elizabeth to 
their identities, (b) the perceived competence of Jonathan and Elizabeth, (c) predictions on how 
other people in general would view Jonathan and Elizabeth, and average levels of gender-based 
stereotypes of the doctor and nurse professions among people in general, and (d) general 
questions about the believability and immersiveness of the study. For each group of questions, I 
briefly report whether they were affected by the information and/or materials manipulations, and 
whether they were related to implicit and explicit beliefs. Due to the exploratory nature of these 
items, these analyses are kept more concise than the main analyses reported above, and analyses 
of questions falling into the fourth category (believability and immersion) are not reported.  
 Importance of career to identity.  Four questions dealt with the degree to which 
participants believed that Jonathan and Elizabeth viewed their jobs as important parts of their 
identity (two each). The two questions on Jonathan’s perceived identification with his profession 
were highly correlated, r(747) = .77, p < .001, as were the two similar questions regarding 
Elizabeth, r(747) = .81, p < .001; these pairs were thus averaged to create single measures of 
identification per person.  As the implicit measures are relative (in the standardized form 
computed above to allow their comparison), in order to examine the relationship between the 
implicit measures and the career importance measures, a career importance difference score was 
produced by subtracting the perceived importance of Elizabeth’s career from the perceived 
importance of Jonathan’s (with higher scores thus indicating a perception that Jonathan’s career 
is more important to his identity).  
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First, the difference score were significantly affected by information condition, but not 
the materials manipulation (and there were no interactions); the relative perceived identity 
importance of Jonathan’s career (vs. Elizabeth’s) was higher when Jonathan was the doctor (M = 
.15, SD = .79) than when Elizabeth was the doctor (M = -.41, SD = .87), t(747) = 9.23, p < .001, 
Hedges’ gs = .675. In other words, the perceived importance of each person’s career to their 
identity was greatest when he/she was the doctor rather than the nurse. 
 This difference score was regressed upon the combined standardized implicit measure 
and information condition, which revealed a significant unique effect of implicit beliefs, β = 
.086, t(746) = 2.07, p = .039, such that higher implicit belief that Jonathan (vs. Elizabeth) was 
doctor-like (vs. nurse-like) predicted a greater explicit belief that Jonathan’s job is important to 
his identity. This was no longer significant when additionally controlling for the single item of 
explicit belief that Jonathan (vs. Elizabeth) was the doctor, β = .058, t(745) = 1.39, p = .165.  
 Perceived competence.  For each of Jonathan and Elizabeth, three questions asked about 
their competence (how competent they are, whether one of the participant’s own family members 
would be in good hands under their care, and the likelihood that they were valedictorian of their 
graduating class). These three items were reliably inter-correlated for Jonathan (Cronbach’s α = 
.723) and Elizabeth (α = .708), and were thus merged into a single index score for each target 
individual.  Similar to the analysis for perceived identity importance, a difference score was 
created by subtracting the score for Elizabeth from the score for Jonathan, with higher scores 
indicating greater perceived competence of Jonathan (vs. Elizabeth). 
 Relative perceived competence of Jonathan over Elizabeth was significantly impacted by 
information condition, F(1,745) = 92.65, p < .001, ηp2 = .111, as well as materials, F(1,745) = 
5.99, p = .015, ηp2 = .008, and the interaction between the two factors, F(1,745) = 8.35, p = .004, 
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ηp2 = .011.  The relative perceived competence of Jonathan over Elizabeth was greater when he 
was the doctor than when he was the nurse in both the minimal materials condition, t(375) = 
8.11, p < .001, Hedges gs = .838, and the immersive materials condition, t(370) = 5.30, p < .001, 
Hedges gs = .549, but this difference was greater in the former than the latter.  This pattern 
indicates that the competence judgments of each individual were higher when he/she was the 
doctor rather than the nurse. 
 Implicit impressions of Jonathan vs. Elizabeth were marginally related to relative 
competence judgments when controlling for information, materials, and their interaction, β = 
.075, t(744) = 1.82, p = .070, but not when additionally controlling for explicit beliefs, β = .057, 
t(743) = 1.37, p = .173. 
 General beliefs about the inferences of others in general.  Because the three items in 
this category were less strongly inter-correlated and were answered using scales of different 
lengths, they were analyzed separately.  
 The question asking participants to infer whether a random man or random woman 
working in the medical industry would be more likely to be a doctor rather than a nurse (9-point 
scale) was not affected by information condition, materials condition, or their interaction, all Fs 
< 2, all ps > .164. When the combined standardized implicit measure was added to the analysis, 
however, it had a significant, unique positive effect, β = .155, t(744) = 3.54, p < .001, such that 
greater implicit judgment of Jonathan (vs. Elizabeth) as doctor-like (vs. nurse-like) was 
associated with greater belief that a random man from the medical industry would be more likely 
to be a doctor than a random woman in that industry. This predictor remained significant, β = 
.163, t(743) = 3.66, p < .001, when controlling for explicit beliefs in the likelihood of Jonathan 
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being the doctor over Elizabeth, which was not independently significant, β = .091, t(743) = 
.995, p = .320. 
 The question on whether “people in general” tend to assume that doctors are male and 
nurses are female (9-point scale) was not affected by the manipulations (or their interaction), all 
Fs < 3, all ps > .1.  With the combined standardized implicit measure added to the analysis, a 
marginally significant positive trend obtained, β = .083, t(744) = 1.89, p = .059, which became 
significant, β = .094, t(743) = 2.10, p = .036, when additionally controlling for explicit 
judgments of the professions of Jonathan and Elizabeth. Explicit judgments were not predictive, 
β = .121, t(743) = 1.31, p = .190. 
 Last was the question on which option a random person on the street would select: a) that 
someone named “Elizabeth” was more likely to be a doctor than someone named “Jonathan”, b) 
that those two individuals were equally likely to be a doctor, or c) that Jonathan is more likely to 
be a doctor than Elizabeth.  A chi-square test suggested that responses on this measure differed 
by information condition, χ2(2) = 9.61, p = .008, with more openness to Elizabeth being the 
doctor in the counter-stereotypical condition (2.8%) than the stereotypical condition (0.3%), and 
more openness to the two individuals being equally likely to be the doctor in the counter-
stereotypical condition (25.7%) than the stereotypical condition (21.6%). There was no effect of 
materials, χ2(2) = 2.19, p = .335. These results were not meaningfully different in an ordinal 
regression, which also demonstrated no interaction between materials and information, Wald(1) 
= .551, p = .458.  Adding the combined standardized implicit measure to the ordinal regression 
revealed a significant positive relationship, estimate = .268, SE = .102, Wald(1) = 6.88, p = .009, 
suggesting that higher implicit judgments of Jonathan (vs. Elizabeth) as doctor-like (vs. nurse-
like) predicted greater likelihood of expecting someone named Jonathan to be a doctor vs. equal 
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chances of either person being a doctor, and greater likelihood of either person being a doctor vs. 
Elizabeth being a doctor. Implicit judgments remained significant, estimate = .307, SE = .105, 
Wald(1) = 8.585, p = .003, when controlling for explicit judgments, which were independently 
significant, estimate = .169, SE = .081, Wald(1) = 4.39, p = .036. 
Discussion 
 The results of Study 12 highlight a variety of important considerations regarding the 
generalization of robust implicit revision to real-world applications.  Though the work presented 
in Chapter II found strong reversals of implicit impressions when participants learned extreme 
new information that proved their initial assumptions to be erroneous, the findings of Cao and 
Banaji (2016) that counter-stereotypical clarifications of the professions of two individuals did 
not reverse implicit gender stereotypes of those individuals raises the question of whether new 
information needs to be extreme in order to prompt revision.  Can less extreme but still 
seemingly diagnostic information that one was wrong about a person not be similarly effective? 
 The results of the present study suggest that the answer may be “yes”, and point to the 
nature of the measure and the relevance of information as potentially important moderators.  
While replicating Cao and Banaji’s (2016) basic effect (of no counter-stereotypic implicit 
impression formation) with a modified IAT, Study 12 found significant counter-stereotypical 
impressions of professions on a misattribution task (the PMP).  Furthermore, counter-
stereotypical impression formation was stronger when the individuating information was 
presented in an immersive, self-relevant narrative than when using Cao and Banaji’s (2016) 
original materials, finding that the immersive version reduced implicit gender stereotyping to 
being indistinguishable from neutral.  In a combined, standardized form that facilitated a 
comparison of the effects of the information on each measure, the effects of individuating 
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information and materials (immersive vs. minimal) did not differ between the measures; this 
suggests that although the modified IAT continued to show higher mean levels of implicit gender 
stereotyping than the PMP, the two measures were equally good at reflecting the encoding of the 
individuating information and the deeper impact of the immersive story. 
 At present, the proper interpretation of the measure effect can only be a matter of 
speculation. A strong candidate explanation, as mentioned in the introduction, is that the IAT 
puts participants into a “categorical” frame of mind (De Houwer, 2001) by imposing a 
categorization task, which makes the gender categories of Jonathan and Elizabeth more salient, 
allowing gender stereotypes to continue to impact responses. Relatedly, more general gender 
stereotypes could have continued to be activated on the IAT by the novel nicknames for Jonathan 
and Elizabeth that were presented as stimuli on the task (e.g., jon, John, johnny, ell, Ella, eliza), 
which had not been learned and practice by participants as referring specifically to this Jonathan 
and this Elizabeth; for these reasons, the IAT used in this study may not have been completely 
altered to specifically measure implicit impressions of the particular Jonathan and Elizabeth in 
question, despite using their images as category labels.   
Another possibility is that the difference stems from other dissimilarities between the 
tasks; for example, the IAT requires fast responses and scores on the task are computed via 
averaging of response times, whereas the PMP does not emphasize rapid responses and scores 
are calculated only based on the final judgments made on each trial.  Automaticity features 
cannot be collapsed into a single construct (Bargh, 1994; De Houwer & Moors, 2012; De 
Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009; Moors & De Houwer, 2006), and although 
both tasks are indirect measures of unintentional judgments of Jonathan and Elizabeth, variation 
in the extent to which responses on the AMP and IAT exhibit other automaticity features (like 
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speed), and differences in their operative processes (e.g., response interference vs. misattribution; 
De Houwer, 2001; Payne & Lundberg, 2014) make it likely that different implicit measures will 
sometimes produce different results (e.g., Deutsch & Gawronski, 2009). In the present case, for 
example, it is possible that the processing of the gendered names on some trials fleetingly 
activates general gender categories and corresponding stereotypes in the moments before they 
are individuated as applying to the particular Jonathan or particular Elizabeth depicted in the 
study. As a rapid-response measure, the IAT may allow for this fleeting activation to drive 
responding; on the slower PMP, on the other hand, the primes may be individuated before an 
impression of the pictograph coheres, allowing for the individuated impression to be 
misattributed to the target rather than a gender stereotype. This possibility should be investigated 
by future work. 
 Equally important are the implications of the immersion manipulation, which showed that 
even on the IAT, a more self-relevant way of delivering counter-stereotypical information about 
Jonathan and Elizabeth heightened the effectiveness of that information in attenuating 
stereotype-based implicit impressions.  This may indicate that in a broad sense, even mundane 
revelations that we might have been wrong about a person may be capable of updating our 
implicit responses to that person to fall more in line with what we now know to be true about 
him or her.  It also raises an important direction for future research: Determining why implicit 
responses might need more immersive information to reverse than explicit responses. 
 Finally, the results of Study 12 demonstrated that the implicit impressions of the 
professions of Jonathan and Elizabeth predicted a variety of other judgments that participants 
made about them.  Though these results were exploratory and thus warrant a priori replication, 
the most interesting findings were arguably the correlations between the implicit impressions and 
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the more general beliefs the participants held about gender and the medical profession, because 
these relationships persisted even when controlling for explicit beliefs. These relationships found 
the implicit impressions to independently predict the views of the participants on the likelihood 
of men and women to be doctors, and their sense of the views of the public on those matters 
more generally. The prediction of these various measures by the implicit impressions of the 
characters adds support for their validity as measures of impactful responses. It also suggests, 
however, that future research should test whether the relationship between the implicit 
impressions of Jonathan vs. Elizabeth and participant beliefs about general gender stereotypes is 
due to a continued impact of gender stereotypic knowledge on implicit impressions of the two 
individuals (regardless of the individuating information they received), or due to the use of 
implicit impressions about Jonathan and Elizabeth to inform responses on those subsequent 
measures of societal notions of gender roles. 
General Discussion 
 The studies in this chapter tested the generalizability of implicit revision through 
reinterpretation, approaching that endeavor in several different ways.  Collectively, these 
investigations into more varied evidence for reinterpretation as a route of implicit change not 
only speak to the broader external validity of the results obtained in Chapter II to implicit 
updating in diverse contexts, but in doing so, provide opportunities to identify and begin to test 
moderators and mediators of the updating process.  
 Studies 7 and 8 found that other approaches to implicit updating which share similar 
constituent features with reinterpretation, drawn from recent theory – negation of some element 
of earlier learning, coupled with affirmation of a new, countervailing impression – could be 
equally effective in overturning an initial implicit impression. These studies thus open the door 
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to a broader family of routes of implicit revision that simultaneously implement some form of 
both of these constituent processing steps, which collectively may be more effective at quickly 
revising implicit evaluations than negation or affirmation alone (Gawronski et al., 2008; Peters & 
Gawronski, 2011; Rydell & McConnell, 2006). 
 Study 9 tested a different, yet critical, element of the external validity of reinterpretation 
as a route of updating by addressing whether reinterpretation could revise implicit evaluations 
after a delay of days that could have produced deleterious forgetting of specific details of the 
story necessary for effective revision.  Instead, reinterpretation was still highly effective in 
reversing implicit evaluations, regardless of recall – suggesting, perhaps, that construal of the 
new information at the time of its learning was the more important factor in determining its 
impact.  
 Next, evidence for reinterpretation as a mechanism for updating implicit impressions was 
found even in the context of a controversial societal issue (big-game hunting; Study 10) and in 
the face of implicit anti-Black bias (Study 11).  Finally, more complex evidence for updating in 
the face of much more mundane and less extreme information – that a man and a woman held 
counter-stereotypic jobs – emerged as well (Study 12).  
 Though Studies 10-12 all found evidence for implicit updating, the strength of revision 
varied substantially among them.  Together with the findings of Studies 7-9, this variation lends 
itself to some potential unifying principles on the generality of implicit updating.   
 Probably the clearest trend among the studies is that when the new information was both 
extreme and indisputable in its ability to compel participants to view the individual in a new 
light, revision was at its strongest, which might be expected.  This was the case both with the 
Francis West fire rescue reinterpretation (Studies 7-9 and 11) and in the negate + affirm 
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condition (Studies 7-8), where the final information left little room for varied interpretation, and 
was arguably extreme; in the negate + affirm case, the positive detail that replaced the negated 
earlier events was both rare and made indisputably relevant by the accompanying negation. In 
the face of extreme and clear-cut information of this sort, revision may be likely to occur even 
against the backdrop of more general intergroup or visual-based implicit biases like race: Study 
11 found robust revision (albeit slightly reduced) even when the character was Black, and even 
when implicit race bias occurred with the control faces. Furthermore, the results of Study 9 
suggest that these ingredients may allow for successful revision even after a longer delay from 
initial formation, and even when recall of the specifics of the formative events is already fading. 
 What about when one or both elements – extremity and indisputable diagnostic value – 
are missing? Revision may be reduced, or at least more nuanced, in such cases; The information 
about big-game hunting in Study 10 may have been new and extreme (participants may have 
been surprised to learn that killing animals could be the best way to save them), but its diagnostic 
relevance to the individual hunter in that study may have been seen as less convincing and clear, 
and only one among many factors worth taking into account when considering him.  To the 
extent that participants did report reinterpreting the activity, their implicit impressions of the 
hunter were updated, but in this study such reinterpretation may have been more of a motived 
choice than an unavoidable consequence of merely learning the new information. The findings of 
Study 11 on counter-stereotypical professions, on the other hand, show that when the new details 
are seemingly clear and diagnostic but not particularly extreme (in that it is not uncommon to 
find women as doctors), implicit updating may be more nuanced, showing up on a misattribution 
task (AMP variant) but not a different implicit measure (IAT), and becoming stronger as the 
immersive nature of the new learning is increased. While the source of the disagreement between 
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measures remains speculative (and may ultimately be linked to systematic differences in the 
processes or automaticity features evoked by the tasks; Deutsch & Gawronski, 2009; De Houwer 
et al., 2009, 2012), it is sensible to remain cautious about whether apparently diagnostic but more 
minimal and mundane revelations will consistently produce updating.   
Together, the considerations above raise the possibility that factors like how much time 
has passed since initial formation, and even whether the new information relates directly to the 
old information at all, may have their influence on implicit updating through their impact on the 
appraised extremity and diagnostic relevance of the new information encountered about a person.  
These factors, in turn, may be influential because of their ability to identify, reactivate, and 
update the relevant memory representations that contribute to the initial implicit response.  In 
reviewing research from a variety of subfields of clinical psychology under a reconsolidation 
framework, Lane and colleagues (2015) argued that very different traditions (from 
psychodynamic approaches to cognitive-behavioral to humanist therapy) may all employ 
reconsolidation by helping patients to identify and modify currently maladaptive memory 
representations; psychodynamic probing of earlier history to find the root causes of current 
cognitive patterns may not be essential for successful change, but may provide a route for 
identifying currently problematic thoughts and responses and, by highlighting their irrational or 
no-longer-relevant origins, help patients appreciate the diagnostic value of the replacement habits 
of thought offered by the therapist; CBT, on the other hand, approaches this identification-and-
change process more directly by attempting to reproduce maladaptive thought patterns 
(regardless of their origins) so as to identify and change them. When successful, the different 
traditions seem to all identify and reactivate maladaptive cognitions and then offer relevant 
replacements, which closely tracks the reconsolidation approach of reactivating a memory so as 
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to allow relevant new information to be integrated (Hardt, Einarsson, & Nader, 2010; Lane et al., 
2005; Lee, 2009; Lee, Nader, & Schiller, in press).   
An important direction for future research will be to test whether some of the factors 
offered by the Studies in Chapter III as potential moderators of revision are influential because of 
their ability to draw upon mechanisms of memory updating.  For example, a longer time delay 
than that used in Study 9 might find revision to be less effective than after two days; if so, the 
study could explore whether this is due to the time delay preventing the new information from 
reactivating earlier memories of Francis. Perhaps after such a delay, the new information will no 
longer sufficiently reactivate even prior gist impressions of him, and more work would be 
necessary to retrieve the relevant memory traces to allow the new details to be integrated; this 
would fit with reconsolidation studies suggesting that memory age moderates the likelihood of 
updating (Alberini, 2007).  Work on this topic is ongoing, but one contributing factor to this 
moderation may be that older memories are less likely to be reactivated during new learning 
(Gershman, Monfils, Norman, & Niv, 2017). It is also possible that at longer delays, the 
reinterpretation information would be more successful at revision than the negate + affirm 
condition, to the extent that the former does a better job of retrieving the representations that 
underlie the initial implicit response. Likewise, the individuating nature of the new information 
about the Black version of Frank in Study 10 may have prevented it from reactivating the set of 
representations that form the substrates of implicit race bias, preventing generalization of Frank’s 
heroic actions to the Black control faces.  A failure to reactive relevant causal memory traces and 
integrate new information into those traces may also have contributed to the persistence of 
gender stereotyping on the IAT even after learning counter-stereotypical information: Perhaps 
because such professions are not all that surprising or unheard of, and the information was so 
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minimal, participants may have failed to form strong or well-integrated representations of these 
novel individuals, resulting in category-based interference of stereotypes on a rapid response task 
that encourages categorical thinking (the IAT) even while the individuating information did 
emerge on a misattribution task (the PMP).   
In sum, the findings of Chapter III offer many directions for future research, while 
increasing confidence in the potential for reinterpretation to play a wider role in implicit 
updating.  One of the most important directions will be to attempt to generalize these 
mechanisms to the modification of group-based implicit impressions themselves (rather than just 
individual members of groups) – an issue to which I will return in the final General Discussion 
(Chapter V). In the next chapter, I turn from the question of external validity to a closer 
characterization of the automaticity features of the revised impressions. 
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Chapter IV. Operating Characteristics of Reinterpretation-Based Revision 
I. Does Reinterpretation Lead to Revision that is Implicit? 
Implicit measures are designed to tap responses that are unintentional (Ferguson, 2007; 
Ferguson & Fukukura, 2012; Payne et al., 2008). Research has suggested, however, that explicit 
response strategies can sometimes impact implicit measures when participants are motivated 
(such as through experimenter instruction) and have a strategy for doing so (e.g., Fiedler & 
Bluemke, 2005, Teige-Mocigemba & Klauer, 2013; see also Teige-Mocigemba & Klauer, 2008; 
cf. Degner, 2009). 
A final goal of the present investigation was to test whether reinterpretation leads to the 
revision of truly implicit (unintentional) evaluations, and to more broadly explore the 
automaticity features of the revised impressions (De Houwer et al., 2009; De Houwer & Moors, 
2012; Moors & De Houwer, 2006).  This issue is of critical importance, because I am focused on 
the ways in which implicit evaluations can be revised. There are a couple reasons to question, 
however, whether recent findings are indeed demonstrations of change in implicit responses.  
First, the existing findings suggest that explicit evaluations in these studies tend to form and 
change in the same directions as implicit evaluations (though their correlations with other 
measures differ; see Chapter II, Table 1).  If the implicit measures were to be “contaminated” by 
any explicit evaluation of the targets, the pattern in the implicit data could bear such general 
similarities to the explicit data even in the absence of truly implicit updating.  Of course, the 
pattern is also consistent with genuine implicit and explicit updating.   
Second, and more importantly, a great deal of the evidence in the present work for 
implicit revision has relied on the Affective Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne et al., 2005), 
a measure that has been challenged recently on its implicitness (Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2012).  
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Specifically, Bar-Anan and Nosek (2012) provided evidence that AMP effects were driven in 
large part by a small subset of participants who reported that they had intentionally evaluated the 
primes.  They found that when such participants were excluded, the good psychometric 
properties of the AMP (its reliability and the size of the priming effect) were greatly diminished. 
They argued from such data that the AMP may not be a good measure of unintentional 
impressions.  On the other hand, Payne and colleagues (2013) argued that such reports might be 
post hoc inferences stemming from awareness on the part of participants, when asked to reflect 
on the task, of correspondence between the primes and their responses. Across three studies, they 
demonstrated: 1) that participants with larger effect sizes on the AMP were more likely to 
endorse either that they had intentionally evaluated the primes or that they had been 
unintentionally influenced by them, depending on which question was asked; 2) that the standard 
(implicit) AMP predicted behavior differently from an explicit version; and 3) that participants 
rarely reported being influenced by the primes when queried on a trial-by-trial basis.   
Previous work on the construct validity of the AMP has thus done much to establish that 
the responses it measures vis-à-vis the primes are implicit (Gawronski & Ye, 2014, 2015; Payne 
et al., 2008; Payne et al., 2013).  This work collectively suggests that AMP effects are driven by 
misattribution (Gawronski & Ye, 2014; Payne & Lundberg, 2014), and that such misattribution 
can occur even when participants are distracted from the features of the primes under 
consideration and unaware of any influence of the primes on their impressions of the targets on a 
trial-by-trial basis (Payne et al., 2013).  Finally, the AMP shows expected dissociation from 
explicit measures, such as in being less susceptible to self-presentational motivations (Payne et 
al., 2008; replicated by Open Science Collaboration, 2015).  This body of evidence strongly 
supports the status of the AMP as an implicit measure.  
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However, given that the present set of studies claims to provide novel evidence for faster 
revision of implicit impressions than some prior theories have posited, the operating 
characteristics of the responses measured by the AMPs used in these studies is of particular 
importance, and warrants independent empirical investigation.  If the revision in prior 
reinterpretation work is relatively more explicit than currently argued and assumed, it may recast 
the theoretical meaning of the findings, making it less clear the degree to which they show 
evidence of implicit revision.  If, on the other hand, revision from reinterpretation is implicit, the 
findings contribute to the theoretical literature on revision, and also speak to the practical 
possibilities of reversing implicit first impressions.  In this Chapter, I directly test the 
implicitness of revision from reinterpretation.    
The impetus for undertaking an independent empirical test of the automaticity features of 
the AMP was a novel, anomalous observation that I recently detected with my colleagues in the 
distributions of AMP data in the earlier studies reported in this package, described in the next 
section.  
II. Novel observation of anomalous distributions in prior studies 
  The critique raised by Bar-Anan and Nosek (2012), in suggesting that AMP effects may 
be driven largely by a subset of participants who intentionally rated the primes rather than the 
pictograph targets, focused on their finding that the high reliability and robust priming effects of 
the task were dependent on the subset of participants who agreed after the task that they had at 
least sometimes intentionally rated the primes (see discussion above of rebuttal by Payne et al., 
2013).  They did not discuss any evidence of unusual distributions in the AMP data. 
 In a survey of prior work reported in this package, however, an unusual and persistent 
pattern was detected in the frequency distributions of the AMP results.  In the aggregate, the 
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pattern is most stark: Figure 19 shows how, pooling across Studies 1a and 2-9 (which feature the 
Francis West paradigm in its original form) the proportion of pictographs judged to be more 
pleasant than average at Time 1 (before the final information about Francis West) has a zero-
inflated, bimodal distribution on trials in which Francis West is the prime stimulus, but not on 
trials in which a control face is the prime stimulus.18  In other words, after learning that Francis 
West had broken into his neighbors’ homes and caused destruction, many participants judged all 
(i.e., 20 out of 20 trials) pictographs on trials with Francis West as the prime to be less pleasant 
than average. 
  
 
                                                
18 Though Study 11 featured a version of the Francis West paradigm, it was substantively 
different from the other 9 studies in that there were different types of control trials and a new set 
of faces.  For this reason, it will be discussed separately, and not included in the pooled analysis 
reported here. 
 225 
Figure 19. Frequency distributions of the proportion of pictographs judged to be more pleasant 
than average at Time 1 by prime stimulus, pooled across information conditions and experiments 
(Studies 1a and 2-9). 
  
Though the distribution of pleasantness proportions on Francis West trials is visually 
quite bimodal, bimodality can also be quantified using statistics like Hartigan’s dip test (Hartigan 
& Hartigan, 1985), which tests the size of the maximum deviation of the experimental 
distribution from a unimodal distribution that minimizes that maximum deviation, and which has 
been recommended in social cognition research for formal tests of bimodality (Freeman & Dale, 
2012; Hehman, Stolier, & Freeman, 2014). The pooled pleasantness proportions on Francis West 
trials, as displayed on the right side of Figure 15, do indeed show significant evidence of 
bimodality using this test, D = .066, p < .001, and non-normality, Shapiro-Wilk W = .942, p < 
.001.  However, importantly, this statistical test of bimodality is not appropriate for use in 
assessing bimodality in the present experiments, because the interval (rather than truly 
continuous) nature of the data produce false positives on the dip test. Because most of the studies 
in this investigation include 20 trials per prime type, pleasantness proportions for Francis West 
can only take on values between 0 and 1 in intervals of .05, and no values in-between. The 
accumulation of scores at these values tends to register as a deviation from unimodality even if 
the distribution used to generate those values is normal.  To demonstrate this, I drew 5000 
random values from a normal distribution and then grouped them into 21 equal-width bins (to 
simulate the 21 values that a proportion can take between 0 and 1 in increments of .05). These 
bins are presented in Figure 20. Although the underlying distribution of raw values does not 
significantly deviate from normality (W = .9997, p = .714) or unimodality (D = .003, p = 1), the 
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binned distribution is neither normal (W = .988, p < .001) nor unimodal (D = .070, p < .001) 
according to the tests. These tests, then, cannot be used to sort out whether a given AMP 
distribution is bimodal, which will be particularly problematic in subsequent studies in this 
chapter that attempt to eliminate the bimodality – the dip test cannot be used to determine if 
those efforts are successful.  As such, simple visual inspection will be used, and frequency 
distributions will be regularly presented below for this purpose. 
 
Figure 20. Values randomly drawn from a normal distribution split into 21 bins, which 
Hartigan’s dip test registers as multimodal. 
 
 A similar, but opposite pattern of bimodality emerged at Time 2 (after the final 
information about Francis West) in the fire rescue condition; in that condition, across studies 
there emerged a second mode at ceiling (1), such that many participants judged all pictographs 
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on Francis West trials to be more pleasant than average after learning that Francis West was a 
heroic figure (Figure 21). 
 
 
Figure 21. Frequency distribution of the proportion of pictographs judged to be more pleasant 
than average on trials in which Francis West is the prime stimulus at Time 2 in the Fire Rescue 
condition, pooled across experiments (Studies 1a and 2-9). 
 
 Some evidence for this bimodal pattern emerged not just in the aggregate, but within each 
study as well. Figure 22 shows the distributions of the frequencies in Studies 1a and 2-9 in the 
fire rescue condition at Time 2, after Francis has been revealed to be a hero.  
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Figure 22. Frequency distributions of the proportion of pictographs judged to be more pleasant 
than average on trials in which Francis West is the prime stimulus at Time 2 in the Fire Rescue 
condition, Studies 1a and 2-9.  
  
 Likewise, there are collections of responses near floor (0) and ceiling (1) in Study 12, 
which examined stereotypical and counter-stereotypical implicit impressions of the professions 
of novel men and women (Figure 23) and similar quirks in the distributions of responses to Frank 
West in Study 11’s examination of the interaction of individuating information and race at both 
Time 1 (Figure 24) and Time 2 (Figure 25). Frequency distributions did not appear idiosyncratic 
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in the examination of implicit impressions of a big-game hunter in Study 10, however (Figure 
26).  
 
Figure 23. Frequency distributions of the proportion of pictographs judged to be more related to 
doctors (vs. nurses) than average in Study 12, by prime stimulus and information condition. 
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Figure 24. Frequency distributions of the proportion of pictographs judged to be more pleasant 
than average at Time 1 in Study 11, by prime stimulus and race of Frank. 
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Figure 25. Frequency distributions of the proportion of pictographs judged to be more pleasant 
than average on trials in which Frank West is the prime stimulus at Time 2 in Study 11, by 
information condition and race of Frank. 
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Figure 26. Frequency distributions of the proportion of pictographs judged to be more pleasant 
than average on trials in which Knowlton (the big-game hunter) is the prime stimulus in Study 
10, by time and podcast condition. 
 
 The observation of bimodality in many of these distributions raises fresh concerns about 
whether the AMP effects presented as evidence of implicit updating in these lines of work truly 
provide evidence for shifts in implicit responses, or instead reflect some degree of explicit 
(intentional) judgments.  The reason why this observation is potentially problematic is that 
bimodality in a distribution is often assumed to reflect the operation of distinct processes in the 
generation of the data (Freeman & Dale, 2012). In the case of zero-inflated distributions with 
count data, bimodality may occur when one process governs whether a case will be zero or not-
zero (e.g., a decision about whether to participate in a game or not participate), and a separate 
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process governs the distribution of scores that are not-zero (e.g., how many points are scored by 
a person who does choose to play; see, e.g., Chester & DeWall, 2017). In aggregate group data 
such as what I presented above, the bimodality can also reflect two overlapping subgroups; for 
example, the raw distribution of a dependent variable may be bimodal after a strong 
manipulation (e.g., self-reported happiness in a sample of participants in which half received an 
electric shock and the other half received a $10,000 check). Along these lines, in the case of the 
AMP distributions in the studies reported here, the bimodality could conceivably be produced 
through two processes: (1) Participants who choose to disregard the instructions and explicitly 
judge the primes will show floor effects when Francis is negative (Time 1) and ceiling effects 
when Francis is positive (Time 2 in the fire rescue condition), and (2) the group of participants 
who follow the instructions will show a more normal distribution of scores away from the floor 
and ceiling.  The presence of both processes in the data would produce the bimodal pattern from 
two overlapping distributions. Only for the latter set of participants are the responses being 
measured toward the primes implicit under the usual criterion of unintentional (Ferguson, 2007; 
Ferguson & Fukukura, 2012; Payne et al., 2008).  
 This bimodal pattern need not guarantee two distinct generative processes, however, or 
necessitate that one generative process is intentional and another unintentional.  It is possible that 
this distribution reflects an unusual pattern in the underlying responses that participants have to 
the materials, rather than that a subset of participants fail to follow the instructions on the task. 
At both Time 1 and Time 2, the AMP may be detecting that participants tend to fall into only 
partially overlapping groups; for example, at Time 1, participants may either have a very strong 
negative reaction to the story about Francis or a mild one (perhaps from reminding themselves 
that the study is fictional and the character fake, or due to suspecting a positive ulterior motive to 
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be revealed later), with few participants falling in-between these “camps.”  At Time 2 in the fire 
condition, participants may be similarly divided into groups: some may have powerfully positive 
feelings toward him (and thus respond near ceiling), while others have a milder reaction – 
perhaps again due to the fictional nature of the story, or from being “hung up” on a detail about 
Francis carelessly stepping on the family cat in the course of saving the children. There may be 
relatively few people who have a view of Francis (or the impression targets in the other studies) 
that falls genuinely in-between. This explanation, of course, requires extra work to account for 
why bimodality is not observed on explicit evaluations (as it is not; floor effects prevail before 
the heroic detail, and ceiling effects after). It is possible that participants feel compelled to 
express an evaluation of Francis consistent with the clear suggestion of the story, even if their 
private feelings are more variable – with the latter being detected by the AMP, given its reduced 
susceptibility to self-expression motives (Payne et al., 2008).19 
 A related question pertains to why this pattern occurs in most (but not all) of the present 
studies but has not been reported in other work using the AMP.  Explanations for the apparent 
novelty of this pattern among AMP studies fall into multiple camps as well; it could be that the 
pattern is present in other studies but has gone unnoticed, or unreported for lack of clear 
explanation. If it is not present in other work, this could be because a) the demand characteristics 
in these experiments – with relatively extreme information – are particularly pronounced relative 
to other studies, leading some number of participants to willfully disregard the instructions, or b) 
                                                
19 The IAT in Study 1b did not show a bimodal pattern, but differs from the AMP in a number of 
ways, including that it is a relative measure of implicit evaluations of Francis vs. control faces. A 
parallel distribution on the AMP would be the difference scores of the pleasantness proportions 
for Francis West and control faces; these distributions of difference scores are not as consistently 
bimodal. 
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underlying implicit impressions of the novel targets in this paradigm genuinely fall into this 
unusual distribution, but take more normal distributions in other lines of work. 
 These various interpretations of the bimodal distributions are, of course, only speculative. 
For this reason, the analyses and additional studies in Chapter IV will focus on providing 
empirical evidence for the implicitness of some of the key effects described in earlier sections 
(Chapters II-III).  I begin with additional analyses of earlier studies, which aim to provide some 
initial evidence for whether the bimodal distributions are likely to be the product of intentional 
judgments of the primes, before moving to additional experiments. 
III. Reanalysis of earlier studies 
Are participants near floor/ceiling still affected by qualities of the pictographs? 
 A unique feature of Study 8, which fit a multinomial model to aggregate AMP data 
within three information conditions (Payne et al., 2010), is that two sets of pictographs were used 
that had been preselected to be inherently more pleasant (pleasant set) or less pleasant 
(unpleasant set) than most other pictographs, based on pilot data. This was a requirement of the 
AMP multinomial model, but also affords an additional analytic opportunity: the participants 
with the most target-dependent extremity in their AMP responses to Francis West can be 
checked for evidence of any influence of the pictograph valence group on their responses. If 
these participants were intentionally rating the primes instead of the pictographs, then the 
(relatively subtle) variation in average pleasantness among the pictographs would not be 
expected to impact their responses. If such participants were following the instruction to attempt 
to rate the pictographs, however, and their large priming effects reflect genuine implicit 
impressions that are misattributed to the pictographs, then the qualities of the pictographs 
themselves should contribute to their responses. 
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 Visual inspection of the frequency distributions in each information condition and time 
point (before – Time 1, and after – Time 2, the final information) suggested that excluding 
participants with proportions of pleasant responses on Francis West trials less than or equal to .1 
at Time 1 or Time 2 in the control information condition, and greater than or equal to .9 at Time 
2 in the fire rescue and negate + replace conditions, visually corrected the distributions.  A 
reanalysis of the factorial ANOVA from that experiment – 2 (Time: Time 1, Time 2) x 2 (Prime 
Person: Francis West, Control Faces) x 2 (Pictograph Valence: Positive, Negative) x 3 
(Information Condition: Control, Fire Rescue, Negate + Replace) – on solely the 88 
participants20 who would be excluded based on one of these criteria replicated the main effect of 
pictograph valence, F(1, 85) = 8.17, p = .005, ηp2 = .088.  This demonstrates that participants 
with extreme reactions to Francis West, thereby contributing to the bimodal patterns, still show 
an overall impact of the qualities of the pictographs on their responses. This makes it unlikely 
that they are exclusively evaluating only the primes. 
Do revision effects emerge when excluding participants near floor/ceiling? 
 Another approach to assessing the robustness of revision effects to the exclusion of 
participants who may potentially be responding to the primes in an intentional manner is to re-
run analyses while dropping participants with extreme scores, in the bimodal tails.  This strategy 
is problematic in that it will also discard data from participants who are performing the task as 
intended and show the strongest effects, and reduces power; it can thus be considered a 
particularly conservative test. 
 To follow this route while keeping statistical power as high as possible given the extreme 
nature of this strategy, I reexamined revision effects in the Francis West paradigm in a pooled 
                                                
20 Of these 88, 37 (42%) met the criteria at both Time 1 and Time 2, 31 (35%) met the criteria 
solely at Time 1, and 20 (23%) met the criteria solely at Time 2.  
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dataset of all participants included in Studies 1a and 2-9 while modeling the effects of 
experiment (Time 2 Fire Rescue distributions shown previously in Figure 22).  Specifically, I ran 
a mixed linear model using the SPSS linear mixed procedure, including only participants with 
Francis West pleasantness proportions between .1 and .9 (exclusive). Fixed factors included 
Time, Prime Type, Information Condition, and all of their interactions.  To examine the 
robustness of the most critical comparison between the fire rescue (reinterpretation) and subway 
rescue (heroic but non-reinterpretation) conditions, only these information conditions were 
included. Time and Prime Type were repeated measures with an unstructured covariance matrix. 
A random effect captured variation across experiments in the critical 3-way interaction between 
time, prime type, and information condition. 
 Even on this subset of participants, the 3-way interaction was significant, indicating 
differential revision between the fire rescue and subway rescue conditions, F(1,33.18) = 6.59, p 
= .015. Simple effects tests showed that Francis West was more negative than control faces at 
Time 1 in both information conditions (both ps < .001); at Time 2, Francis West remained 
significantly less positive (M = .52, SD = .17) than control faces in the subway condition (M = 
.58, SD = .19), F(1,37.94) = 11.58, p = .002, but Francis West had become significantly more 
positive (M = .58, SD = .16) than control faces (M = .53, SD = .16) in the fire rescue condition, 
F(1,27.23) = 35.10, p < .001.  There was no evidence of significant variance in the effect 
attributable to experiment, Wald Z = .716, p = .474.21  This shows that the Francis West revision 
effect does not depend on participants in the extreme tails of the distributions, and that the nature 
                                                
21 All of these results are equivalent if Experiment is treated as a fixed factor fully crossed with 
the other three and/or if only the three experiments that included both the fire rescue and subway 
rescue conditions are included (to equate cell sizes), all ps < .05. 
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of the new information (whether or not it prompts reinterpretation) continues to critically matter 
even when setting aside participants with extreme scores on the AMP. 
Do participants near floor/ceiling differ in other identifiable ways? 
 If participants who have extreme scores toward Francis West on the AMP (low 
proportions of “pleasant” trials when Francis is negative and high proportions when he is 
positive) are systematically different from other participants in their strategy for approaching the 
task – such as by being more likely to have chosen to deliberately judge the primes instead of the 
targets – then it might be possible to detect other differences between those with extreme scores 
and those with less extreme scores.  After all, if these participants are not following the task 
instructions, then their reasons for doing so could also lead to differences on other measures. 
Were such participants confused? Were they less careful in reading the materials (including 
instructions) presented during the study? Explicit measures included in the various experiments 
provide opportunities to test for clues.  For example, participants in the extremes of the 
distributions – if they are “intentional responders” – might report that they found the task more 
confusing, or might score worse on comprehension checks if they were less attentive overall.  If 
participants with more extreme scores are not so different from other participants in their 
approach to the experiment, on the other hand, then differences on other measures may be less 
likely (though could still occur to the degree that those differences are causally related to 
variance in implicit impressions, rendering findings of significant differences inconclusive). 
 To look for differences between participants with extreme scores (falling into the bimodal 
tails) and the rest of the sample with high power, I pooled all participants from the 7 experiments 
dealing with the basic Francis West effect discussed above that included the AMP as well as 
explicit questionnaire items of potential interest (Studies 1a, 2-6, and 9). Based on examinations 
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of distributions across multiple studies, participants were classified as contributing to bimodality 
if their proportion of pleasant responses on Francis West trials at Time 1 was less than or equal 
to .1, if their proportion at Time 2 in the control information condition was less than or equal to 
.1, if their proportion at Time 2 in the fire rescue condition was greater than or equal to .9, or if 
their proportion at Time 2 in the subway rescue condition was less than or equal to .1 or greater 
than or equal to .9 (as this condition had signs of additional modes at floor and ceiling). Point-
biserial correlations were calculated between this bimodality indicator and 12 self-report 
measures: confusion with the study (all studies), extent of thinking about the story (Studies 1a 
and 2), difficulty making sense of the story (Studies 1a and 2), perfect comprehension 
performance (all studies), change in meaning of the earlier story (Studies 4-5), whether thoughts 
came together quickly vs. gradually (Study 4), deliberation extent (Studies 4-5), belief that the 
story was real (Studies 6 and 9), positive mood (studies 6 and 9), recall score (Study 9), extent of 
thinking back to the new information after relieving cognitive load (Study 3) and extent of 
thinking back to the old information after relieving of cognitive load (Study 3). 
 Only two correlations were significant. Participants in the bimodal tails were more likely 
to be in a good mood at the end of the experiment, r(446) = .11, p = .019, and reported more 
extensively thinking back to the new information after relieving cognitive load in Study 3, r(246) 
= .128, p = .044.  The interpretation of the former relationship seems unclear, and the latter 
would seem to suggest that people with more extreme scores were being more attentive to the 
procedures. No other correlation involving the bimodality indicator was significant, all ps > .16.    
Can the distributions be modeled in terms of component AMP processes? 
 As noted briefly in an earlier section, though the bimodal distributions are unusual, and 
could be consistent with a subset of participants responding intentionally to the primes, it is 
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possible that the bimodality stems from the distribution of underlying evaluations of the primes, 
even if no intentional responding is present.  The AMP process model (presented in Study 8) 
offers one way to conceptualize the different processes that underlie any given response on the 
AMP that might contribute to the distribution of overall scores on the task. The M parameter 
models the likelihood that whatever response the participant has to the prime will be expressed 
toward the pictograph, while the A parameter captures the likelihood that the prime will activate 
a positive response, and finally the P parameter indicates the likelihood that the response to the 
pictograph will be pleasant in the absence of misattribution.  Intentional responding would most 
likely entail a high value for the M parameter, as the likelihood that impressions of the prime will 
guide judgments of the pictograph are high in that case.  The alternative that the distribution of 
reactions to the primes are not normally distributed would, on the other hand, likely be evidenced 
by a bimodal distribution of the A parameter. Additionally, pooling at the extremes of the 
distributions of AMP pleasantness proportions might be more likely to occur if M and A are 
correlated; this seems plausible in that a participant with a stronger reaction to the Francis West 
prime may have increased likelihood of misattribution, even if they are attempting to only judge 
the pictograph targets. 
 To examine these possibilities, I reanalyzed the results of Study 8 to fit an AMP 
multinomial model to the data from each participant separately. The main analysis in Study 8 fit 
a single model to the aggregate data from all participants within each information condition, to 
be consistent with common practice (Payne et al., 2010; see also Conrey et al., 2005; Sherman et 
al., 2008) and because models fit on individual participant data can be high in noise. 
Nonetheless, the distributions of the resulting fit parameters could add insight in addressing the 
underlying sources of the bimodality in the AMP distributions.  
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 For each participant, there are 8 trial cells, from crossing the levels of Time (2), Prime 
Type (2), and Pictograph Valence (2), allowing for a maximum of 7 model parameters. I tested 
two alternative models: 
Model 1. 
 4 A parameters (one per prime type per time, across pictograph valence) 
 1 M parameter (across pictograph valence, time, and prime type) 
 2 P parameters (one per pictograph valence, across time and prime type) 
Model 2. 
 3 A parameters (one for control faces across time, and two for Francis West, at Time 1 
and 2, across pictograph valence) 
 2 M parameters (on per time, across prime type and pictograph valence) 
2 P parameters (one per pictograph valence, across time and prime type) 
 
Model 2 was not able to reproduce the experimentally observed patterns in the data, so Model 1 
was selected (Palminteri, Wyart, & Koechlin, in press).  Model 1 generated predicted data that 
reproduced all experimentally observed patterns in the AMP data in Study 8 (Figure 27), and 
also reproduced the patterns of bimodality in predicted Time 1 data (Figure 28) and predicted 
Time 2 data (Figure 29). 
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Figure 27. Predicted AMP results from multinomial model fit to individual participant data, 
which reproduce the results of Study 8. Error bars are standard errors. 
 
Figure 28. Frequency distributions of the predicted proportions of pictographs judged to be more 
pleasant than average at Time 1 by the AMP model, by prime type. 
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Figure 29. Frequency distributions of the predicted proportions of pictographs judged to be more 
pleasant than average at Time 2 by the AMP model, by prime type and information condition. 
 
 Analysis of fitted model parameters.  Across the sample of 310 participants, the 
participant-level models had adequate fit (indicated by a non-significant p-value), with an 
average p-value of .167 (SD = .164). The distributions of A parameters were markedly bimodal, 
both at Time 1 (Figure 30) and Time 2 (Figure 31). The M parameter was bimodal in the control 
information condition and more weakly so in the other two (Figure 32).   
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Figure 30. Frequency distributions of the A parameters fit by the AMP model at Time 1, by 
Prime Type. 
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Figure 31. Frequency distributions of the A parameters fit by the AMP model at Time 2, by 
Prime Type and Information Condition. 
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Figure 32.  Frequency distributions of the M parameters fit by the AMP model, by Information 
Condition. 
 
There were strong correlations between the M parameter and the A parameters 
corresponding to evaluations of Francis West, suggesting that participants with more extreme 
responses to the primes co-occurred with a higher likelihood of that response influencing 
ultimate judgments of the pictograph. At Time 1, there was a negative correlation between the M 
parameter and the A parameter for Francis West, r(308) = -.526, p < .001 (but no relationship 
with the A parameter for the control faces, r(308) = -.042, p = .459). At Time 2, in the control 
condition, the relationship between M and the A parameter for Francis West was similarly 
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negative, r(308) = -.462, p < .001. In the fire rescue condition, on the other hand, the relationship 
between M and the A parameter for Francis West was positive, r(308) = .575, p < .001; the same 
was true in the negate + replace condition, r(308) = .365, p < .001. In sum, for participants with 
stronger negative reactions to Francis West when he was believed to be bad and more positive 
reactions to him when he was believed to be good, the likelihood of responding to the pictograph 
based on the prime was higher, compounding to produce many participants with AMP 
proportions near floor or ceiling.  
These fitted parameters, which were able to reproduce all of the patterns in the data, 
suggest that bimodality in evaluative reactions to the primes is capable of producing the 
experimentally-observed AMP patterns even when the distribution of the likelihood of 
misattribution is less unusual overall, at least in the fire rescue and negate + replace conditions. 
Furthermore, a correlation between the intensity of evaluative reactions to the primes and the 
likelihood of misattributing those reactions to the pictographs – even when honestly attempting 
to judge only the pictographs – is an intuitively plausible pattern, even if no participant in the 
sample is intentionally judging the primes rather than the pictographs. 
 The additional analyses conducted in this section collectively argue against the possibility 
that the bimodal patterns observed in the AMP data are produced (at least solely) by a subset of 
participants who choose to disregard the task instructions and intentionally rate the prime images 
instead of the pictographs, and also demonstrate that the critical analyses are robust to the 
exclusion of participants with extreme scores falling into the tails of these distributions. 
However, additional empirical data is necessary to more firmly test the implicitness assumptions 
of the AMP as used in the current work. It is to these studies that I now turn. 
IV. Additional studies to test implicitness 
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To bolster the case for the implicit nature of the revision effects found in earlier studies, a 
number of additional experiments will be presented that approach the question in different ways. 
Following one of the critical experiments reported by Payne and colleagues (2013; Study 3), 
Studies 13 and 14 will reproduce two central effects from earlier studies while offering 
participants the option to skip any trial during the AMP on which they felt their impending 
response to the pictograph might be influenced by the prime face image. To the extent that 
participants skip few trials and still show evidence of priming effects on the non-skipped trials, 
the argument that participants are intentionally rating the primes online during the task is 
counter-indicated. Such persistent effects speak not just to the unintentional nature of the 
measured responses to the primes, but also to lack of participant awareness of such influence. 
This is arguably better evidence for lack of intentional responding to the primes than post-hoc 
survey questions that are open to confabulation (Payne et al., 2013). Importantly, if bimodality is 
detected even when the skip option is offered, it supports the proposal that this pattern is caused 
by something other than intentional responding. 
Study 15 will then make use of a technique proposed by Gawronski and Ye (2015) for 
decoupling post-hoc reports of intentional responding (whether accurate or confabulated) from 
priming effects on the AMP. This study will provide participants in the Francis West procedure 
with a distracting secondary task to perform while completing the AMP that is meant to draw 
their attention away from the identity of the prime faces (Francis West or unknown control 
faces), so as to assess whether the priming effects emerge in the same direction even when no 
longer related to self-reported intentional responding. Because of the taxing nature of the 
distraction, this study will also add further evidence of the effects of cognitive load on implicit 
revision (see Study 3). 
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Finally, Studies 16 and 17 will add an additional, forceful “warning” page to the 
instructions of the AMP to strongly discourage participants from intentionally rating the primes 
during the task. These studies examine the impact of this warning on the distributions of 
responses on the task as well as the prime effect within the control, fire rescue (reinterpretation), 
and subway rescue (non-reinterpretation positive action) information conditions (see Study 2), 
with a particular focus on whether the critical difference between the fire rescue and subway 
rescue conditions continues to emerge even with this warning.  
Study 13: Awareness of Influence: An Option to Skip – I 
Bar-Anan and Nosek (2012) raised the possibility that on the AMP – the implicit measure 
used in most of the work on fast implicit impression revision, including studies in the present 
work (Cone, Mann, & Ferguson, in press) – a large portion of the priming effect could be driven 
by intentional evaluation of the primes, because effect sizes on the AMP correlated with self-
reported extent of intentionally rating the primes (when it is the pictographs, and not the primes, 
that participants are instructed to judge). Payne and colleagues (2013) found, however, that such 
a correlation was probably based on some post hoc realization on the part of participants that 
there had been a systematic relationship between the primes and their responses through the 
course of the task. For instance, such participants were also simultaneously more likely to 
endorse the idea that they had been unintentionally influenced by the primes (suggesting that 
they might endorse any plausible theory connecting the primes and responses to which the 
researchers drew their attention), showed very different patterns of responding when they were 
explicitly instructed to rate the primes, and showed little awareness of being influenced by the 
primes at a more sensitive trial-by-trial level. These results indicate that overall, the AMP 
measured unintentional evaluations, and perhaps even that participants are unaware of the 
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influence of the primes on the pictographs on a trial-by-trial basis, because they generally did not 
avail themselves of an option to skip trials on which they felt the prime was influencing their 
feelings toward the pictograph, and having this option available did not reduce the priming 
effect. It may be that only in hindsight (when the correlation between their responses and the 
primes on the trials is clear in the aggregate) that inferences of intentional responding develop. 
 The fast revision work, however, is very different from that of Payne et al. (2013) in that 
it directly provides participants with strong reasons to change their mind about a target person 
that serves as the critical prime on the task, whereas the primes used in the work of Payne and his 
colleagues were members of established social groups about whom the participants did not learn 
new information during the course of the study. The information presented in the fast revision 
studies, which shows that a prior impression of an individual was highly inaccurate, could 
provide participants with a particularly strong incentive to exert explicit control over their 
responses on the AMP. This would suggest that “implicit” revision effects might actually reflect 
some degree of explicit responding, which would undercut the theoretical contribution of the 
reinterpretation findings. I expected, however, that reinterpretation changes the unintentional 
impression of the target person that is primed. These competing possibilities promote very 
different ways of viewing the efficacy of fast revision effects; do these manipulations only 
overturn the effects of a rejected first impression when participants are motivated to explicitly 
regulate their responses, or do they generalize to cases in which person impressions truly operate 
implicitly? 
 To test these different possibilities, I adapted a version of the study discussed above 
(Payne et al., 2013, Study 3) in which participants were provided with an option to skip any trial 
of the implicit measure when they felt that their response to the pictograph would be influenced 
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by the prime that came before it. I predicted that if positive reinterpretation of seemingly 
negative initial behaviors produced a revised implicit impression of the target, then I would 
continue to observe a priming effect comparable to when no option to skip trials is available. 
Alternatively, if explicit evaluation of the primes is the primary reason for a strong revision 
effect on the measure, then I should observe that the availability of the “skip” option reduces or 
eliminates the priming effect, because those participants who for whatever reason will not or 
cannot evaluate the pictographs and would otherwise evaluate the primes instead now have a 
legitimized way to proceed through the task without violating the instructions. Because my focus 
was on whether participants would intentionally evaluate the primes on the AMP after learning 
the fire rescue information, all participants were assigned to the reinterpretation (fire rescue) 
condition, and I administered the AMP only once in the current study, after that final information 
about Francis had been presented. 
Method 
 Participants. Fifty-nine students were recruited through a department subject pool in 
return for partial course credit (Mage = 19.61 years, SDage = 1.59 years, 13 men, 46 women) and 
randomly assigned to either the trial skip option or no trial skip option condition. 
 Learning task. After completing a short unrelated study, participants read through the 
story about Francis West used in the prior two studies. 
Participants were next told that they would now read some additional information about 
Francis West, and were all presented with the reinterpretation condition, learning that Francis 
had broken into the homes of his neighbors to save children from a fire. Participants were 
instructed to take at least 15 seconds to consider the new information, and then advanced to the 
next task at their own pace after at least that much time elapsed. 
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 Implicit measure. After participants learned the information about Francis West, I 
assessed implicit evaluations of him using an AMP similar to those used in the preceding studies. 
The specific instructions for this task varied depending on trial skip condition. 
No trial skip option condition. In this condition, participants completed the AMP using 
the conventional instructions, as in Studies 1 and 2. The AMP included 60 trials (30 with Francis 
West as the prime, and 30 with control faces as the prime).  
Trial skip option condition. Participants in the trial skip option condition completed the 
AMP in an identical manner to those in the no-skip condition, with one exception. Drawing on a 
similar condition in prior work (Payne et al., 2013, Experiment 3), I instructed participants that 
they should skip a trial, by pressing the spacebar, if they felt that the prime on that trial might be 
influencing their response to the pictograph. Specifically, they read: 
“IMPORTANT: If you ever think that your evaluation of any pictograph might be 
influenced by the photo that preceded it, you should pass on the trial by pressing the space 
bar. You should only evaluate the pictograph whenever you believe that your opinion reflects the 
qualities of the pictograph itself. Otherwise, please skip the trial whenever you feel your 
evaluation of the pictograph is being influenced by the photo that came before.” 
Each trial of the task contained a reminder on the bottom of the screen that the spacebar 
should be used to skip the trial if they felt influenced by the photo that preceded the pictograph. 
In every other regard, this condition was identical to the standard no-skip condition.  
Two sets of 60 pictographs drawn from prior work (Payne et al., 2005) were used in this 
study as target stimuli (regardless of skip option condition), with one set randomly assigned for 
each participant. Pictograph set had no effects in the analyses reported below.     
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Explicit attitude scale. After the AMP, participants completed the same six-item scale 
from the previous studies to assess their explicit attitude toward Francis West.  
Final questionnaire items. Finally, participants were asked whether they know 
Mandarin and/or Cantonese, to identify Francis West from the set of 11 face images presented 
during the study, to identify the final information they read about Francis West from a set of five 
short summaries, to provide their age and gender, and to give open-ended feedback regarding 
what they thought the study was about and any other comments they had. They were then 
debriefed, thanked, and compensated.  
Results 
 Data preprocessing. In accordance with established protocol for the AMP (Payne et al., 
2005), I excluded a priori 18 participants who speak Mandarin and/or Cantonese, as the 
pictographs would not be neutral for such participants. This left a final sample of 41 participants. 
However, because of the large number of exclusions due to language in this undergraduate 
sample (30.5%), I also chose to report (unplanned) analyses involving results for the full set of 
59 participants. All participants correctly identified Francis West from the set of 11 faces at the 
end of the study, and all but one participant correctly identified the final information they had 
read about Francis West. 
 Proportion of skipping on Francis vs. control trials. Overall, participants in the skip 
option condition opted to skip trials relatively infrequently.  In the restricted sample, participants 
skipped an average of 3.70 trials out of 60; in the full sample, they skipped an average of 3.89. 
Even so, if participants have any on-line subjective awareness of being influenced by the primes 
(whether intentionally or unintentionally), then they would nonetheless be expected to be more 
likely to skip trials with a Francis West prime than trials with a control prime, because the former 
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have stronger evaluative connotations than the latter. If, on the other hand, the misattribution 
account is correct, and participants attribute an evaluative response triggered by the Francis West 
prime as being generated by the pictograph itself, then participants may be equally likely to skip 
Francis West and control trials. They might, in fact, be more likely to skip control trials, in that 
those trials are more difficult given their lack of any subjective evaluative reaction to the targets 
(Payne et al., 2013).  
 The results suggest that participants lacked insight into being influenced by the Francis 
West prime, supporting the misattribution hypothesis. In the restricted sample, participants were 
directionally more likely to skip trials with control primes (M = 2.40 trials out of 30, SD = 4.03) 
than trials in which Francis West was the prime image (M = 1.30 trials out of 30, SD = 2.96), 
t(19) = 1.59, p = .128, Hedges’ gav = .30. In the full sample, this difference was significant 
(control primes: M = 2.57 trials, SD = 3.66; Francis West prime: M = 1.32 trials, SD = 2.70), 
t(27) = 2.423, p = .022, Hedges’ gav = .38. 
Implicit evaluations. I next compared implicit evaluations of Francis West (relative to 
control faces) in the skip and no-skip conditions. If participants lack insight into how the primes 
are influencing their responses to the targets, then having the option to skip should not decrease 
the size of the priming effect. For each participant, I calculated the proportion of trials on which 
the pictograph was judged to be more pleasant than average following the Francis West prime 
image, and a similar proportion for trials following control face images. For participants in the 
skip option condition, these proportions were calculated using the number of non-skipped trials.  
I analyzed these proportions in a 2 (Prime: Francis West, control faces) x 2 (Skip 
Condition: trial skip option, no trial skip option) mixed ANOVA, with the latter factor 
manipulated between-participants. There was a main effect of prime in both the restricted 
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sample, F(1,39) = 14.296, p = .001, η2p = .268, and full sample, F(1,57) = 11.296, p = .001, η2p = 
.165, such that pictographs were judged as pleasant more frequently on trials with Francis as the 
prime (restricted sample: M = .647, SD = .230; full sample: M = .632, SD = .228) than on trials 
with control primes (restricted sample: M = .449, SD = .189; full sample: M = .487, SD = .209). 
There was no main effect of skip condition in the restricted sample, F(1,39) = 2.087, p = .157, η2p 
= .051, or the full sample, F(1,57) = .182, p = .671, η2p = .003. The effect of prime was not 
moderated by skip condition in either the restricted sample, F(1,39) = .306, p = .584, η2p = .008, 
or the full sample, F(1,57) = .165, p = .686, η2p = .003. Simple effects tests found that the priming 
effect was significant in both the no-skip condition (restricted sample: F[1,39] = 5.341, p = .026, 
η2p = .120; full sample: F[1,57] = 4.599, p = .036, η2p = .075), and the skip-condition (restricted 
sample: F[1,39] = 9.167, p = .004, η2p = .190; full sample: F[1,57] = 6.753, p = .012, η2p = .106). 
Collectively, these findings suggest that the priming effect was not impacted by the availability 
of the skip option, suggesting that participants were not aware of, and could not exert control 
over, the misattribution of their evaluative responses from the primes to the targets.  
Bimodality.  As shown in Figure 33, despite the availability of the option to skip any trial 
in which the participant felt that their response to the target might be affected by the prime, the 
distribution of the proportion of pleasant responses on trials in which Francis West was the prime 
was still bimodal. 
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Figure 33.  Frequency distribution of the proportion of pictographs judged to be more pleasant 
than average on trials in which Francis West was the prime stimulus in Study 13, by skip option 
availability. Proportions were computed out of the total number of non-skipped trials. 
 
Explicit evaluations. Though the primary focus was on implicit evaluations, I also tested 
for the effect of skip option condition on explicit liking of Francis West. The six items in the 
liking scale cohered well (Cronbach’s α = .834 in the restricted sample, .870 with the full 
sample), and were thus averaged together to create a single score for explicit liking. Skip option 
condition had no effect on explicit liking in either the restricted sample, t(39) = .372, p = .712, 
Cohen’s d = .116, or the full sample, t(57) = 1.565, p = .123, Cohen’s d = .410. This suggests 
that having the skip option available on the AMP did not subsequently impact how participants 
deliberatively evaluated Francis West. Instead, he was explicitly liked on average, and 
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significantly so (above the scale midpoint of 4) in the restricted sample (M = 5.89, SD = .74), 
t(40) = 16.32, p < .001, and in the full sample (M = 5.79, SD = .85), t(58) = 16.15, p < .001. 
Discussion 
 In this study, participants who were encouraged to skip any trial on which they felt that 
their impression of the pictograph was biased by the prime only rarely invoked that option, were 
more likely to do so on control trials than on those featuring the target of the impression as a 
prime, and showed directionally larger priming effects compared to participants who were not 
provided with an option to skip trials (in fact, in the full sample this trend was significant). This 
suggests that participants were largely unaware of being influenced by the primes on a trial-by-
trial basis, which would preclude their ability to exert intentional control over the priming effect.  
The results thus supported the hypothesis that reinterpretation would produce a positive 
impression of the target which could implicitly influence responding – that is, without intention.  
In contrast, the results did not corroborate the alternative proposal that reinterpretation 
primarily affects explicit control over AMP responses, while leaving implicit impressions 
potentially unchanged. I note that although this study had a comparably small sample size, the 
sample was large enough to replicate the implicit preference for Francis West over control 
primes in the reinterpretation condition, even within the skip option and the no-skip conditions. 
Furthermore, a larger sample may well have found significantly more frequent skipping of 
control trials rather than Francis West trials, as I found in the full sample here, which would 
speak against the hypothesis that participants are aware of the influence of the Francis West 
prime on their impressions of the pictographs. Finally, I expected that if the AMP were truly 
driven by explicit responding in this paradigm, allowing participants to indicate this by skipping 
those trials would produce a rather large effect of the skip manipulation, which did not emerge. 
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 Importantly, the present results complement the studies in Chapters II-III in that they 
inform a different aspect of how reinterpretation impacts the impressions measured by the AMP. 
Though earlier studies dealt with the process operations that occur as a result of reinterpretation 
– both at the time of learning (negation + affirmation), and during responding (shifts in 
impression activation but not misattribution) – the current evidence speaks to the automaticity 
conditions under which those processes occur (like intentionality, awareness, and control; see, 
e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2014; Moors & De Houwer, 2006). By demonstrating that 
reinterpretation results in a positive impression of the target that can be impactful even when 
participants are able to skip any trial on which they believe the prime might be biasing their 
judgments of the pictograph, the results entail that the AMP is not capturing intentional 
responses to the primes; in fact, participants do not even seem to be aware of the prime effects 
while completing each trial. 
 The findings also add a point of clarity to the source of the bimodality observed in the 
distribution of the Francis West AMP pleasantness proportions.  By replicating the bimodal 
pattern (at Time 2 in the fire rescue condition) even when participants were offered – and 
encouraged to use – an easy way to avoid allowing the prime to influence their judgments in any 
way that they had conscious access to (whether through intentional responding or otherwise), this 
study suggests that the bimodal pattern may have emerged through the implicit misattribution 
mechanism that research has generally pointed to as the driving force behind AMP effects 
(Payne & Lundberg, 2014).  To gather more evidence to bolster this point, Study 14 offered 
participants a similar skip option on an AMP in the very different paradigm featured in Study 12, 
in which bimodal distributions were observed on a profession misattribution procedure (PMP; 
see Figure 23). 
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Study 14: Awareness of Influence: An Option to Skip – II 
Method 
 Participants.  Out of a targeted sample size of 400 (to achieve 200 participants per each 
between-participants condition), 398 participants completed the study. Two additional 
participants reported technical issues and were compensated for their participation, but generated 
no data. Out of the initial set of 398 participants, data from six participants were dropped for 
familiarity with Mandarin or Cantonese, and one additional participant was excluded for using a 
single key on every trial of the PMP. This left 391 participants for analyses (53.2% women, Age 
M = 36.67 years, SD = 11.61). 
 Procedure.  Participants completed a procedure similar to that from Study 12, in which 
information about two novel individuals (Jonathan and Elizabeth) is presented that either 
conforms to gender stereotypes of typical professions of men and women (Jonathan is a doctor 
and Elizabeth is a nurse) or defies gender stereotypes (Elizabeth is a doctor and Jonathan is a 
nurse). The two chief differences between Study 12 and the present study were that the 
procedure was greatly simplified, and that the skip option used in Study 13 was made available 
to all participants. 
 All participants were placed into the minimal information condition.  As in Study 12, 
they were first acquainted with Jonathan and Elizabeth and told that either individual might be 
the doctor or nurse. They were then assigned to the stereotypical or counter-stereotypical 
information condition, with the new information being presented on a single screen as done in 
the work by Cao and Banaji (2016), with the one exception being that the same faces used in 
Study 12 were again included.  The more immersive information condition from Study 12, in 
which participants were asked to imagine going through a medical emergency, was not included 
 260 
here. Furthermore, there was no manipulation of measure: All participants completed the PMP, 
rather than the IAT, so that the availability of an option to skip trials could be examined.  As in 
the previous study (Study 13), the PMP was modified to provide participants with the option to 
skip any trial in which they felt that the prime stimulus might influence their response to the 
pictograph, by pressing the space bar. That option appeared on-screen on every trial, along with 
the standard key labels of “More related to doctors” and “More related to nurses.”  
Results 
 Implicit impressions.  I assessed implicit impressions of the primes – Elizabeth, 
Jonathan, control women, and control men – as more associated with doctors vs. nurses by 
computing the proportion of non-skipped trials in which the pictograph was judged as more 
related to doctors (vs. nurses) within each prime type. These proportions were then analyzed in a 
4 (Prime Type: Elizabeth, Jonathan, Control Women, Control Men) x 2 (Information Condition: 
Stereotypical, Counter-stereotypical) mixed ANOVA, with prime type manipulated within-
participants. For this analysis, data for 3 participants were set aside, because they skipped every 
trial within at least one prime type, making the calculation of all 4 proportions impossible. 
 There was a significant main effect of prime type, F(3, 1158) = 20.55, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.051. This was qualified by a significant interaction between prime type and information 
condition, F(3,1158) = 51.88, p < .001, ηp2 = .118.  
 An examination of the simple effects showed that in the stereotypical information 
condition, in which Jonathan was revealed to be the doctor and Elizabeth was revealed to be the 
nurse, Jonathan was more implicitly associated with doctors (vs. nurses; M = .66, SD = .22) than 
Elizabeth (M = .40, SD = .23), t(168) = 8.86, p < .001, Hedges’ gav = 1.13.  Jonathan was also 
more associated with doctors than control men (M = .61, SD = .21), t(168) = 3.20, p = .002, 
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Hedges’ gav = .22.  However, Elizabeth was no more associated with doctors (vs. nurses) than 
control women (M = .42, SD = .22), t(168) = 1.37, p = .173, Hedges’ gav = .09.  Control men 
were more implicitly associated with doctors than control women, t(168) = 7.10, p < .001, 
Hedges’ gav = .912. 
 In the counter-stereotypical information condition, Elizabeth was more implicitly 
associated with doctors (vs. nurses; M = .60, SD = .23) than Jonathan (M = .49, SD = .25), t(218) 
= 4.11, p < .001, Hedges’ gav = .46.  Elizabeth was also more implicitly associated with doctors 
than control women (M = .51, SD = .21), t(218) = 5.15, p < .001, Hedges’ gav = .41.  Jonathan 
was less implicitly associated with doctors (thus, more implicitly associated with nurses) than 
control men (M = .52, SD = .21), t(218) = 2.16, p = .032, Hedges’ gav = .15.  Unlike in the 
stereotypical condition, control women and control men did not differ in their implicit 
association with doctors over nurses, t(218) =  .65, p = .515, Hedges’ gav = .07.  Figure 34 shows 
the proportion of pictographs judged to be more related to doctors (over nurses) within each 
condition. 
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Figure 34. The proportion of pictographs judged to be more related to doctors (over nurses), by 
prime type and information condition in Study 14. Error bars are standard errors. Proportions 
were computed using non-skipped trials. 
 
 Skip frequencies.  The proportion of trials that were skipped by each participant were 
computed within each prime type, and analyzed in a 4 (Prime Type: Elizabeth, Jonathan, Control 
Women, Control Men) x 2 (Information Condition: Stereotypical, Counter-stereotypical) 
ANOVA. There was a main effect of prime, F(3, 1167) = 10.91, p < .001, ηp2 = .027, which was 
not qualified by an interaction with information condition, F(3, 1167) = 1.02, p = .382, ηp2 = 
.003.  Participants skipped a higher proportion of trials that included Jonathan (M = .051, SD = 
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.137) or Elizabeth (M = .054, SD = .153) primes than trials with control men (M = .034, SD = 
.104) or control women (M = .034, SD = .105) as primes.  All differences in proportions between 
Jonathan and control trials, and Elizabeth and control trials, were significant (all ps < .01), but 
the proportions skipped did not significantly differ between Jonathan and Elizabeth, t(387) = 
.854, p = .394, Hedges’ gav = .02. 
 Bimodality.  As was the case in Study 13, once more, the availability of an option to skip 
any trials in which the participant felt that their response to the pictograph might be affected by 
the prime did not eliminate bimodality in the distributions (Figure 35).  For the proportion of 
pictographs judged as more related to doctors (vs. nurses) than average on Elizabeth and 
Jonathan trials in particular, the distributions appeared multimodal in both information groups. 
 
Figure 35.  Frequency distributions of the proportion of pictographs judged to be more related to 
doctors (vs. nurses) than average in Study 14, by prime type and information condition. 
Proportions were computed out of the total number of non-skipped trials. 
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Discussion 
 The implicit impressions of the professions of Jonathan and Elizabeth on the PMP 
replicated the results of Study 12, showing that responses to those two individuals corresponded 
to the individuating information about their professions. These results, then, constitute additional 
evidence for a divergence between implicit impressions assessed via a misattribution measure 
and the IAT.  Furthermore, the responses to the male and female control faces were also similar 
to Study 12, with implicit gender stereotyping in the stereotypical information condition but not 
in the counter-stereotypical information condition.  
 The findings of Study 14 also replicate the basic observation of bimodality in Study 13 in 
a different paradigm and using a different AMP-like task.  Although participants were provided 
with an option to skip the trial whenever they felt that their response to the pictograph might be 
influenced by the prime image that came before it, and were encouraged to use that option, 
pictograph judgments within prime types were bimodal, particularly for Jonathan and Elizabeth. 
Furthermore, skipping was once again infrequent, with only slightly more than 5% of trials with 
Jonathan or Elizabeth as the prime being skipped. The frequency distributions showed that 
extreme responses to Jonathan and Elizabeth tended to be consistent with the individuating 
information that had been presented about each individual. 
 Together, Studies 13 and 14 show that in two different experimental paradigms, one in 
which participants learn about a seemingly negative person who becomes heroic and another in 
which participants learn stereotypical or counter-stereotypical professions for two individuals, 
bimodal frequency distributions emerge, despite the presence of an easy way to avoid any 
consciously-available influence of the primes on the targets – whether intentional or otherwise. 
Furthermore, this persistence was found on two different versions of the AMP: The standard 
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version that measures evaluative impressions (Study 13) and a modified version that measures 
impressions of professions (Study 14). The findings thus span both evaluative and semantic 
applications of the misattribution procedure (Gawronski & Ye, 2014), suggesting that bimodality 
might be more broadly common with such tasks. Importantly, the persistence of the pattern 
despite the skip instructions and the low frequency of skipping in general (see also Payne et al., 
2013) best fits an interpretation of the bimodality as emerging under truly implicit misattribution, 
rather than a subset of participants eschewing the task instructions and intentionally rating the 
primes. 
Study 15: Attention to an Irrelevant Dimension 
 The preceding two experiments, coupled with the re-analyses of earlier data, begin to 
build the case that the bimodality in the distributions of the AMP data are not the result of 
participants intentionally rating the primes instead of the pictographs.  Study 15 takes a different 
approach to establishing the implicitness of the AMP results by giving participants an attention-
demanding distractor task to complete during the AMP that will divert attention away from the 
identities of the prime stimuli. 
 In light of the original concerns about the implicitness of the AMP raised by Bar-Anan 
and Nosek (2012), Gawronski and Ye (2015) tested whether the correlation between the AMP’s 
priming effect and self-reported intentional responding – whether due to post-hoc confabulation 
or accurate reporting – could be reduced or eliminated by giving participants a distracting task to 
complete during the AMP that would call their attention away from the relevant dimension of the 
primes.  This could helpfully reduce both true intentional responding by making it more likely 
that participants would respond intentionally based on the distractor task, and post-hoc 
confabulation of intentional responding to the critical prime dimension by making it more likely 
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that post-hoc inferences would instead be drawn about the distractor task that had occupied 
attention.  Gawronski and Ye (2015) found that when participants were asked to tally the primes 
based on their races, a priming effect of age persisted but was no longer correlated with post-hoc 
intentional responding reports; likewise, when participants were asked to tally the primes based 
on their ages, a priming effect of race persisted but was also no longer correlated with post-hoc 
intentional responding reports.  Self-reported intentional responding was instead only related to 
the dimension of the prime that was the focus of attention during the tally task. 
 Using a procedure adapted from the ideas presented in Gawronski and Ye (2015), Study 
15 modified the AMP during a Francis West study to provide a tallying task designed to distract 
participants from the identity of the primes (Francis vs. control faces). This allowed a test of 
whether the revision effect would persist on the AMP under conditions of distraction, informing 
both the spontaneous (implicit) nature of the effect and providing more information on its 
efficiency under cognitive load (see Study 3). Additionally, the relationship between self-
reported intentional responding and the Francis West priming effect, vs. priming based on the 
nature of the distractor task, can be examined.  
A final goal of Study 15 is to examine whether the bimodal frequency distributions 
persist under conditions of considerable distraction, with no strong predictions as to whether it 
would.  An elimination of the bimodality could occur if genuine intentional responding is 
curtailed, or if the load imposed by the distractor task reduces the priming effect; the latter would 
be consistent with work showing that processes often thought to be relatively automatic can be 
impaired by cognitive load (e.g., Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Wells, Skowronski, Crawford, Scherer, 
& Carlston, 2011). 
Method 
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 Participants.  I aimed to recruit 300 participants from Mechanical Turk to participate in 
the study, receiving 301 responses. A priori exclusions consisted of: 1 server error, 9 participants 
who knew Mandarin and/or Cantonese, 2 participants who used a single key on every trial of the 
AMP, 7 for failing a manipulation check, and 2 for indicating that they had previously 
participated in a study using the Francis West story or a highly similar one.  This left a final 
sample of 280 participants for analysis (52.9% women; Age M = 36.40 years, SD = 11.49). 
 Procedure.  The experiment reproduced the basic Francis West paradigm (Study 1), with 
participants asked to read the standard story about Francis West that conveyed him as performing 
seemingly negative actions by breaking into his neighbors’ homes.  All participants then viewed 
the fire rescue information at Time 2, revealing that Francis had broken into the homes to save 
two children form a fire.   
The modified AMP. The main differences between this study and the Francis West 
design from Chapter I dealt with the nature of the AMP, which was only administered once, at 
Time 2 (after the fire rescue information).  First, to attempt to make it less likely that participants 
would notice frequent appearances of Francis West during the task, which might lead them to 
construe the task as being about Francis, the number of trials on the AMP was increased from 40 
to 92, so that the number of Francis trials could remain similar to prior studies while allowing for 
Francis trials to be relatively infrequent. Francis appeared on 16 of the trials, with control faces 
on the remaining 76. 
Second, to implement a procedure similar to Gawronski and Ye (2015), it was necessary 
to introduce a new dimension to each prime stimulus orthogonal to the identity as Francis vs. a 
control face, as the tallying dimensions in prior work were orthogonal (age vs. race in sets of 
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the tallying dimension and the identity of the primes as Francis vs. a control face would risk 
keeping that prime dimension in the attention of participants, and also make it possible for 
reports of intentional responding to the dimension being tallied to introduce an artifactual 
correlation between those response reports and the critical prime effect. 
To address these issues, the AMP trials were modified such that each prime face image 
was partially occluded by a black-and-white icon of a smile or frown, appearing to the left or 
right of the face shown in the prime image (but not blocking the face).  Within the sets of Francis 
West and control face trials, 25% featured a smile icon on the left, 25% had a smile icon on the 
right, 25% had a frown icon on the left, and 25% had a frown icon on the right.  These icons 
appeared at the same time as the prime image and left the screen with the prime image.  The 
duration of the prime + icon was lengthened from the default 75ms to 200ms to give participants 
more time to view the icon.  The tallying task required participants to pay attention to these icons 
while carrying out the main task of judging the pleasantness of the pictograph. There were two 
versions of the tallying task, with participants randomly assigned to complete one or the other. In 
one version, participants were asked to keep track of the number of icons appearing on each side 
of the prime over the course of the task; in the other version, participants were asked to keep 
track of the number of icons with each expression (smile vs. frown) appearing over the course of 
the task. They were directly told to ignore the other dimension of the icons.  
The nature of the tally task was manipulated because it was unclear whether one would 
be more or less effective than the other. The dimensions featured in the tally task of Gawronski 
and Ye (2015) were social in nature (age and race), and it was possible that a relatively social 
tallying task (judging face-like expressions) would be a more effective distraction from the prime 
faces and/or could be necessary for preserving a strong main prime effect (Francis vs. control 
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faces) by keeping evaluation as a central focus of attention (Klauer & Musch, 2002; Spruyt, De 
Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 2007; cf., e.g., Ferguson, Bargh, & Nayak, 2005). On the other 
hand, because the smile-vs.-frown tallying task focused participants on a highly evaluative 
dimension besides the pictograph, there was some risk that it could interrupt misattribution of 
affect to the pictograph, so a left-vs.-right tallying task was also used as a precaution. The left vs. 
right tally task also supplemented another reason for introducing the variation in the side on 
which the icons appeared, which was to encourage participants to attend to the center of the 
prime image (the approximate location of the Francis/control face) in general given that they 
could not predict the side on which the icon would appear on any given trial.  
After completing the modified AMP, participants were asked to report the results of the 
tally. These were not analyzed given the lack of any a priori predictions regarding the 
implications of tallying accuracy or the size of errors on this task, but the question was included 
to validate the cover story.  
Explicit evaluations. Participants answered the same 6-item explicit liking scale 
employed in Study 1. Because of the central focus on implicit evaluations, analysis of the 
explicit scale is omitted in the present discussion. 
Reports of intentional and unintentional responding. Next, participants were asked 
two questions, one to obtain their belief about the extent to which they had intentionally judged 
the primes on the AMP, and the second to obtain their belief about the extent which their 
responses to the pictographs may have been unintentionally influenced by the primes (both 
adapted from Payne et al., 2013). To gauge intentional responding, participants were asked, 
“During the task in which you were asked to rate the pleasantness of the Chinese pictographs 
(symbols), did you intentionally rate the images of people or face icons instead of the symbols?” 
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and responded on the following 5-point scale: Not at all, I rated the symbols; Usually no; 
Sometimes, but not always; Usually yes; Yes, I rated the images of people or face icons. To 
assess reports of unintentional influence, participants were asked, “During the task in which you 
were asked to rate the pleasantness of the Chinese pictographs (symbols), were your ratings of 
the symbols unintentionally influenced by the images of people or face icons?” and responded on 
the following 5-point scale: Not at all; Usually no; Sometimes, but not always; Usually yes; Yes. 
On in the intentional responding question, if participants selected anything other than 
“Not at all, I rated the symbols”, they were presented with an intermediate page between these 
two questions that followed up on their report of intentional responding. On this page, they were 
asked to Agree or Disagree (dichotomous choice) with 7 potential reasons for responding 
intentionally, which had been drafted by the research team. They could agree with as few or as 
many of the 7 reasons as they liked: 
1) I found it more interesting to rate the images of people or face icons. 
2) I thought I was supposed to rate the images of people or face icons, not the Chinese 
pictographs. 
3) I tried to rate the Chinese pictographs, but kept rating the images that flashed beforehand by 
accident. 
4) I wanted to help the researchers find a connection between my responses and the images. 
5) I had too much trouble seeing the Chinese pictographs, so I rated the other images instead. 
6) I couldn’t pay enough attention to the Chinese pictographs while also trying to tally the face 
icons. 
7) It was easy to just press the key that was on the same side as the face icons. 
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 Secondly, participants were given an open-ended response box in which they could offer 
any additional reasons for which they might have intentionally judged the images of faces or 
icons instead of the pictographs, if not captured by the reasons available above. These open-
ended responses have not yet been systematically analyzed and coded, and so will not be 
discussed further here. 
Final questions. Participants were additionally asked two exploratory questions, one on 
how difficult they found the tallying task to be from 1 (Not at all difficult) to 7 (Extremely 
difficult) and one asking the extent to which they tried to keep an accurate tally of the face icons, 
from 1 (Did not try at all) to 7 (Tried as hard as I could).  They then answered the story 
comprehension questions from the studies in Chapter II, were asked to identify Francis West in 
photo array, identified the final information that they had learned about Francis from a set of 3 
choices, indicated if they had participated in a study using the Francis West story before, and 
provided demographic information. 
Results 
 Implicit evaluations.  The proportion of pictographs judged as more pleasant than 
average was computed for each participant within each cell of a 2 (Prime Type: Francis West, 
control faces) x 2 (Icon Expression: frown, smile) x (Icon Side: left, right) x 2 (Tally Task: 
expression, side) design. These proportions were analyzed within a mixed ANOVA, with the last 
factor manipulated between-participants and the rest manipulated within-participants. 
 A main effect of prime type obtained, F(1,278) = 13.18, p < .001, ηp2 = .045, such that 
Francis West was implicitly more positive (M = .58, SD = .21) than control faces (M = .54, SD = 
.14). This main effect was not qualified by interactions with tally instruction, F(1,278) = 1.82, p 
= .179, ηp2 = .006, icon expression, F(1,278) = .88, p = .349, ηp2 = .003, or icon side, F(1,278) = 
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.80, p = .372, ηp2 = .003.  There was a three-way interaction between prime, icon side, and icon 
expression, F(1,278) = 7.50, p = .007, ηp2 = .026, to be discussed below. The four-way 
moderation of that effect by tally instruction was not significant, F(1,278) = .825, p = .365, ηp2 = 
.003. 
 There were main effects of icon side, F(1,278) = 24.38, p < .001, ηp2 = .081, and icon 
expression, F(1,278) = 61.99, p < .001, ηp2 = .182, which were qualified by an interaction 
between the two, F(1,278) = 8.12, p = .005, ηp2 = .028.  Collectively, the interpretation of these 
effects is that pictographs were more likely to be judged as less pleasant when the face icon 
appeared on the left side (which was the location of the “less pleasant” response key) than the 
right side (the location of the “more pleasant” key), and that pictographs were more likely to 
judged as more pleasant than average when the accompanying face icon was smiling rather than 
frowning. However, the effect of side was stronger for frowning icons than smiling icons, and 
the effect of icon expression was stronger when the icons appeared on the left side (the side of 
the “less pleasant” key).  
 As previewed above, however, these effects were subsumed by a significant three-way 
interaction between prime, icon side, and icon expression.  This interaction was such that the 
prime effect (Francis vs. control faces) was strongest when the icon expression mismatched the 
side on which it appeared; in other words, Francis West was significantly more implicitly 
positive than control faces on trials in which a smiling icon appeared on the left side (with the 
“less pleasant” key), t(279) = 4.01, p < .001, Hedges’ gav = .252, or on trials in which a frowning 
icon appeared on the right side (with the “more pleasant” key), t(279) = 3.35, p = .001, Hedges’ 
gav = .211. The prime effect was smaller, though still significant, on trials in which smiling icons 
appeared on the right side, t(279) = 2.19, p = .029, Hedges’ gav = .149, and did not reach 
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significance on trials in which frowning icons appeared on the left side, t(279) = .621, p = .535, 
Hedges’ gav = .037. Figure 36 shows the AMP scores within each cell of the interaction between 
icon side, icon expression, and prime type. 
 
Figure 36. Proportion of pictographs judged more pleasant than average in Study 15, by icon 
side, icon expression, and prime type. Error bars are standard errors. 
 
 Bimodality.  As shown in Figure 37, the frequency distribution of AMP proportions on 
Francis West trials was far closer to normal than in prior studies, with only a somewhat fatter tail 
on the upper end of the distribution. The modifications made to the study seem to have been 
effective in altering that otherwise prominent pattern. 
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Figure 37. Frequency distribution of the proportion of pictographs judged to be more pleasant 
than average on trials in which Francis West was the prime image, in Study 15. 
 
 Self-reported intentional and unintentional influence.  I next turned to an analysis of 
the two questions asking participants to report, first, the degree to which their responses to the 
pictographs were intentionally affected by the prime faces that came before each, and second, the 
degree to which their responses had been unintentionally affected by those primes.  Mean 
unintentional responding (M = 2.54, SD = 1.20) was higher than mean intentional responding (M 
= 2.08, SD = 1.27), t(279) = 7.02, p < .001, Hedges’ gav = .370.  The two measures were strongly 
positively correlated, r(278) = .609, p < .001, which is consistent with the proposal that 
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intentionality reports after completing the AMP may represent post-hoc inferences, given that the 
same participants who report responding intentionality also report unintentional influence; 
awareness of some connection between the primes and their responses may prompt participants 
to make either inference when a plausible hypothesis to explain the connection is provided in the 
text of the question (Payne et al., 2013).   
 The intentionality and unintentionality reports were next examined for evidence of 
correlation with three difference-score measures tapping different priming effects within the 
AMP: the relative implicit positivity of Francis West vs. control faces, the relative implicit 
positivity of smiling icons vs. frowning icons, and the relative implicit positivity of icons 
appearing on the right side vs. icons appearing on the left side. Intentionality reports were 
correlated only with the implicit preference for smiling icons over frowning icons, r(278) = .325, 
p < .001, and not with implicit positivity of Francis West over control faces, r(278) = .052, p = 
.387, or with implicit evaluations of right-side icons over left-side icons, r(278) = .041, p = .496. 
Reported unintentional influence was correlated with implicit preference for smiling icons over 
frowning icons, r(278) = .238, p < .001, as well as implicit evaluations of Francis West vs. 
control faces, r(278) = .170, p = .004. These reports were not correlated with implicit right-side 
vs. left-side icon preference, r(278) = .081, p = .177. 
 I next ran a multiple linear regression analysis on implicit evaluations of Francis West vs. 
control faces, including both reported intentional and unintentional responding as predictors. 
This analysis showed a unique effect only of unintentional response reports, β = .220, t(277) = 
2.96, p = .003, and not intentional response reports, β = -.082, t(277) = 1.11, p = .269.   A 
separate regression using the same predictors but implicit preference for smiling vs. frowning 
icons found the opposite pattern, with a unique effect only of intentional response reports, β = 
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.287, t(277) = 4.01, p < .001, and not unintentional response reports, β = .063, t(277) = .88, p = 
.380.  
 Reported reasons for intentional responding.  If participants selected anything other 
than the lowest scale endpoint – “Not at all, I rated the symbols” – on the question asking 
whether they ever intentionally rated the faces during the AMP, they were then presented with 
seven possible reasons for such intentional responding and asked to select “agree” or “disagree” 
to indicate whether each reason contributed to their behavior on the task.  The levels of 
agreement with each reason (in descending order) among participants who indicated some 
intentional responding (53.21% of the total sample) were: Inability to pay enough attention to the 
pictographs while also tallying the face icons (63.1%), wanting to help the researchers find a 
connection between the responses and the images (57.7%), trying to rate the pictographs but 
judging the images that came before by accident (57.0%), finding the images of people or face 
icons more interesting to rate (36.2%), having too much trouble seeing the pictographs (35.6%), 
finding it easier to press the key on the same side as the face icon (21.5%), and thinking that the 
images of people or face icons were supposed to be rated (17.4%).  A series of point-biserial 
correlations testing for relationships between endorsement of each of these reasons and implicit 
preference for Francis West vs. control faces found that only one – reported reliance on the icon 
side in informing responses – was related to the implicit preference, but in the negative direction, 
r(147) = - .199, p = .015.  That is, to the degree that participants reported relying on the side of 
the screen on which the smiling/frowning icon appeared in determining their judgments on each 
trial of the AMP, the less implicitly positive Francis West was relative to control faces.  Implicit 
preference for smiling vs. frowning icons, on the other hand, was related to agreement with more 
of the reasons, including a desire to help the researchers, r(147) = .192, p = .019, difficulty 
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seeing the pictographs clearly, r(147) = .187, p = .022, and reliance on icon side, r(147) = .161, p 
= .05. Finally, implicit preference for right-side vs. left-side icons was (unsurprisingly) related 
only to reported reliance on icon side, r(147) = .236, p = .004. 
Discussion 
 The most central finding in Study 15 is that the revision effect of Francis West becoming 
more implicitly positive than control faces after participants learn the fire rescue revelation 
replicated under conditions of heavy distraction. Though a smaller effect than in the studies 
contained within Chapter II (which is perhaps not surprising given the taxing nature of attending 
to two running tallies over the course of the AMP), implicit preference for Francis West survived 
an elimination of bimodality in the distribution of AMP scores and was not correlated with 
subjective reports of intentional responding or endorsement of all but one (in a non-troubling 
direction) of the reported reasons for responding intentionally. Instead, paralleling the results of 
Gawronski and Ye (2015), reports of intentional responding correlated with priming effects 
along the dimension to which the participants attended: the properties of the icons. 
 Interestingly, reported extent of unintentional influence correlated with implicit 
evaluations of Francis West over control faces, even though reported intentional responding did 
not. Though not predicted, this relationship could suggest that participants have some more fine-
grained insight into their own implicit cognition (see also Hahn et al., 2014), or could be 
produced by a lay inference that their judgments were probably influenced by the appearance of 
Francis to the degree that they feel strongly about him, even without conscious memory for any 
actual such influence. 
 Among the slightly more than half of participants who reported some amount of 
intentional responding, endorsement of many of the potential reasons for doing so was quite high 
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(3 were endorsed by more than 50% of participants indicating some amount of intentional 
responding).  It is difficult to know from the present study the degree to which endorsement of 
any of these reasons might have been increased by the presence of the tallying task, which would 
limit generalization from these results to earlier work; reasons like finding it difficult to pay 
attention to the pictographs and accidentally judging the earlier stimuli almost certainly were 
increased by the presence of the tallying task (and the latter reason could even be considered 
unintentional responding). More generally, as with providing participants with the very idea of 
intentional responding and asking for them to reflect on whether that occurred, it is possible that 
providing these reasons produced some confabulation (Payne et al., 2013). 
 Whereas Studies 13-14 examined whether bimodality may be result of intentional 
responding, Study 15 found evidence that the attenuation of the bimodality through a distracting 
and taxing task does not keep new information that provides a reinterpretation of Francis West’s 
earlier actions from producing a significantly positive implicit impression of him.  
Due to the difficulty of interpreting the self-report measures of intentional and 
unintentional responding in this study, and the cognitive demands imposed by the tally task that 
may both reduce real implicit priming effects and make it less practical to put participants 
through multiple iterations of this version of the AMP, the next two studies take a different 
approach.  First, Studies 16-17 focus squarely on reducing bimodality (whether it is or is not due 
to intentional responding) rather than de-correlating the AMP priming effect from intentional 
response reports, given that the former has been the original impetus for concern and the latter is 
known to be an inherently ambiguous and probably misleading indicator of actual intentional 
responding (Gawronski & Ye, 2015; Payne et al., 2013).  Second, these next studies will attempt 
to achieve the reduction in bimodality by increasing the vigilance of participants against any 
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temptation to intentionally judge the pictographs on the basis of the primes, rather than just 
giving them a way to skip the trial if the influence would occur and encouraging them to use it 
(Studies 13-14). Third, the studies will use the paintings stimuli set made use of in the hunting 
podcast study (Study 10), which found weaker implicit impression change in a real-world 
context but distributions closer to normal. The paintings were used here because it is possible 
that although they are all similar in many ways, with their varied colors and patterns the 
paintings might carry greater inherent evaluative preferences for the participants, such that it 
would be less likely for a strong prime to “swamp” the responses to the paintings in participants 
who are attempting to perform the task properly.  Additionally, it was thought possible that 
genuine intentional responders might find the paintings more interesting or easier to rate than 
pictographs, and easier to see (with their varied, bright colors), which might coax such 
participants into following the task instructions to judge the paintings instead of the primes. 
 Given the importance of the comparison between the fire rescue (reinterpretation) and 
subway rescue (non-reinterpreting positive) information conditions presented in Study 2 for 
establishing that the propositional relationship between the new and old information matters 
greatly in determining how much revision in an initial negative implicit evaluation the new 
information will produce, Studies 16 and 17 will both include the three information conditions 
used in Study 2: control, fire rescue, and subway rescue. 
Study 16: Warning to Avoid Influence – I 
Method 
 Participants.  I aimed to recruit 750 participants from Prolific Academic, to achieve 
approximately 250 per each between-participants condition.  Out of 750, I made the following a 
priori exclusions: 1 for failing to complete all parts of the experiment, 3 for server errors, 8 for 
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failing a manipulation check, 4 for misidentifying Francis West in the photo lineup, 59 for 
pressing a single key on every trial of at least one AMP, and 27 for indicating prior participation 
in a study using the Francis West story (or a highly similar one). The last criterion was necessary 
to weed out participants who had participated in a related study on the Mturk platform. This 
resulted in a final sample size of 648 (53.7% women, Age M = 33.01 years, SD = 11.44). 
 Procedure.  Participants completed the standard Francis West procedure including the 
information conditions from Study 2 (control, fire rescue, and subway rescue). They completed 
the AMP twice, once after reading the initial information at Time 1 (when Francis was ostensibly 
negative) and once after reading the final screen of information about him (Time 2). For all 
participants, the AMPs included the original configuration of 40 trials (20 with Francis West as 
the prime and 20 with control faces as the prime), but were modified in two ways.  First, the 
painting stimuli from Study 10 were used, in two sets of 40, with painting set order manipulated 
between-participants. Second, all participants viewed an additional, final page of instructions on 
the AMP, which implored them to avoid intentionally judging the primes instead of the 
pictographs. To avoid scaring participants into going to lengths to avoid any connection between 
the primes and the pictographs, including monitoring for any unintentional prime effects or 
ensuring 50% pleasantness responses to each prime type, the page also told them that it was fine 
if they noticed that their responses occasionally matched how they would have rated the faces, 
but that they should just focus on rating the paintings. The appearance of this final page of 
information is shown in Figure 38. 
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Figure 38. The final page of instructions on the AMP in Studies 16-17. 
 
 Explicit evaluations were assessed after each AMP, with the 6-item scale used throughout 
this work. At the end of the experiment, participants completed a manipulation check asking 
them to identify Francis’ final action out of 6 choices, identified him in a photo lineup, reported 
if they had previously participated in any experiment using the same Francis West paradigm or a 
highly similar one, and provided demographic information. 
Results 
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 Implicit evaluations.  The proportion of paintings judged to be more pleasant than 
average was computed at each time within each prime type, and analyzed in a 2 (Time: Time 1, 
Time 2) x 2 (Prime Type: Francis West, Control Faces) x 3 (Information Condition: Control, Fire 
Rescue, Subway Rescue) mixed ANOVA, with the first two factors manipulated within-subjects. 
 The three-way interaction between time, prime, and final information was significant, 
F(2,645) = 6.84, p = .001, ηp2 = .021. Figure 39 shows mean implicit evaluations within each cell 
of this design. 
 Time 1 initial formation. I first examined whether Francis West was implicitly negative 
relative to control faces after the initial story portraying him as breaking into and damaging the 
homes of his neighbors. In the overall sample, there was a marginally significant effect of prime 
at Time 1, t(647) = 1.72, p = .085, Hedges’ gav = .069. A between-participants ANOVA found no 
evidence that the formation (prime) effect varied by subsequent information condition, which 
was not yet manipulated, F(2,645) = 1.48, p = .228, ηp2 = .005.  
 Time 2 revision. After participants learned the final information about Francis West 
(Time 2), there was a significant interaction between prime and information condition, F(2,645) 
= 16.16, p < .001, ηp2 = .048.  This interaction was decomposed for follow-up tests into two 
orthogonal interaction contrasts, one comparing the prime effect in the control condition to the 
prime effect in the other two combined (fire rescue and subway rescue), and the other comparing 
the prime effect in the fire rescue condition to that in the subway rescue condition. The first 
contrast was statistically significant, F(1,645) = 28.42, p < .001, ηp2 = .042, as was the second, 
F(1,645) = 4.10, p = .043, ηp2 = .006. 
 Simple-effects tests on the prime effects at Time 2 indicated that in the control condition, 
Francis West remained significantly less implicitly positive (M = .44, SD = .20) than control 
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faces (M = .50, SD = .21), t(210) = 3.70, p < .001, Hedges’ gav = .263. In the fire rescue 
condition, however, Francis West had become implicitly more positive (M = .50, SD = .21) 
relative to the control faces (M = .45, SD = .20), t(214) = 4.19, p < .001, Hedges’ gav = .268. 
Finally, in the subway rescue condition, implicit evaluations of Francis West (M = .46, SD = .20) 
and control faces (M = .45, SD = .20) did not differ, t(221) = 1.14, p = .254, Hedges’ gav = .076. 
 
 
Figure 39.  Mean proportion of paintings judged more pleasant than average in Study 16, by 
information condition, time, and prime type. Error bars are standard errors.  
 
Bimodality.  Figure 40 shows the frequency distribution at Time 1 for trials in which 
Francis West was the prime stimulus, and Figure 41 shows the frequency distributions at Time 2 
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within each information condition for trials in which Francis West was the prime stimulus, with 
no bimodality present at Time 1 or at Time 2 in any of the three conditions.  
 
 
Figure 40. Frequency distribution of the proportion of paintings judged to be more pleasant than 
average on trials in which Francis West was the prime image at Time 1 in Study 16. 
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Figure 41.  Frequency distributions of the proportion of paintings judged to be more pleasant 
than average on trials in which Francis West was the prime image in Study 16, by information 
condition. 
 
Ancillary analysis. Given the relatively weak initial formation of negative implicit 
evaluations of Francis West in this study, I conducted an ancillary analysis (similar to Study 1b) 
to examine the effects of information condition at Time 2 exclusively among those participants 
who showed negative implicit evaluations of Francis West at Time 1 (i.e., people for whom the 
proportion of paintings judged pleasant on trials in which Francis West was the prime image was 
lower than the proportion of paintings judged pleasant on trials in which a control face was the 
prime image).  Though no measure is process-pure (Conrey et al., 2005; Payne et al., 2001, 
Payne et al., 2010; Sherman et al., 2008), the idea that this procedure will select for those 
participants with genuine initial negative evaluations of Francis West is supported by two 
indications of genuine signal (vs. solely noise) in the measure: (a) the correlation between 
explicit liking and implicit preference for Francis West (the difference score of proportion of 
“pleasant” painting responses on Francis trials minus the proportion on control trials) at Time 1 
was positive and significant in the overall sample, r(646) = .177, p < .001, and within the fire 
rescue condition, r(213) = .163, p = .016, and subway rescue condition, r(220) = .225, p = .001; 
the correlation was marginal in the control condition, r(209) = .120, p = .083; and (b) similar to a 
finding in the initial line of studies (Chapter II), the correlation between Time 1 and Time 2 
implicit preference for Francis West over control faces was significant in the control condition, 
r(209) = .385, p < .001, and subway rescue condition, r(220) = .235, p < .001, but not the fire 
rescue condition, r(213) = -.007, p = .923, which is theoretically consistent with the idea that 
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only in the fire condition will reinterpretation completely sever the relationship between initial 
and final implicit evaluations of Francis. 
The ancillary analysis – with this restricted sample – corroborated the results of the main 
set of tests.  There remained a significant interaction between prime and information condition at 
Time 2, F(2,300) = 13.18, p < .001, ηp2 = .081, and both the control vs. other contrast and fire 
rescue vs. subway rescue contrasts were significant, F(1,300) = 18.20, p < .001, ηp2 = .057, and 
F(1,300) = 8.23, p = .004, ηp2 = .027, respectively.  In the control condition, Francis West was 
less implicitly positive (M = .42, SD = .22) than control faces (M = .51, SD = .22), t(103) = 3.64, 
p < .001, Hedges’ gav = .407. In the fire rescue condition, Francis West had become more 
implicitly positive (M = .50, SD = .22) than control faces (M = .43, SD = .21), t(98) = 3.26, p = 
.002, Hedges’ gav = .315. Lastly, in the subway rescue condition, Francis West (M = .45, SD = 
.19) and the control faces (M = .47, SD = .19) did not significantly differ, t(99) = 1.13, p = .260, 
Hedges’ gav = .114. 
Explicit evaluations.  Analyzing the explicit evaluation mean scores at both Time 1 and 
Time 2 across information conditions revealed a significant interaction between time and 
information condition, F(2,645) = 949.54, p < .001, ηp2 = .746, with results that parallel those of 
Study 2. Figure 42 displays the mean explicit evaluations of Francis West in each condition. 
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Figure 42. Mean explicit evaluations of Francis West in Study 16, by time and information 
condition. Error bars are standard errors. 
 
Discussion 
 The results of Study 16 found that the critical difference between the fire rescue and 
subway rescue information conditions, first established in Study 2, replicated under conditions 
that eliminated the bimodal distributions in the AMP data.  The argument that reinterpretation is 
a mechanism through which the revision of implicit evaluations can occur was bolstered by 
studies in which self-reported use of reinterpretation mediated change (Studies 4, 5, and 10), but 
the experimental difference between the fire rescue and subway rescue information conditions is 
arguably the most straightforward and clearest evidence for the important role played by the 
connection between the new information and the old.  Though both actions were rated as 
equivalently positive out of the context of the rest of the story, only the heroic act that recasts the 
earlier story in a negative light produced a reversal in implicit evaluations in those initial studies. 
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The replication of the difference in revision between the fire rescue and subway rescue 
conditions is thus a critical step in demonstrating that regardless of the ultimate meaning of the 
bimodal pattern in the initial AMP data, the role of reinterpretation in reversing implicit 
evaluations is not dependent on the presence of that distribution (which was also suggested by 
the re-analyses of earlier studies showing that the revision effect replicated even when excluding 
the uniform responders). 
 The outcome of this study demonstrates that the combination of adjustments to the AMP, 
including the additional page of warning instructions and the use of painting stimuli instead of 
pictographs, effectively eliminated bimodality without imposing a taxing and distracting task on 
participants (Study 15). It is unknown at present whether one of these elements would be 
sufficient to achieve the elimination of bimodality or whether both are required; nonetheless, the 
study offers a possible route through which future studies using the AMP can avoid bimodal 
distributions in the data, if desired. 
 One difference of potential interest between the present results and earlier studies that 
included the subway rescue condition is that here, final implicit evaluations toward Francis in the 
subway rescue condition were indistinguishable from control faces, whereas in earlier studies 
Francis West remained significantly negative relative to control faces after participants learned 
this control heroic information.  Though the meaning of this difference is open to interpretation, 
it suggests that the negativity that remained toward Francis in this condition in earlier work may 
have been somewhat tenuous, not able to survive the changes made to the AMP in Study 16. 
Nonetheless, the most critical finding was that only in the fire rescue information condition were 
final implicit evaluations of Francis West significantly positive.  
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 The results were not without limitations, however.  The initial formation of negative 
implicit evaluations of Francis West was surprisingly weak, especially given that initial 
formation has typically been robust. Indeed, the elimination of bimodality seems to have reduced 
the size of the priming effects across the board, but this reduction was most pronounced at Time 
1. The interpretation of this difference from earlier studies is ambiguous, because although it 
would be expected if “true” intentional responders (with their inflated effect sizes) are now less 
frequent, it also could occur if participants who are faithfully attempting to follow directions and 
would normally have extreme scores were prompted by the warning instruction to engage in 
some monitoring of their responses to avoid strong correlations between the primes and their 
responses (despite our statement that unintentional correlation is perfectly acceptable).  The use 
of the paintings as target stimuli could also have reduced priming effects to the extent that 
participants might have stronger evaluative preferences among them.  
 Fortunately, the ancillary analysis, paralleling the procedure employed in Study 1b with 
the similarly weaker initial formation effects found on the IAT, found that revision occurred in 
the fire rescue condition even among only those participants who did show initially negative 
implicit evaluations of Francis West at Time 1, and also found that the difference between the 
fire rescue and subway rescue conditions remained.  Analyses including only participants who 
show initial formation of a response are arguably even more appropriate than use of the whole 
sample in work focused on examining change, as formation is a necessary antecedent to change 
and analyses of whole samples will include participants who failed to produce that initial 
response. Excluding participants who do not show initial formation is for this reason common in 
other work meant to examine change, such as studies of memory reconsolidation (e.g., Schiller, 
Kanen, LeDoux, Monfils, & Phelps, 2013; Steinfurth et al., 2014).  
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 Even with the ancillary analysis, however, it would be ideal to demonstrate that stronger 
initial formation, detectable in the full sample, can still occur and be undone through 
reinterpretation with the modified AMP that eliminates bimodality.  The aim of Study 17 is to 
replicate the results of Study 16 with stronger initial formation. 
Study 17: Warning to Avoid Influence - II 
Method 
 Participants.  As with Study 16, I aimed to recruit 250 participants per each between-
participants condition (750 in total) from Prolific Academic.  The following exclusions were 
determined a priori: 2 for not finishing the study, 1 for a server timeout, 32 for indicating 
participation in a prior related study, 10 for failing a manipulation check, 5 for misidentifying 
Francis West in a photo lineup, and 81 for using a single key on every trial of at least one AMP.  
This brought the final sample to 619 participants for analysis (59.3% women, Age M = 31.37 
years, SD = 10.82). 
 Procedure.  The participants completed a procedure identical to Study 16, with one 
modification: For all participants, an additional detail was added to the initial story about Francis 
West at the very beginning, noting that although Francis’s town is 99% white, the Griffins and 
Wards had just moved in, and were the first interracial couples in town. This is the same 
additional detail that had been used in Study 1b, and was meant to lead participants to infer that 
the actions undertaken by Francis in breaking into the homes of those neighbors might have been 
motivated by racial hatred, thereby increasing initial negativity felt toward Francis. The only 
other alteration to the story (as in Study 1b) was to change “years worth of careful cultivation” 
(in reference to a garden maintained by Francis’s neighbor) to “countless hours of careful 
cultivation” for consistency with the claim that the neighbors had moved to town only recently. 
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 As in Study 16, participants were assigned to one of the control, fire rescue, or subway 
rescue information conditions, and completed all of the same measures in an identical fashion to 
the protocol from that study. 
Results 
 Implicit evaluations.  Proportions of pleasant responses were computed following the 
procedure for Study 16, and analyzed within a 2 (Time: Time 1, Time 2) x 2 (Prime Type: 
Francis West, Control Faces) x 3 (Information Condition: Control, Fire Rescue, Subway Rescue) 
mixed ANOVA, with the first two factors manipulated within-participants.  As in Study 16, the 
three-way interaction between time, prime, and information condition was significant, F(2,616) 
= 6.59, p = .001, ηp2 = .021.   
 Time 1 initial formation.  At Time 1, unlike in the prior study, there was evidence of 
significant formation of negative implicit evaluations of Francis West relative to control faces, 
t(618) = 3.74, p < .001, Hedges’ gav = .160. An ANOVA showed that these formation prime 
effects did not significantly differ between (not-yet-assigned) information conditions, F(2,616) = 
.29, p = .750, ηp2 = .001.  
 Time 2 revision.  A significant interaction between prime and information condition 
emerged on the Time 2 AMP scores gauging implicit evaluations after participants learned the 
final information about Francis West (specific to their information condition), F(2,616) = 11.68, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .037. As with Study 16, I decomposed the Time 2 effect into orthogonal contrasts 
testing for differences in the prime effect in the control condition vs. the other two, and between 
the fire rescue and subway rescue conditions. The first contrast was significant, F(1,616) = 
17.71, p < .001, ηp2 = .028, as was the second, F(1,616) = 5.13, p = .024, ηp2 = .008. Figure 43 
displays the mean implicit evaluations within each condition.  
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Figure 43. Mean proportion of paintings judged as more pleasant than average in Study 17, by 
information condition, time, and prime type. Error bars are standard errors. 
 
 Bimodality. Figure 44 shows the frequency distributions of the Francis West trials at 
Time 1, and Figure 45 shows the frequency distributions of the Francis West trials within each 
information condition at Time 2.  As was the case in Study 16, the strongly bimodal pattern 
observed in earlier work with the unmodified AMP was again eliminated here.  
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Figure 44. Frequency distribution of the proportion of paintings judged to be more pleasant than 
average on trials in which Francis West was the prime image at Time 1 in Study 17. 
 
 
Figure 45.  Frequency distributions of the proportion of paintings judged to be more pleasant 
than average on trials in which Francis West was the prime image in Study 17, by information 
condition. 
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 Explicit evaluations. The pattern of explicit evaluations mirrored that found in Study 16, 
with a significant interaction between time and information condition on explicit index scores, 
F(2,616) = 957.15, p < .001, ηp2 = .757. Explicit evaluations of Francis West were very low (on a 
scale from 1 – 7, with higher scores indicating more positive evaluations) at Time 1 (M = 1.28, 
SD = .76), remained so at Time 2 in the control condition (M = 1.14, SD = .42), and had 
increased in the subway rescue (M = 2.35, SD = 1.37) and fire rescue conditions (M = 5.96, SD = 
1.31). The increases from Time 1 to Time 2 in the fire rescue and subway rescue conditions, the 
slight decrease over time in the control condition, and the differences among the three conditions 
at Time 2 were all significant, all ts > 3.4, all ps <= .001. 
Discussion 
 Revision in implicit impressions of Francis West was once again stronger in the fire 
rescue (reinterpretation) condition than in the subway rescue (control positive) condition, such 
that evaluations reversed in the former, becoming significantly positive, while only shifting to 
neutrality in the latter.  Importantly, this difference emerged here in the context of stronger initial 
formation of a negative initial implicit impression than what was observed in Study 16, with the 
overall sample now evidencing initial formation.   
General Discussion 
 The additional analyses and experiments presented in Chapter IV take a variety of 
approaches to assessing the features of automaticity that are exhibited by the revised impressions 
first studied in Chapters II-III.  Of primary focus has been the question of whether responses on 
the AMP and its variants – the main measure used in this work for its attractive metrics (see 
Payne & Lundberg, 2014, for a review) and lack of reliance on response time and noise-inducing 
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block orders – truly reflect an unintentional process of evaluating the primes, or instead reflect 
intentional rating of the primes.  This is an important issue given that unintentionality is often 
regarded as the most central unifying feature of responses on the family of tasks regarded as 
“implicit measures” in social cognition (Ferguson, 2007; Ferguson & Fukukura, 2012; Payne et 
al., 2008; see also discussions in De Houwer et al., 2009; De Houwer & Moors, 2012).  For this 
reason, the implicitness of the AMP has been discussed before (Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2012), with 
the bulk of the evidence showing that post-hoc reports of intentional responding on the part of 
participants with the strongest effect sizes is probably due to confabulation (Payne et al., 2013) 
and that AMP effects persist even when the correlation with self-reported intentional responding 
is eliminated (Gawronski & Ye, 2015; see also Gawronski, Cunningham, LeBel, & Deutsch, 
2010). However, the previously unidentified pattern of bimodal proportions of pleasant 
responses on the AMP, which was present in most of the studies in this package, seemed to 
warrant a reexamination of this issue, because such a pattern could be produced by dual 
processes (Freeman & Dale, 2012). A mixed set of some participants who were intentionally 
judging the primes and some who were following the task instructions to rate the pictographs 
constituted one such plausible (though not exclusive) cause of the pattern. 
 The analysis and studies in this chapter largely support the claims that 1) the bimodal 
pattern is not (at least entirely) due to intentional rating of the primes and 2) the critical priming 
effects from earlier studies are not dependent on the presence of the anomalous pattern.  The 
initial analyses show that participants falling into the bimodal tails of the distributions still show 
evidence of being impacted by the qualities of the pictographs themselves and do not notably 
differ from other participants in their responses to the various explicit measures included across 
Studies 1a-9.  The bimodal data patterns were also successfully reproduced by the multinomial 
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modeling approach first used in Study 8, and showed that these trends could be produced by 
bimodality in the pattern of underlying evaluative responses to the primes without marked 
bimodality in the likelihood of misattribution, and also suggested that a correlation between the 
evaluation of the primes and likelihood of misattribution could exacerbate bimodality in the final 
responses – an unsurprising relationship even if no participants are intentionally judging the 
primes. It is important to note, however, that the bimodal pattern in the A parameter predicted by 
this model is currently without clear explanation, especially if it were to be found to occur across 
different paradigms in the present work (e.g. Francis West, Jonathan and Elizabeth). Finally, the 
elimination of participants in the extremes of the distributions, though drastic, does not result in 
the loss of the crucial difference in revision between the fire rescue and subway rescue 
conditions.  This is a key comparison for the argument that the relationship between new and old 
information, and not just the valence and extremity of the new information, is important in 
driving revision. 
 The studies in the chapter bolstered the argument by showing that 1) priming effects (and 
bimodality) persist even when participants are given an option to skip any trial in which they felt 
that the prime might impact their responses (Studies 13-14), and were encouraged to use that 
option (Payne et al., 2013); 2) the priming effect in the fire rescue condition replicated under 
conditions of distraction and considerable cognitive load (Study 15); and 3) priming effects 
replicated when the bimodality was eliminated by enhanced warning instructions and the use of 
new stimuli (Studies 16-17). These studies collectively support the conclusion that the AMP 
priming effects used throughout Chapters II-III to argue for the role of reinterpretation in driving 
implicit revision do not depend on the bimodal pattern; this fits with the conclusion of earlier 
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researchers that the evidence continues to support the implicit status of the AMP (Gawronski & 
Ye, 2015; Payne et al., 2013).  
 Is it possible that there is still intentional responding on the AMP? The additional 
analyses and studies in this chapter cannot rule it out, though use of implicit measures has never 
rested on the assumption that all participants complete them properly. The IAT can be faked if 
participants know of or discover the best strategy for influencing their scores (e.g., to reduce 
implicit bias, slow down on the compatible block; Fiedler & Bluemke, 2005), as can the 
evaluative priming task (Teige-Mocigemba & Klauer, 2013; see also Teige-Mocigemba & 
Klauer, 2008; cf. Degner, 2009).  But as Teige-Mocigemba and Klauer (2013) noted in their 
work on the controllability of evaluative priming, “the present findings will in all likelihood not 
pose a threat to the validity of evaluative-priming measures in most research situations in which 
participants are not motivated to fake, not given specific directions on how to do so, and/or in 
which the measurement purpose is often obscured on purpose.” (p. 654) The key question is 
whether a non-trivial portion of participants deviate from the task instructions under typical 
usage of the task. The observation of bimodality certainly raised the possibility that this was so, 
but most of the subsequent studies and analyses suggested that despite the unusual pattern, the 
pattern is possibly not attributable to intentional responding.  As Gawronski and Ye (2015) also 
noted with regard to correlations between self-reported intentionality and priming effects on the 
AMP, regardless of the ultimate interpretation of that finding, it is straightforward to simply 
avoid it by adopting changes to the task.  An approximation of the strategy employed by 
Gawronski and Ye (2015) for eliminating a correlation between reported intentional responding 
and the priming effect on the AMP was successful, though not feasible to widely implement 
given its taxing nature (Study 15), but the modifications made in Studies 16-17 – the use of 
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enhanced warnings and the paintings stimuli – appear to offer a straightforward route for 
eliminating the bimodal distributions produced by the task.   
In general, the issues with one implicit measure can also be compensated for through use 
of other measures that have their own advantages and drawbacks (convergent validity).  In future 
work, it will be advisable to use a wider range of implicit measures as another source of evidence 
for the conditions under which implicit updating will vs. will not emerge, especially if such 
measures sometimes disagree (Study 12; Deutsch & Gawronski, 2009; Deutsch, Kordts-
Freudinger, Gawronski, & Strack, 2009). Importantly, the basic revision effect was reproduced 
in Chapter II with an IAT (Study 1b), though further replications with other measures would be 
desirable.  The new studies in this chapter have focused on further tests of the AMP both because 
doing so helps to validate the results of the majority of the earlier studies in this package that 
made use of that task, and because the desirable psychometric properties of the AMP (Bar-Anan 
& Nosek, 2014; Payne et al., 2005; Payne & Lundberg, 2014) make it attractive for continued 
use (which also motivated its use in the first place) if a way to correct for bimodal distributions 
could be found (the goal of Studies 15-17).  This work on implicit impressions of novel targets 
(see also Cone & Ferguson, 2015) has made relatively less use of the IAT and related tasks 
because its strong block order effect is particularly problematic for work with novel targets. With 
a relatively small amounts of information yet learned about a novel target, the assigned pairing of 
the target with either the positive or negative key for the entire first half of the task could result 
in evaluative conditioning as much as evaluative measurement (De Houwer, Thomas, & 
Baeyens, 2001; Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010), as that practiced 
pairing constitutes a significant portion of the participant’s entire history of experience with that 
target. Another prominent alternative is the evaluative priming task (EPT; Fazio et al., 1986; 
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Fazio et al., 1995; see Herring et al., 2013, for a review), in which participants categorize 
unambiguously positive and negative stimuli that are preceded by experimental primes, with 
effects computed as temporal response facilitation scores for each prime type to positive vs. 
negative targets. Though this is an oft-used implicit measure (Cameron et al., 2010; Herring et 
al., 2013) and has attractive features, like allowing for an examination of bivalent priming (Zayas 
& Shoda, 2015), my colleagues and I have preferred the AMP due to the often relatively low 
reliability of the EPT (Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2014; Fazio & Olson, 2003), which we previously 
found to be an issue for detecting even implicit impression formation effects with the online 
samples that we have often used.  Replication of some of the effects in the present work in the 
more controlled lab environment using an EPT is, however, an important additional direction for 
research. 
 It must not be overlooked that the studies in Chapter IV also provide new evidence on 
other automaticity features of the revised implicit evaluations, including whether participants are 
aware of implicit misattribution on a trial-by-trial basis (Studies 13-14) and the efficiency with 
which implicit evaluations can be produced under load (Study 15). That participants only 
infrequently used a readily-available option to skip trials on the AMP (Study 13) and PMP 
(Study 14), despite showing strong priming effects on those studies, suggests that participants do 
not generally believe that their responses to the pictographs are the product of the primes until 
they make post-hoc assessments of their overall task performance after the fact (Payne et al., 
2013). Finally, whereas Study 3 (in Chapter II) revealed that processing the propositional 
meaning of new, reinterpreting information while under load curtails revision, Study 15 offered 
evidence that revised implicit evaluations continued to be evoked while under cognitive load, 
albeit with a reduced effect size.  This is consistent with the findings of prior studies that 
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imposed distracting tasks on the AMP and continued to produce priming effects (Gawronski et 
al., 2010; Gawronski & Ye, 2015). Priming may been more attenuated in the present studies than 
in other work given that the clearly valenced nature of the smile/frown icons could add noise to 
the task, and the need to attend to the peripheries of the prime stimulus in order to identify the 
icons could have drawn attention away from the primes to a degree that diminished the implicit 
responses that they produced. 
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Chapter V. General Discussion 
 Fiction is rife with tales of characters who seem initially to be kind, friendly, and good, 
only to be revealed through a clearer understanding of events to be quite the opposite – and vice 
versa.  Be it through the discovery of ulterior motives (e.g., Palpatine from Star Wars), the 
unearthing of critical new information (e.g., Sirius Black from Harry Potter), or the overturning 
of misunderstandings (e.g., Boo Radley from To Kill a Mockingbird), many characters in 
literature, film, and television have ultimately shown true colors opposite from initial 
expectations.  Such updates in how characters should be understood often come at the height of 
the climax, or at the center of critical plot points, and add greater depth of meaning to the work.   
 If the prevalence of such twists and turns in fiction attests to a human appetite for 
exercising and challenging our powers of social inference, the case of Richard Jewell at the 1996 
Summer Olympics testifies to the dark side of our drive to understand others, showing how 
quickly a construal can turn when a compelling (even if erroneous) new interpretation of events 
comes to light.  Such errors notwithstanding, however, the general point that social perceivers 
seem quite capable of rapidly updating their impressions of other people when seemingly clear, 
diagnostic, and compelling information is revealed fits with the view of a predictive mind 
adapted to survive in a complex social world.   
 The studies in this package provide evidence that even implicit responses to other people 
can be updated to reflect relevant new information, thereby diverging from theories and findings 
that argue that although it is easy to quickly set aside an erroneous explicit (intentional) first 
impression, it is much harder and slower to set aside an implicit (unintentional) one (Gawronski 
et al., 2008; Gregg et al., 2006; McConnell et al., 2008; Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Rydell et al., 
2007; Wilson et al., 2000).  Chapter II provided a series of studies to show that when a strong 
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and clear reinterpretation of ostensibly negative behavior is revealed (Francis West broke into his 
neighbors’ homes, but for the purpose of saving children from a fire), implicit evaluations of the 
character update from negative to positive. The studies examined reinterpretation as the 
mechanism of change through manipulation of the type of information presented, and through 
self-report measures of reinterpretation, and established the resource-dependence and durability 
of updating.  Chapter III tested broader conditions of implicit updating by both examining a 
potentially broader family of revision strategies that include elements of negating an earlier 
understanding of events and replacing it with new information, and testing the effects of 
reinterpretation in contexts involving a complex real-world issue, intergroup implicit bias, and 
gender stereotyping.  These studies found diverse evidence for the possibility of implicit 
updating in numerous domains.  Finally, the re-analyses and new studies in Chapter IV tested the 
implicitness and other operating conditions of the updated impressions examined in the present 
work, finding evidence in support of the implicitness and robustness of the results.   
Implicit vs. Explicit Updating 
 The studies in this package illustrate that it is possible for initial implicit impressions to 
be updated quickly, often paralleling the updating of explicit impressions, and through a process 
of propositional reasoning about the validity of different interpretations of information that has 
often been thought to generally impact only explicit responses (McConnell & Rydell, 2014; 
McConnell et al., 2008; Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). This poses 
difficulties for theoretical treatments of implicit and explicit cognition that rely on dissociated 
processes or systems, particularly those that assume that propositional processes can influence 
only explicit responses.  This is not to say, however, that implicit impressions will always update 
in parallel with explicit impressions, a point first made in the General Discussion of Chapter II 
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that is worth expanding on here.  Studies 11 and 12 in Chapter III found some persistent 
evidence of implicit race bias and implicit gender stereotyping (on the IAT), respectively, and 
many lines of work have found dissociations between implicit and explicit responses (e.g., 
Gawronski & LeBel, 2008; Gawronski & Strack, 2004; Gregg et al., 2006; Ranganath & Nosek, 
2008; Ratliff & Nosek, 2011; Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Rydell et al., 2006, 2007; see also 
Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 2011; Nosek, 2007). Though some differences between 
measures are possibly due to the structural features of the tasks rather than due to baked-in 
differences between implicit and explicit cognition, implicit and explicit measures have still 
differed even when made structurally similar (Payne et al., 2008; replicated by Open Science 
Collaboration, 2015). Although dual-process theories have suggested that such differences are 
due to the selective influence of motivation, propositional knowledge, and reasoning on explicit 
cognition, the present results and many other lines of work show how such factors can influence 
implicit cognition as well (De Houwer, 2014; Ferguson & Wojnowicz, 2011).  To what can 
dissociations between implicit and explicit impressions then be attributed? 
 A possible answer is provided by views of implicit and explicit evaluations as emerging 
from one common, iterative, dynamical process of constructing a response on-line as constraint 
satisfaction operates continuously over time across diverse networks in the brain (Cunningham, 
Zelazo, Packer, & Van Bavel, 2007; Ehret, Monroe, & Read, 2015; Ferguson & Wojnowicz, 
2011; Monroe & Read, 2008; Van Bavel, Xiao, & Cunningham, 2012; Wojnowicz, Ferguson, 
Dale, & Spivey, 2009).  This perspective suggests that both intentional and unintentional 
(explicit and implicit) responses are generated in a fundamentally similar way, in that both types 
of responses are constructed in time and can be influenced by inputs from external and internal 
context, goals, emotions, propositional knowledge, and memory representations.  Differences in 
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the inputs into this constructive process that tend to differ between intentional and unintentional 
responses – the defining difference between implicit and explicit responses – would then be the 
source of dissociations. 
 How might inputs into the construction of a response differ between implicit and explicit 
responses? The degree to which participants believe in the moment that they are intentionally 
providing their opinion of a stimulus (vs. doing something else, like judging a different stimulus, 
or categorizing it) may not delineate inherently different types of cognitive processes.  After all, 
research suggests that subjective intentionality is an inference on the part of an actor that an 
action was produced by a particular goal (Aarts, Custers, & Marien, 2009; Aarts & van den Bos, 
2011; Wegner, 2003; Wegner, Sparrow, & Winerman, 2004; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999; see also 
De Houwer & Moors, 2012; Moors & De Houwer, 2006), and because introspective insight into 
mental processes is imperfect (Morsella, 2005; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wilson, 2002), goals 
can influence cognition even without awareness (e.g., Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, 
& Trotschel, 2001; Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; Custers & Aarts, 2010; Ferguson, 2008; Kleiman 
& Hassin, 2013; Marien et al., 2012). Instead, when a participant has a subjective intention to 
evaluate a stimulus, this intention may bring to bear a different set of inputs into the construction 
of an evaluation than would otherwise arise, not because such inputs can’t affect unintentional 
responses, but rather because the context of intentionally judging a stimulus tends to activate 
different goals, knowledge, and representations that have come to be associated with that 
context. In particular, the context of giving an intentional judgment of a stimulus may tend to 
activate considerations related to social interaction and self-presentation – goals that can 
modulate implicit cognition when sufficiently active, even when externally imposed (e.g., 
Castelli & Tomelleri, 2008; Mendoza, Gollwitzer, & Amodio, 2010; Sinclair, Lowery, Hardin, & 
 305 
Colangelo, 2005; Stewart & Payne, 2008; see Ferguson & Wojnowicz, 2011), especially if 
strong internal motivations are activated (Legault, Gutsell, & Inzlicht, 2011).  However, absent 
particularly strong activation, social goals may tend to be less effective on a trial-by-trial basis 
during an implicit measure when the task context switches from giving an intentional response to 
implementing the proximal task instructions.  Even if participants are generally aware of the 
“true” purpose of an implicit measure, the rapid task-switching in working memory that is 
necessary to follow the focal task (such as categorizing stimuli on the IAT; e.g., Klauer, Schmitz, 
Teige-Mocigemba, & Voss, 2010; see also Kiesel, Kunde, & Hoffmann, 2007; Monsell, 2003) 
might suggest that interpersonal goals that are most strongly active during intentional responding 
may often not dominate in shaping an unintentional response on a trial-by-trial basis to the same 
degree.  Also in support of this account, it is possible for explicit responses to align with implicit 
responses when the usual goals related to intentional expression, like self-presentation, are 
reduced by asking participants to rely more on intuitions (e.g., Loersch, McCaslin, & Petty, 
2011). 
 Under the framework above, explicit responses may change more quickly than implicit 
responses when new information is learned in a manner that associates it primarily with a goal to 
report that information intentionally. For instance, when minimal counter-stereotypical 
information is learned about Jonathan and Elizabeth (Studies 12 and 14; Cao & Banaji, 2016), 
participants clearly encode the information – after all, they are able to report it later. Why then is 
this individuating information not dominant on the IAT?  One possibility is that participants 
learn it as something to report later, and therefore learn it most strongly under an “expression” 
goal rather than more generally. After all, they know it to be information they need for this 
experiment alone, rather than after they complete the study.  The frequent task-set switching that 
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occurs during the IAT (Klauer et al., 2010) may make it particularly unlikely that this 
expression-context-dependent knowledge will be brought to bear on IAT responses.  Some of the 
moderators of implicit revision discussed in the preceding chapters, like immersion, realism, 
extremity, motivation, and convincingness of new information may produce fast implicit revision 
by discouraging the encoding of the new information in a way contextualized to facilitate 
reporting, and instead encouraging more general learning, a direction that future research might 
explore.  Indeed, Brannon and Gawronski (2017) recently showed in a replication and extension 
of the Francis West work (and the work presented by Cone & Ferguson, 2015) that the updated 
implicit impressions were not restricted to the context in which the new information was learned, 
in contrast to prior work showing that more moderately valenced new information often 
produces context-specific implicit responses (Gawronski et al., 2010; Rydell & Gawronski, 
2009; see Gawronski & Cesario, 2013).  
Revision in the World 
 It is possible, of course, that new information might be seen as highly relevant, generally 
important, and believable, and yet still fail to override a person’s earlier implicit responses even 
when he or she sees it as more widely applicable than “just” for reporting purposes. The 
experience of being disgusted with one’s own implicit group-based biases, and expressing a wish 
to change them, has been frequently observed (Banaji & Greenwald, 2013), and recent findings 
have reiterated that implicit impressions of known groups are difficult to durably revise (Lai et 
al., 2016; see also Forscher et al., 2017; Bargh, 1999). In such cases, people certainly link 
egalitarian information with goals of intentional expression, in that they definitely report 
egalitarian ideals when asked for their views, but they might also wish to integrate their 
egalitarian beliefs into their implicit cognition with less success (though see Moskowitz, 
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Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999; Moskowitz & Ignarri, 2009; Moskowitz & Li, 2011; 
Moskowitz, Salomon, & Taylor, 2000). Especially with groups about which a person has learned 
over the course of a lifetime, it may be particularly difficult to isolate, identify, and activate all 
relevant older representations that might become active and drive implicit responses in order to 
update them in light of the new information, especially early in the construction of a response 
before egalitarian goals come online to constrain the produced evaluation.  
 There are a number of reasons why new information may not fully integrate with all 
relevant memories (of highly familiar and well-learned groups) that could be activated on an 
implicit measure when unconstrained by intentional response goals. One, which has already been 
extensively discussed in Chapter III, is that new information is more likely to be incorporated 
into or override an earlier memory if those earlier memories are retrieved first (Hardt et al., 2010; 
Hupbach, 2011; Lee et al., in press), but tends to be encoded as a separate trace otherwise, 
allowing for either the initial or new response to be retrieved in the future depending on context 
(Gawronski & Cesario, 2013; Bouton, 1994). In the case of groups, context can lead to the 
activation of different group subtypes that are associated with different implicit impressions 
(e.g., Maddux, Barden, Brewer, & Petty, 2005). To the extent that the relevant memories 
underlying an implicit response are less likely to be retrieved over time due to differences in 
context, forgetting, or the simple introspective difficulty of identifying the true reasons behind 
our thoughts (Wilson et al., 1989), such updating may be more difficult (Gershman et al., 2017). 
Yet, theoretical discussion of successful reconsolidation in the context of clinical treatment may 
offer productive future directions for work on implicit impression change to explore (Lane et al., 
2015).  
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A recent intervention designed to durably reduce explicit transphobia (on relatively well-
disguised questionnaires administered over multiple months) by first inducing participants to 
generate introspective reasons for their discomfort with transgender people before presenting 
them with new perspectives on experiencing the world as transgender showed strong evidence of 
revised explicit impressions (Broockman & Kalla, 2016).  Their procedure seemed to draw on 
many elements of the techniques highlighted by Lane and colleagues (2015) as uniting 
successful yet diverse clinical traditions that may all draw on reconsolidation update 
mechanisms. These techniques have notable similarities to the negate-plus-affirm/subtract-plus-
add approach of reinterpretation, and so it remains possible that efforts to revise even implicit 
impressions of entire groups that make use of techniques along these lines could be effective. For 
example, future work could ask participants to introspect on their intuitive, spontaneous feelings 
toward Muslims, the elderly, or Black people, and to try to identify thoughts that come to mind 
that might contribute to those reactions. Along the lines of Broockman and Kalla (2016), 
potential reasons could even be presented to participants to further aid in memory retrieval (such 
as stereotypes, prominent events, and beliefs of national figures to which they may have been 
exposed). Then, ways to reframe those ideas from the perspective of the stigmatized group could 
be presented. A series of studies could aim to isolate exactly which ingredients in the kitchen-
sink strategy employed by Broockman and Kalla (2016) might generalize to successful implicit 
impression change, making use as well of insights from basic research on reconsolidation, such 
as the importance of expectancy violation during retrieval (Sevenster et al., 2012, 2013, 2014).  
 Of course, updating with known groups presents more challenges than simply retrieving 
the relevant memories to revise; people often learn about individual members of groups rather 
than the groups as a whole, and this distinction allows for impressions of the overall groups to be 
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“protected” by individuation and subtyping (e.g., Kunda & Oleson, 1995, 1997), especially if the 
perceiver is motivated to maintain the first impression.  Nonetheless, as the study on big-game 
hunting (Study 10) suggests, to the degree that a person does find new information about a group 
persuasive and important, implicit impressions of well-known groups can change, even in 
complicated applied settings in which the new information is not as clean and clear-cut as in the 
Francis West paradigm.  I thus remain optimistic that in future work examining applications of 
the findings described here, routes for the updating of implicit impressions of known groups will 
be identified and prove fruitful, especially with the leads provided by the studies found in 
Chapter III and recent advances in memory updating.  
Conclusion 
 It is possible for implicit first impressions to be updated through reinterpretation, 
bringing even our spontaneous responses to other people into harmony with what we learn to be 
true.  Though there is still much work to be done to understand the full scope, implications, and 
limitations of the routes to revision examined here, the endeavor ultimately promises to paint a 
more complete picture of how the mind navigates the complex, ever-changing social world.  
Instead of being fundamentally incapable of fully aligning with important new truths, we are at 
times able to adapt to those truths at both an explicit and implicit level.      
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Appendix: Immersive Materials Condition of Study 12 
Instructions Page 
On the following pages, we will ask you to read statements describing fictional events, and 
would like you to imagine that these events are actually occurring, and happening to YOU.  
 
It is very important that you really try to immerse yourself in the situation being described. 
Please read the information carefully, as you will be asked questions on it later. 
 
Materials (1 paragraph per screen) 
Imagine you are driving home one day from a long day of work, and you get a searing pain in 
your side.  The pain is so bad that you have to immediately pull over.  It feels like someone has 
just stabbed you in your abdomen, and you double over while holding your side.  
 
You start to breath heavily, and grasp for your phone.  In a panic, you quickly call your best 
friend, who advises you to call an ambulance right away.  The pain is wave-like, and sometimes 
dull and deep, and sometimes intense and unbearable. 
 
You agree to call the ambulance, which arrives in about 6 minutes.  The medics carefully put you 
into the ambulance, and race to the hospital with the sirens blaring.  
 
While in the ambulance, they take your vitals.  You have a high fever, and your blood pressure is 
increasing.  You are sweating and dizzy, and are very afraid.  They rule out any problem with 
your appendix, and call the staff at the hospital to advise them that they are bringing you in. 
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Once you get to the hospital, you meet your nurse, [Jonathan/Elizabeth], and lead 
doctor, [Elizabeth/Jonathan]. [Images of Jonathan and Elizabeth are first displayed on this page.] 
 
They read the chart from the ambulance medics, and rush you into an exam room to take further 
tests.  [Jonathan/Elizabeth], the nurse, is taking your vitals again, and [Elizabeth/Jonathan], the 
doctor, is deciding which course to follow.  You will need to ask them questions and so you 
should take a minute to remember their face and name carefully and their role in diagnosing your 
condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
